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“Active Enchantments”: Form, Nature, and Politics in American Literature 
Vesna Kuiken 
 
Situated at the crossroads of literary studies, ecocriticism and political theory, Active 
Enchantments explores a strain of thought within American literature that understands life in all 
of its forms to be generated not by self-determined identities, but by interconnectedness and 
self-abandonment. I argue that this interest led American writers across the nineteenth century 
to develop theories of subjectivity and of politics that not only emphasize the entanglement of 
the self with its environment, but also view this relationship as structured by self-overcoming. 
Thus, when Emerson calls such interconnectedness “active enchantment,” he means to signal 
life’s inherent ability to constantly surpass itself, to never fully be identical with itself. My 
dissertation brings to the fore the political and ecological stakes of this paradox: if our selves 
and communities are molded by self-abandonment, then the standard scholarly account of how 
nineteenth-century American literature conceptualized politics must be revised. Far from 
understanding community as an organic production, founded on a teleological and harmonizing 
principle, the writers I study reconceive it around a sense of a commonality irreducible to fixed 
identity. The politics emerging out of such redefinition disposes with the primacy of individual 
or human agency, and becomes ecological in that it renders inoperative the difference between 
the social and the natural, the human and the non-human, ourselves and what comprises us. 
It is the ecological dimension of what seems like a properly political question that brings 
together writers as diverse as Emerson and Sarah Orne Jewett, Margaret Fuller and Henry and 
William James. I argue, for example, that in Jewett’s The Country of the Pointed Firs, racial 
minorities emerge from geological strata as a kind of natural archive that complicates the 
 
nation’s understanding of its communal origin. When she sets her romances on Native 
American shell-mounds in Maine, or makes the health of a New England community depend on 
colonial pharmacopoeia and herbalist healing practices of the West Indies, Jewett excavates 
from history its silent associations and attunes us not only to the violent foundation of every 
communal identity, but to this identity’s entanglement in a number of unacknowledged 
relations. Her work thus ultimately challenges the procedures of democratic inclusiveness that, 
however non-violent, are nevertheless always organized around a particular notion of identity. 
The question of the self’s constitutive interconnectedness with the world is as central to 
Margaret Fuller’s work. Active Enchantments documents how Fuller’s harrowing migraines 
enabled her to generate a peculiar conception of the “earthly mind,” according to which the 
mind is material and decomposable, rather than spiritual, incorruptible or ideal. This notion 
eventually led her to devise a theory of the self that absolves persons from self-possession and 
challenges the distinctiveness of personal identity. My concluding chapter argues that Henry 
James’s transnational aesthetics was progressively politicized in the 1880s, and that what 
scholarship celebrates as the peak of his novelistic method develops, in fact, out of a network of 
surprising and heretofore unexplored influences – William James’s concurrent theories of 
corporeal emotion, Mikhail Bakunin’s anarchism, and Henry James’s friendship with Ivan 
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Active Enchantments  
 
Emerson’s early book Nature, a text often read as the mind’s idealist triumph over nature’s dead 
matter, contains two remarkable descriptions of an enchanted mind. There is, first, the famous 
eye-ball passage in Chapter I: “I am glad to the point of fear. … Standing on the bare ground,– 
my head bathed by the blithe air and uplifted into infinite space, – all mean egotism vanishes. I 
become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being 
circulate through me; I am part or parcel of God.”
1
 The second is a similar image in Chapter III: 
I see the spectacle of morning from the hill top over against my house, from day-break 
to sun-rise, with emotions which an angel might share. The long slander bars of cloud 
float like fishes in the sea of crimson light. From the earth, as a shore, I look out into that 
silent sea. I seem to partake its rapid transformations: the active enchantment reaches 
my dust, and I dilate and conspire with the morning wind. (Nature 15, emphasis added) 
While these are descriptions of a person transfixed by the beauty of the world or struck dumb by 
an unexpected sensation of “gladness,” they are also disconcerting illustrations of paralysis, 
exemplified by the image of a body and a mind momentarily immobilized, arrested by the 
overwhelming world that continues to pulse. Emerson sometimes calls this state one of “active 
enchantment,” at other times he uses the words “ecstasy,” “growth,” “divine expansion” or 
“enlargement.” Although these states resemble mystical ecstasy, with which they share the basic 
attribute of “being outside oneself” (ek-stasis), the two accounts differ from religious rapture in 
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one crucial aspect: Emersonian enchantment lacks transcendence. Neither divine intervention, 
nor supernatural force, nor a set of contemplative practices overpower Emerson’s enchanted 
person. Nor is Emersonian enchantment reducible to the psychological state of elation or 
euphoria: it is not a property or an expression of individual interiority. The gladness the speaker 
feels in the “eyeball passage” is not the “joyous consciousness of the rich plentitude of 
existence.”
2
 It is, rather, a potentially terrifying experience of falling through the cracks, losing 
ground – an affect accompanying the more fundamental process of “enlargement” and 
depersonalization (“I am nothing; I see all”). Emerson’s enlargement, to press matters a little 
further, is not only a version of the mind’s imaginative conquering and shaping of the outside 
world (although Nature offers those idealist definitions as well). The mind’s expansion is, 
rather, projected out into the world’s fullness – the uncircumscribed flow of matter, percepts, 
forces – which is revealed as the “all” only on the condition that “I” is also experienced as 
“nothing.” In this state of active enchantment, the mind’s capacity to unify the self into a 
coherent whole – to give meaning to what it sees – is suspended, and the speaker, released from 
the subjective position of the “I,” is discharged into an elemental, material state (“I dilate and 
conspire with the morning wind”; “I am part or particle of God”). With no self to take 
possession of a given experience, the latter ceases to be an experience at all, becoming instead a 
pure, unattributable affect. For a brief moment, the speaker becomes impersonal – and hence, 
“transparent.” 
The two passages above are illustrative of two phenomena: 1) the way our individual 
selves operate; and 2) the way the world operates. On this account, the world – another name 
for life or nature – is not some distant exterior, separate from us, but an infinite onrush of 
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matter, forces, intensities, “particles,” and “currents” in constant transformation, of which we 
too “partake” (“I seem to partake its rapid transformations”). At the same time, our selves are 
not stable, self-enclosed, autonomous individualities either, but temporally (and temporarily) 
coherent coagulations of matter, sensations, affects, perceptions and their constantly 
transforming relations, which the labor of the mind processes, structures and unifies into an 
intelligible whole. Persons and the world they are immersed in share the same materiality and 
the same operative mode. Both are a series of impermanently sculpted, unstable forms. 
Emersonian active enchantment, thus, marks a liminal state that blurs the distinction between 
our selves and the world, allowing the latter to appear in its fullness precisely when the 
perspective from which it is ordinarily organized by the mind’s interpretations is rendered 
inoperative.  
Moreover, Emerson’s ecstatic protocol of making the world emerge in its fullness is 
exactly contrary to the method of epistemological certainty that the Western philosophical 
tradition has held dear since Descartes. In order to remove doubt about his own existence, 
which gradually guided him toward the cogito’s inevitability, Descartes had to dismantle the 
world through a methodical reduction. Thus, the first philosophical certainty by which the 
modern subject confirmed its existence as the self-present, self-identical, autonomous, 
individual “I,” “was gained at the expense of a total eclipse of the world, in a nighttime 
darkness no longer inhabited by anyone.”
3
 But whereas the modern subject depends on a 
destruction of the world, Emerson turns this proposition around and asks: What happens when, 
instead of dismantling the world, the thinking “I” is disassembled? Does anything remain, and if 
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so, what? What remains, Emerson surprisingly concludes, is the “all”
4
: the world, life and 
nature unstructured by the “I.” So to repeat: for life to emerge from its partial visibility into all 
its unfamiliarity and splendor, the “I” must be eclipsed by the mind’s relinquishing of its 
mastery over itself. According to Emerson, when this occurs, the world (or “life”) does not 
disappear. Instead, once the standpoint from which the world makes sense as “my own” has 
been dismantled, the enchanted self is exposed to the radical foreignness of others and of itself. 
Sense and meaning are destabilized in all kinds of wonderful and frightening ways, opening 
themselves up to new interpretations, mobilizing new relations, coinages, admixtures, new 
forms. Once uprooted from the pre-given meanings and familiar values, the sensation of radical 
wonder may prompt in us new ethical relations to others and new political orientations.  
This seemingly strange yet universal state of enchantment is the subject of this 
dissertation. Situated at the crossroads of literary studies, ecocriticism and political theory, 
Active Enchantments explores a strain of thought within American literature that understands 
life in all of its forms to be generated not by self-determined identities, but by 
interconnectedness and self-abandonment. This interest, I argue, led American writers across 
the nineteenth century to develop theories of subjectivity and of politics that not only emphasize 
the entanglement of the self with its environment, but also view this relationship as structured 
by self-overcoming. Thus, when Emerson calls such interconnectedness “active enchantment,” 
he means to signal life’s inherent ability to constantly surpass itself, to never fully be identical 
with itself. Active Enchantments brings to the fore the political and ecological stakes of this 
paradox: if our selves and communities are molded by self-abandonment, then the standard 
scholarly account of how nineteenth-century American literature conceptualized politics must 
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be revised. Far from understanding community as an organic production, founded on a 
teleological and harmonizing principle, the writers I study reconceive it around a sense of a 
commonality irreducible to fixed identity. The politics emerging out of such redefinition 
disposes with the primacy of individual or human agency, and becomes ecological in that it 
renders inoperative the difference between the social and the natural, the human and the non-
human, ourselves and what comprises us. What emerges is a peculiar theory of impersonality – 
a theory often overshadowed by the paradigms of idealism, liberal individualism, and 
exceptionalism that have dominated the study of nineteenth-century American literature. The 
period’s investment in notions of enchantment has been reconceived by recent scholarly 
endeavors that either attempt to salvage the vibrancy of enchanted states as an exclusively 
religious sentiment, or view enchantment as the foundation of the American discourse of 
disenchantment and secularism. Against these critical configurations, the argument that propels 
the reading and textual engagements in this study is that, for the four authors I analyze, the 
states of enchantment, ecstasy, trance and conversion are neither religious nor secular, much 
less psychological. Instead, they are conducive to nothing short of a new ontology. 
 
On Enchantment as a Religious Sentiment 
In 1941 F.O. Matthiessen famously interpreted Emerson’s claim that “the age is Swedenborg’s” 
as reflective of the nineteenth century’s embrace of “subjective philosophy” and its “extreme 
development of idealism.”
5
 Matthiessen’s assessment influentially applied the link between 
Swedenborg’s mysticism and idealism to nineteenth-century literary expressions. Matthiessen is 
correct to say that Swedenborg’s religious ideas resonated throughout the 1800s. He is also right 
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that authors of the period, including the four featured in Active Enchantments, were familiar or 
profoundly influenced by Swedenborg’s ideas – particularly by his doctrine of correspondences, 
his theory of dreams, and his descriptions of angelic and ecstatic visions. Still, it is also true that 
Swedenborg’s mysticism was of a special kind, traversed as it was by materialism, which also 
found its way into America’s “age of Swedenborg.”
6
 Matthiessen’s all too familiar 
“normalization” of mysticism’s visionary and ecstatic practices as versions of idealism fails to 
take note of this materialism and its influence on American authors. Enchanted subjects, mystical 
visions, ecstatic experiences are, thus, understood either as expressions of individual spiritual 
insight or, if collective, as sporadic eruptions of eccentricity. Individual or collective, they are 
always conceived as a spiritual endeavor of doing away with the body. 
Of the four authors I read in this study, critical commentary on Margaret Fuller is perhaps 
the best example of such misconceptions. Persistently interpreted as a feminist mystic, her 
notorious ecstatic states have been unfailingly represented as attempts to spiritually transcend 
contemporary gender inequalities, and to empower women through education and cultivation of 
the “soul.”
7
 Normalized and trivialized, her ecstatic trances and glossolalic writings are most 
often turned into a tool in service to a larger political agenda. But when Fuller encounters the 
mystics – Swedenborg and Boehme, among others – her interest is elsewhere. She reads 
Swedenborg’s call for the “annihilation of our own personality” as an injunction to induce in 
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herself ecstatic trances through which she attempts collapse the self’s ideal properties (the soul, 
spirit, the mind, self-presence) into its corporeal properties. This process then opens the way for 
a redefinition of the mind’s place in the hierarchy of the self: by placing the mind on a par with 
other sense organs, she is able to retire its pivotal role in maintaining personhood. Not only is 
there no trace of idealist triumph of the mind in her enchanted states, but at stake is a much more 
radical revaluation of mysticism’s spiritual properties.  
In a similar vein, Sarah Orne Jewett, who knew well both Swedenborg and François 
Fénelon, translates the latter’s counsel toward “self-surrender” into an original idea of “self-
forgetfulness.” Through self-forgetfulness, one relinquishes one’s own self-mastery, and is, thus, 
invited to enter into relations with the influences, cultures and values one otherwise understands 
as foreign. When that occurs, Jewett’s literary characters begin to speak in unexpected tongues – 
the tongues of colonized subjects or murdered Native Americans, who inhabit the white body 
and destabilize its hegemonic identity. Fuller and Jewett thus not only unsettle the period’s 
prevalent conceptions of personal and collective identity as the nucleus of political life – they 
also dismantle the critical consensus that their engagements with mysticism and enchanted states 
were necessarily idealist, spiritual or religious, or that they presuppose any higher, unchangeable 
law. 
 
On Enchantment as Secularism’s Ghost 
In Secularism in Antebellum America John Modern suggests that enchantment is “a rule” rather 
than “the exception that proves the rule of the Enlightened, … calculating and calculable 




calls into question more static versions of human nature.”
8
 While I agree with Modern that these 
inordinate affective states have the potential to cultivate a resistance to ideological paradigms 
and rigid social hierarchies, I depart from his attempt to view enchantment as an allegory of 
secularism. At its core, Modern’s study joins recent scholarship on secularism in America, 
which itself emerges out of engagements with Charles Taylor’s monumental Secular Age,
9
 Talal 
Asad’s Genealogies of Religion
10
 and Robert Bellah’s numerous studies on religious 
ceremonialism of American democracy.
11
 Following this debate, Modern purports that religious 
affects, experiences and structures are so embedded in the secular institutions and ideologies of 
nineteenth-century America that they constitute its ghostly foundation. Within this argument, 
enchantment is perhaps not the exception to rationalist paradigms of Enlightenment, but is 
certainly positioned as its religious anchor. Gregory Jackson’s The Word and Its Witness 
articulates a similar position in claiming that “the esthetic innovations of literary realism 
emerged not only from a cosmopolitan embrace of scientific empiricism but also from … the 
heuristic tradition of Protestant homiletics.”
12
 Coleman’s Preaching and the Rise of the 
American Novel follows the same itinerary by showing how American literature diverged from 
its British parent through the cultivation of exclusively religious genres.
13
 The prime suspect is 
always, of course, Emerson, whose post-1832 lectures and essays are read as a thinly disguised 
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continuation and stylistic reinterpretation of his sermons. In his recently reprinted study, 
Emerson and the Conduct of Life, David Robinson, for example, charts the secularization of 
Emerson’s concept of ecstasy, from mysticism (which Robinson understands as a form of 
private individualism) to “pragmatism” and the concerns for the practical and social life. 
Perhaps unintentionally even, Robinson argues that the mystical concept of ecstasy is embedded 
in the pragmatics of everyday life.
14
 Common to all these studies is the inversion of the anyway 
long-refuted conception that the process of secularization emerges from the outright rejection of 
religious states, discourses and practices, whereby religious affects of enchantment and ecstasy 
get foregrounded as the repressed, haunting foundation of American secularism.  
 
Enchantment as “Ontological Wonder” 
In Varieties of Religious Experience, William James equates religious rapture with “ontological 
wonder”:  
We find [spiritual excitement] in Stoicism, in Hinduism, and in Buddhism in the highest 
possible degree. They harmonize with paternal theism beautifully; but they harmonize 
with all reflection whatever upon the dependence of mankind on general causes; and we 
must, I think, consider them not subordinate but coordinate parts of that great complex 
excitement in the study of which we are engaged. Religious rapture, moral enthusiasm, 
ontological wonder, cosmic emotion, are all unifying states of mind, in which the sand 
and grit of the selfhood incline to disappear. … The best thing is to describe the 
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condition integrally as a characteristic affection to which our nature is liable, a region in 
which we find ourselves at home, a sea in which we swim.
15
 
Not only does ecstatic trance accord with general causes; it is, more significantly, a state of 
mind in which the self dissipates. Referring to conversion, another enchanted state considered in 
the Varieties, James asserts that “converted men as a class are indistinguishable from natural 
men.”
16
 This naturalization of ecstasy, enchantment, conversion, rapture and enthusiasm is the 
basis that enables James to call wonder “ontological.” To render our natural state wondrous, is 
to see the self as constantly “inclined to disappear,” prone to relinquishing the self’s mastery 
over itself. That is how our persons are, James suggests, not as religious or secular subjects, not 
as psychologically euphoric individuals, but as their very nature. That is how life is, in and of 
itself, always: ontologically (Emerson would say “actively”) enchanted. And that ontological 
attitude is the basis through which the authors gathered in this study develop their own 
particular notions of enchantment (Emerson), ecstasy (Fuller), self-surrender (Jewett) and 
conversion (Henry and William James).  
The definitions of these terms, and their importance to the writings I explore in what 
follows, approximate Jane Bennett’s characterization of enchantment: 
To be enchanted is to be struck and shaken by the extraordinary that lives amid the 
familiar and the everyday. … Thoughts but also limbs … are brought to rest, even as the 
senses continue to operate, indeed in high gear. You notice new colors, discern details 
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previously ignored, hear extraordinary sounds, as familiar landscapes of sense sharpen 
and intensify. The world comes alive as a collection of singularities.
17
  
The riveting sky and absorbing landscape that mesmerize Emerson in the passage from Nature I 
quoted at the beginning square with Bennett’s description. But while she is set on seeking the 
extraordinary in the ordinary, the authors I read focus on the opposite: they find the experiences, 
states, and modes typically understood as extraordinary to be entirely ordinary, common, 
universal, general, natural – one might simply say, as William James does, “ontological.” The 
difference might appear to be minor, especially in light of strikingly similar end-results. For 
Bennett, as for Emerson, enchantment is “active engagement with objects of sensuous 
experience.”
18
 Further, while as an ontological state enchantment may be overpowering, 
crushing, paralyzing, it is also ethically imitable. As both Emerson and Bennett acknowledge, 
recognizing that we are ontologically ecstatic can lead us to intentionally cultivate the states, 
ethics and politics that would instantiate this ontology. As Bennett suggests, “enchantment is 
not a moral code, but it might spark bodily will to enact such a code and foster the presumption 
of generosity toward those who transgress or question it.”
19
 
 Which leads me to the third term in the subtitle of my study: politics. In the mid-
nineteenth century, when the advent of the Civil War and new cultural and political 
circumstances produced a widespread de-stratification of the social body, the ground was 
prepared for a multitude of identities to seek and to demand recognition. The writers gathered in 
Active Enchantments readily recognized the ethical purchase of these calls. Emerson’s “Letter to 
the President Martin Van Buren” in 1838 against the Cherokee removal, his “Address on the 
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Anniversary of the Emancipation of the Negroes in the West Indies” in 1844, his bitter critique 
of the Fugitive Slave Law, his public support to women’s rights and suffragist movement in 
1855, and to John Brown in 1860 all testify to Emerson’s persistent care for the unrepresented 
and the silenced. Margaret Fuller, too, expressed her allegiances assiduously, both in writing and 
in action, as she wrote about the horrifying labor and health conditions she witnessed in 
European and American hospitals and asylums, slums, factories and prisons, and also later, while 
tending to the wounded in Princess Cristina Belgioioso’s hospital in Rome during the Revolution 
of 1848. Jewett’s care for the elderly and the mad, and her attunement to the ongoing abysmal 
consequences of slavery and the industrial destruction of indigenous lives in post 1870s America 
have gone largely unnoticed, overshadowed by the racism she expressed in some of her letters 
from Haiti and Jamaica. Finally, Henry James’s concern about the “Irish question,” his 
disappointment with Britain’s reticence in rising against the Ottoman massacre of Bulgarian 
civilians in 1876, his interest in the Russo-Turkish War, in European anarchism and in national 
revolutions in Eastern Europe, all reveal a sensibility troubled by the cries of the anonymous and 
the defeated.  
However, this active interest in political matters was accompanied by a sense of 
uneasiness and doubt. Emerging directly out of their philosophical investment in enchantment, 
the goals these writers pursued disallowed easy political allegiances. Their writings, too, were 
haunted by troubling questions. If identity is not essential but circumstantial and impersonal, as 
Emerson believed; if the structure that unifies the self into a temporarily coherent form is not an 
inherent property of a person but, as Margaret Fuller insisted, the labor of a material mind that 
can be dismantled or, as Henry James proposed, a shared property belonging to no one in 




belonging to collective identities which, as Jewett submitted, are palimpsestic and idiorrhythmic? 
More specifically, can ethics and politics be anchored in a conception of volatile identities, 
selves prone to disintegration and “sinking,” as William James puts it? While necessarily 
rhetorical, these questions were nevertheless real and urgent for the authors I discuss. Emerson, 
Fuller, Jewett and the James brothers did not resolve them, even though they tried. Yet, they 
asked them in an insistent way that mustn’t be ignored. What in the end they made clear is that a 
politics that strives to do justice to everyone must take into consideration an ontology of 
enchantment. Jane Bennett puts it succinctly: “A moral code is insufficient to ethics. In addition 
to rules of behavior, one needs an aesthetic disposition hospitable to them, the perceptual 
refinement to apply them to particular cases, the energy or will to live them out, and the generous 
mood that enables one to reconsider them in the face of new and surprising developments.”
20
 
To explore the divergent conceptions of this philosophy of enchantment in the nineteenth 
century, I show how these conceptions played out in different registers and on different “sites”: 
nature, mind, community and art. I begin my dissertation with Emerson, whose conception of 
nature as the universal ecstatic life resonated throughout the period. Chapter One, on “Nature and 
Politics in Emerson,” extracts two focal claims from Emerson – “Life is an ecstasy” and “nature 
is the work of ecstasy” – and unfurls from them his philosophy of life according to which nature 
is never entirely one with itself. In the first issue of the Massachusetts Quarterly Emerson 
declares: “We believe politics to be nowise accidental or exceptional, but subject to the same 
laws with trees, earths and acids.”
21
 In thus identifying nature with politics, he subjects both 
nature and politics to the laws of ecstasy: “I hold that ecstasy will be found normal,” he writes, 
“or only an example on a higher plane of the same gentle gravitation by which stones fall and 
                                               
20
 Ibid., 29. 
21






 If ecstasy is an ontology that propels all forms toward their exteriority, then the 
stasis necessary to delineate any discernible set of properties we call identity is rendered 
inoperative. Focusing on his fascination with the banyan tree, which confuses its own branches 
with multiple roots and stems, and serves as a model of identitarian impermanence, I show that 
Emerson’s “self-reliant” subject, far from being a highly individualized emblem of American 
exceptionalism, is in fact always relational, beside itself, revolutionary and, thus, political before 
it is individualized.  
I take Emerson’s theory of ecstatic life to its “practical” application in Chapter Two, 
“Thinking through Pain in Margaret Fuller,” where I read Fuller’s experimentation with ecstatic 
states as her pain-management method. I trace Fuller’s writing about her harrowing headaches, 
which she understood to have been caused by the operation of thinking, as the germ of her theory 
of the “earthly mind,” which bestows materiality on what is conventionally understood as the 
spiritual or ideal dimension of the self. In Fuller’s view, the mind, a sense organ on a par with the 
other five, aches under the pressure of heavy thoughts. The chapter documents how Fuller found 
the cure for her headaches through trance-like states, induced through bodily exhaustion, that 
eventually dim consciousness and relinquish any sense of self-presence. By wearing down the 
body, Fuller wore down the mind’s ability to unify its perceptions into a coherent whole, which 
in turn allowed her to displace herself from pain. In its potential to transcend and abolish 
personal experience, Fuller’s practice of impersonality raises urgent political questions about 
rational agency, responsibility, and the possibility for collective action.  
I then turn to the question of what Fuller’s enchanted subject may do to the constitution 
of a community. My third chapter, “The Interrupted Community in Sarah Orne Jewett,” shows 
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how ethnic and racial minorities in Jewett’s works emerge as unassimilated remainders from 
forgotten social and historical strata to complicate the nation’s understanding of its communal 
origin or identity. By setting her fictions on Native American shell mounds in Maine, in the 
imaginary ghost-land of the North Pole, and in the colonial slave-trade narratives of the West 
Indies, Jewett excavates from history its silent or repressed relations, and brings them forth in 
order to attune us to the violent foundation of every communal identity. The chapter documents 
how Jewett refashioned François Fénelon’s protocol of “absolute self-surrender” into an original 
strategy of “self-forgetfulness” as a way of allowing the repressed to speak. As the self – 
personal or collective – withdraws from the site of its own identity, a host of heretofore repressed 
or silenced voices come to the fore to demand recognition. Jewett’s strategy consists in a peculiar 
gesture of self-enlargement through impersonal self-forgetting, and as such challenges the 
procedures of democratic inclusiveness which, however non-violent, are nevertheless always 
organized around a particular notion of coercive identity.  
My concluding chapter, “The Art of Conversion in Henry James,” investigates how 
Henry James arrived at his famous conception of a “bewildered” consciousness through an early 
exposure to two contemporary influences: William James’s theory of corporeal emotion, and 
European anarchism. In the 1880s James came into contact with Mikhail Bakunin’s anarchist 
theories and his notion of Amorphismus – the absence of all social forms. In the “Principles of 
Revolution” Bakunin argued for a “formless” community, devoid of any organized center of 
power that gives it legitimacy. James picks up on this idea in The Princess Casamassima, which 
uses Bakunin’s idea of amorphousness to depict society as never fixed once and for all, but 
rather as traversed by open-ended potentialities. In this chapter, I claim that it is only after he had 




his conception of an amorphous self – a self whose consciousness belongs to no one in 
particular. The novelistic method of the bewildered consciousness that informed his later phase is 
aptly diagnosed in the preface to The Ambassadors as his “ecstasies of method” through which 
James attempted to destabilize not only the centeredness of an individual experience, but also the 
coherent linearity of the novelistic method that renders it. I propose that a rereading of his “most 
political” and “most realist” novel reveals a more radical Henry James, interested in the 
possibility of a politics of nonidentity. 
In conclusion, let me add a note about the enchanting quality of these texts – not only in 
terms of their properly “literary” value, but as vigorously contemporary ideas. As I pointed out 
above, while the differences between the authors of Active Enchantments and Jane Bennett’s 
conception of enchantment may be slight, they are nevertheless important because they 
foreground the radical potential, the scope, and the contemporary relevance of nineteenth-
century American thought. For, while Bennett’s primary sources go as far back as the classics 
(she reads Epicurus, the Stoics and Lucretius, while also citing Thoreau and Emerson), her 
thinking has primarily been enabled by the more recent thinking of Nietzsche, Freud, Bergson, 
Adorno, Deleuze, Foucault, and Latour. Although I don’t believe that reading can ever be 
divorced from the historical moment in which it takes place (the present), the philosophy of 
enchantment I uncover in nineteenth-century American authors is not entirely a product of the 
concerns and theoretical perspectives that currently occupy literary studies – the non-human turn, 
affect theory, ecological thinking, or secularism. The complex vocabulary the authors I study 
invent, the rigor with which they present their concepts, the freshness of the literary style 
required to articulate the awkwardness of their ideas, and the radical consequences their ideas 




know whether these ideas, had they been embodied and lived out, would have made the century 
in which they were formulated go otherwise. Yet, I am struck by their relevance for what seem 
like unresolvable tensions and horrific sufferings of contemporary world. Why we keep coming 
back to these works, why we find vibrancy and freshness in them today, is as much a verdict on 
our time as it is on theirs. If the nineteenth century was to be “the age of Swedenborg,” as 
Emerson wrongly predicted, one can only hope that the twenty-first still has the chance to be the 





“Life is an Ecstasy”: Nature and Politics in Emerson 
 
In “Fate” and “Illusions,” the two essays that frame the series Conduct of Life, Emerson defines 
life as ecstasy. In “Fate” both life and ecstasy are identified with madness, drunkenness, dreams, 
and love:  
Life is an ecstasy. We know what madness belongs to love,—what power to paint a vile 
object in hues of heaven. As insane persons are indifferent to their dress, diet, and other 
accommodations, and as we do in dreams, with equanimity, the most absurd acts, so a 
drop more of wine in our cup of life will reconcile us to strange company and work.
1
  
“Illusions” treats ecstasy as the very principle of life, and equates it with the universal life of 
nature. Having recounted how “some years ago,” during his exploration of the Kentucky 
Mammoth Cave, nature played a disagreeable “theatrical trick” on him by reflecting the light of 
his torch on the cave’s ceiling, thereby creating an illusion of a sublimely starry sky, Emerson 
concludes that “the best thing which the cave had to offer was an illusion” (“I” 941). It provided 
a useful lesson: 
Our conversation with Nature is not just what it seems. The cloud-rack, the sunrise and 
sunset glories, rainbows, and northern lights are not quite so spheral as our childhood 
thought them; and the part our organization plays in them is too large. The senses 
interfere everywhere, and mix their own structure with all they report of. Life is an 
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ecstasy. Life is sweet as nitrous oxide; … . . . We live by our imaginations, by our 
admirations, by our sentiments.” (I 942, emphasis added) 
Emerson’s assertion that “our conversation with Nature is not just what it seems” is perhaps 
deceptively simple. It does not imply, as it may at first appear, that some unfathomable truth 
remains inaccessible to us due to our “senses’ interfer[ing] everywhere,” distorting the true 
image of nature and of life. Instead, the crux of Emerson’s claim is that the “reports” our senses 
send to the mind are misleading and unreliable, as they provide only half of the story. The 
illusion on the cave’s ceiling is analogous to the illusion produced by our mind when it 
interprets the report that our senses convey.
2
 Our interpretations are misleading precisely 
because they are reports – narratives of only one aspect of nature: namely, its “spheral” quality. 
Spheral, that is to say spherical, “symmetrically rounded or perfect” (OED), shaped into a body. 
Nature and life appear to us as a series of forms, as separate entities molded into independent, 
rounded, self-identical structures. But if, for Emerson, the universal life of nature is “ecstasy,” 
then life is necessarily non-spherical and out of bounds. Further, the fact that life is equated with 
the “sweetness” of nitrous oxide, the laughing gas introduced in the practice of dentistry a 
decade earlier, suggests that life is self-forgetful and hallucinatory – a life in which the mind’s 
reasoning operation is suspended. In short, a mind under the influence of nitrous oxide is not 
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self-present, and the sensations and perceptions it otherwise collects to form a self-identical 
person are dispersed.  
 Emerson’s conflation of life with nature, and of both with our ecstatic mental life, is not 
limited to Conduct of Life. It is ubiquitous – beginning, as I will suggest below, with his earliest 
publication, “An Extract from Unpublished Travels in the East” (1829), and culminating in his 
later lectures on The Natural Method of Mental Philosophy (1858). The clearest articulation of 
these equations is certainly the 1841 oration “The Method of Nature” where nature and all life 
are said to be the “work of ecstasy” (MN 120). In fact, I see “The Method of Nature” as the very 
center of Emerson’s thought, a textual hotbed for his early writings on nature, and from which 
his elaboration of the same concerns develops into the two series of essays, and into his later 
lectures. In what follows I set about to unravel Emerson’s strange correlations of nature with 
life, of vegetative with mental laws, and of both as traversed by the force of ecstasy. In the 
reading and analysis below, I am guided by the following question: if life is generally ecstatic – 
if we normally live beyond rather than as one with ourselves – what kind of ethics and politics 
arise from the conception of a self as ontologically discontinuous, interrupted, non-
autonomous? Can we still call it a politics, even if it is not grounded in the notion of an 
autonomous individual; or on an expansion of the field of rights (human or animal), but instead 
on a redefinition of the premises on which the very concept of political rights rests? In this 
chapter I argue that Emerson answered this question in his characteristically complex 
affirmative. In order to see how he arrived at this claim, I will proceed from his own starting-





I  Nature: Ecstatic Life 
A striking image closes Emerson’s essay “Compensation.” Enveloped in a mercantile language 
of exchange, loss and gain, the essay – which postulates a law of compensation as the way to 
accept a change in one’s life – culminates in a botanical narrative: 
The changes which break up at short intervals the prosperity of men are advertisements 
of a nature whose law is growth. … The death of a dear friend, wife, brother, lover, 
which seemed nothing but privation, somewhat later assumes the aspect of a guide or 
genius. . . . [The loss] permits or constrains the formation of new acquaintances and the 
reception of new influences that prove of the first importance to the next years; and the 
man or woman who would have remained a sunny garden-flower, with no room for its 
roots and too much sunshine for its head, by the falling of the walls and the neglect of 
the gardener is made the banian of the forest, yielding shade and fruit to wide 
neighborhoods of men. (Comp. 302) 
The essay closes with an image of the banyan – an Indian tree that didn’t exist in America until 
the 1920s.
3
 This tree is unique in that its circular operating mode is that of a multiplicity: its 
branches grow downwards into the ground, where they take root and become so-called “aerial 
roots,” from which a new trunk grows and develops new branches, which then shoot downward 
and become new roots. Although Emerson couldn’t have seen a specimen in America, he 
encountered a picture and description of the tree in Almira Lincoln Phelps’s Familiar Lectures 
on Botany,
4
 a copy of which he owned and annotated. In a chapter on stems, Phelps provides a 
drawing of the tree and the following description:  
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A remarkable phenomenon is described by travellers, as being exhibited by the stems of 
the Banyan tree of India, Ficus Indicus; these stems throw out fibers, which descend and 
take root in the earth. In process of time, they become large trees; and thus from one 
primitive root is formed a little forest. . . . The Hindoos plant them near their temples, 
and in many cases, the tree itself serves them for a temple. Milton speaks of this tree, as 
the one from which Adam and Eve obtained leaves to form themselves garments. … 
You have here a representation of this wonderful tree which is said to be capable of 
giving shelter to several thousand persons.
5
 
Phelps is referring to Book 9 of Milton’s Paradise Lost, which gives a lengthy account of the 
fig tree whose leaves Adam and Eve used to cover their nakedness after the Fall: 
   Both together went 
Into the thickest wood. There soon they chose 
The fig-tree; not that kind for fruit renowned 
But such as at this day, to Indians known 
                                                                                                                                                       
Britannica or in James Forbes’s Oriental Memoirs (1813), which contains several informative passages 
and a series of drawings of the banyan, but there is no solid proof that he read either of these.  
5
 Almira Lincoln Phelps, Familiar Lectures on Botany: Practical, Elementary and Physiological, 7
th
 ed. 




In Malabar or Decan spreads her arms 
Branching so broad and long, that in the ground 
The bended twigs take root, and daughters grow 
About the mother tree, a pillared shade 
High over-arched, and echoing walks between: 
There oft the Indian herdsman, shunning heat 
Shelters in cool, and tends his pasturing herds  
At loop-holes cut through thickest shade.  
    Those leaves    
They gathered, broad as Amazonian Targe,     James Forbes, Oriental Memoirs, vol. 2.  
And with what skill they had, together sewed  (London: White, Cochrane and Co., 1813), plate 86. 
To gird their waist – vain covering, if to hide 
Their guilt and dreaded shame! (9: 1099-1114) 
 
Phelps’s botanical entry was not the only account of the banyan tree that Emerson and his 
readers might have had access to. A number of American journals, from as early as the 1780s, 
carried extensive descriptions of it, often simply copying each other.
6
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branches shoots, exactly like roots, issue, and growing till they reach the ground, fix themselves and 
become mothers to a future progeny; they thus extend as far as the ground will admit. … It has the quality 
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and constitute a third stem, and so on… We mistook it at first for a small hill” (The Literary Magazine 
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The banyan tree planted by Thomas Edison in 1925, Fort Meyers, Florida
7
 
It may seem puzzling, however, that Emerson deals with the image of this rare tree in the 
climactic moment of his essay. If the essay’s metaphor of a merely ornamental flower 
transforming itself into a communally giving tree should be read as representing a person 
becoming a solid individual while learning from his losses, an image of any sturdy tree – an 
oak, for example – would have sufficed. But the choice of banyan is not at all accidental or 
arbitrary. The Banyan tree is not particularly arborescent, rooted or immobile: it doesn’t have a 
primary root from which the whole grows, but consists, instead, of a multiplicity of roots that 
have previously been branches and trunks, and will later produce other branches, trunks and 
roots. The tree, therefore, perpetuates itself laterally, by constantly giving birth to itself on all 
sides and without a central point or a distribution of identifiable parts. The Banyan’s 
exceptionality is paradoxically universal, however. Its indistinguishable parts are only a more 
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extreme form of general vegetative logic, according to which plants’ individual organs do not 
result in an organic, hierarchized whole. Michael Marder reminds us of Hegel’s recognition that 
“though an organic being, the plant is not an organism, because, in it, ‘the difference of the 
organic parts is only a superficial metamorphosis and one part can easily assume the function 
of the other … In the plant, therefore, the members are particular only in relation to each other, 
not to the whole.’”
8
 Emerson’s choice of the banyan, while intentional, is not meant to single 
out an exception, but rather to describe, through an example that takes the rule cited above to 
the extreme, something typical of plant-life. In this process of growing itself into a network and 
establishing relations horizontally rather than vertically, the banyan creates a mobile community 
– “a small forest,” as Phelps says in her entry, in which, as in any forest, the orienting center, 
the originary trunk, is lost. It is with this horizontal forest-tree, rather than a vertical 
individuality, that Emerson chooses to identify the self emerging from loss. This self is thus not 
a person born anew, but a multiplicity that resists the totalizing principle of either personal or of 
collective identity. For, while it confuses its own branches, roots and trunks, the banyan also 
disturbs the distinction between a single tree and the forest, the individual and the multiplicity. 
The banyan-self becomes, then, Emerson’s version of a singularly plural self.
9
  
 I want to insist, however, that the banyan tree from “Compensation” is more than a mere 
metaphor for the compensatory law, according to which the loss of “a sunny garden-flower” 
enables the development of a communally useful “banian of the forest.” More importantly, 
when in the paragraph I cited above Emerson claims that “the changes which break up at short 
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intervals the prosperity of men are advertisements of a nature whose law is growth,” his 
juxtapositions equate the law that governs nature with the law that governs human lives – both 
are subject to the law of growth, interruption and change.
10
 In “The Method of Nature,” for 
example, human thought is said to “run laterally,” like the banyan: “The crystal sphere of 
thought is as concentrical as the geological structure of the globe. As our soils and rocks lie in 
strata, concentric strata, so do all men’s thinkings run laterally, never vertically” (MN 117, 
emphasis added). These ontological identifications of human with vegetal life – resulting in 
banyanesque singular pluralities – traverse all of Emerson’s thought and intervene into the 
concepts and distinctions that govern what, at the time, were as yet unsolidified concerns of 
nineteenth-century American democracy. It is that nascent discourse that Emerson’s thinking 
attempts to influence, by laying the foundation for a politics no longer restricted to rights-
oriented notions of the individual.  
 If Emerson articulated the law that links the vegetal with the human realm, what is it that 
binds the life of trees and humans to ecstasy? “The Method of Nature,” an oration Emerson 
delivered in 1841, describes the link most clearly by declaring ecstasy to be the “power or 
genius of nature” (MN 126), and consequently the force traversing all of life, including trees 
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and human persons. It took Emerson twenty years to arrive at these unorthodox identifications, 
the history of which I uncover below. 
 In June 1821 The Philanthropist and The Weekly Recorder published the same article 
about the banyan tree: 
THE BANYAN TREE: 
AN EXTRACT FROM A BRITISH PUBLICATION. 
Ficus Indica, is one of the most extraordinary productions of the vegetable kingdom. 
This singular tree, a native of the warmer parts of India, throws out shoots from the 
horizontal branches, & these shoots extending toward the earth, strike root in the ground 
and become stems; new branches push out in the same manner, and new shoots as they 
extend from roots and new stems, till at last a single tree becomes the parent of an 
extensive grove. … The banyan tree may be regarded as a natural temple in eastern 
countries: idols are set under its shade, before which the natives perform their devotions; 
and it is sometimes called the tree od councils, because the people assemble under it for 




All of the article’s observations are found in Phelps’s Lectures on Botany published ten years 
later – from the tree’s peculiar organization and communal provisions, to its serving as “a 
natural temple in eastern countries.” It is this overlapping of tree and temple (cf. Phelps: “The 
Hindoos plant them near their temples, and in many cases, the tree itself serves them for a 
temple”) that for Emerson provided an early link between ecstasy and the laws that govern 
vegetal and human life.  
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On October 20, 1822 Emerson entered a parable into his journal that likely borrowed 
from the description of the banyan tree in a newspaper article similar to the one published in 
The Philanthropist and The Weekly Recorder. Seven years later, this very parable became 
Emerson’s first prose publication: titled “An Extract from Unpublished Travels in the East,” it 
was included in Andrews Norton’s gift-book collection The Offering for 1829.
12
 The parable 
describes a flood on the fictional Bread Island in the Pacific Ocean, and a collective drowning 
caused by a musical instrument the islanders had created from the so-called Siphar trees,
13
 
whose tubular organization of roots and trunks, as F. Y. St. Clair suggests, was modeled on a 
fictional cross of the banyan tree and the bamboo.
14
 Because Emerson considered the parable 
valuable enough to have it published, and more importantly, because, as I believe, it marks the 
beginning of Emerson’s life-long interest in the intersections of ecstasy and (vegetative) life, it 
is worth citing in full: 
AN EXTRACT FROM UNPUBLISHED TRAVELS IN THE EAST 
After the feast of the house of the Bey in Samarcand was concluded, the company were 
entertained by narratives told with great spirit by some of Shah Lufi’s friends. Old 
Yelghar, who had seen an English organ at Bombay, before he came hither, related a 
marvellous anecdote, of which this is the substance: 
“When I was a lad,” said the bearded slander, “we had a kind of vast musical 
apparatus in the Pacific islands, which must appear as fabulous to you, as it proved fatal 
to us. On the banks of the Lagoons, in the Bread islands, there grew an abundance of 
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Siphar trees, which consist of vast trunks perforated by a multitude of winding tubes, 
and having almost no external verdure. When the roots were artificially connected with 
the water of the creek, the water was instantly sucked up by some of the tubes, and 
discharged by others, and the operation attended (especially, if properly echoed) with the 
most beautiful musical sounds in the world. My countrymen built their temples to the 
great Zoa, upon the margin of the water, and enclosed a suitable number of these trees, 
with the design of entertaining the ears of the god, with this sweet harmony. Finding, 
however, by experience, that the more water the pipes drew, the more rich and various 
were the sounds of their organ, they constructed a very spacious temple, with high walls 
of clay and stone, curiously adapted to reverberate the sound, and enclosed a hundred 
large Siphars.  
When the edifice was complete, the people from all the country round 
assembled, in throngs, to hear the concert. After they had waited a long time, and the 
tide began to rise, the instrument suddenly emitted the finest notes imaginable. Through 
some of the larger pipes, the water rushed with the voice of thunder, and through other, 
with the sweetness of one of your lutes. In a short time, the effect of the music was such, 
that it seemed to have made all the hearers mad. They laughed and wept alternately, and 
began to dance; and such was their delight, that they did no perceive the disaster which 
had befallen their organ. 
Owing to the unusual height of the tide, and to some unaccountable irregularity 
in the ducts, the pies began to discharge their contents within the building. In a short 
time, the evil became too apparent; for the water rose in spouts from the top of the larger 




Meanwhile, the music swelled louder and louder, and every note was more 
ravishing than the last. The inconvenience of the falling water, which drenched them, 
was entirely forgotten, until, finally, the whole host of pipes discharged every one a 
volume of water upon the charmed congregation. The faster poured the water, the 
sweeter grew the music; and the ground being covered to the height of two or three 
cubits, with the torrent, the people began to float upon it, with intolerable extacies. 
Finally, the whole multitude swam about in this deluge, holding up their head with open 
mouths and ears, as if to swallow the melody, whereby they swallowed much water. 
Many hundreds were immediately drowned; and the enormous pipes, as they emptied 
their rivers, swelled their harmony to such perfection, that the ear could not longer bear 
it, and almost all who escaped drowning, died of the exquisite music. 




The Siphar-tree construction is both a temple and a musical instrument – an organ. In the 
journal manuscript, the word “ORGAN” is centered at the bottom of the page.
16
 Given 
Emerson’s habit to mark each journal page at the bottom with a term that subsumes the content 
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of one or several related pages, and given that he isolated this word as illustrative of the entire 
parable, it is likely that “Organ” was meant as the story’s original title and central motif. The 
machinic organicity of this organ-temple, a hybrid of man’s labor and natural resources, 
suspends the construction somewhere between the house and the body of the goddess Zoe, 
through which water circulates like blood.
17
 The parable merits attention if for no other reason 
than for its unique collapsing of a number of divides: the machinic and the organic (is the 
musical instrument a machine or an organism?); life and death (is ecstasy real death or symbolic 
conversion?); the material and the spiritual (does the organ channel water or divine infusion?).
18
 
Just as it won’t give any structural closure by closing the frame story, the parable leaves these 
questions unanswered by refusing to yield to the body-soul, spirit-matter, mind-nature dualism. 
The figure of this ecstasy-producing arboreal organic instrument, where the organic emphasizes 
its material as well as its anatomic qualities, marks the beginning of Emerson’s philosophical 
pairings of ecstatic state with nature. 
 Nineteen years after the “Organ” parable, in the oration “The Method of Nature,” 
Emerson returned to the motif of ecstasy and declared it to be the very force of nature itself. 
Numerous intertextual parallels between the “Organ” and “The Method” (ecstasy, organicity, 
corporeality, floating, flowing, flooding, filling, circulating) require that the latter be read 
alongside the former, most likely as its corrective elaboration:  
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old” (Nature 41). A definition of man in “Literary Ethics” as “vascular organization whereinto the 
universal spirit freely flows” (LE, 100), is largely reminiscent of the “tubular” organization of Siphar’s 
roots. 
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 Apart from its organic quality, the Siphar tree contains a dimension of collectivity that becomes crucial 
in Emerson’s thought. The only genealogical interpretation I have detected about the tree’s etymology 




I conceive a man as always spoken to from behind, and unable to turn his head and see 
the speaker. In all the millions who have heard the voice, none ever saw the face. … 
That well-known voice speaks in all languages, governs all men, and none ever caught a 
glimpse of its form. If the man will exactly obey it, it will adopt him, so that he shall not 
any longer separate it from himself in his thought, he shall seem to be it, he shall be it. If 
he listen with insatiable ears, richer and greater wisdom is taught him, the sound swells 
to a ravishing music, he is borne away as with a flood, he becomes careless of his food 
and of his house, he is the fool of ideas, and leads a heavenly life. But if his eye is set on 
the things to be done, and not on the truth that is still taught, and for the sake of which 
the things are to be done, then the voice grows faint, and at last is but a humming in his 
ears. His health and greatness consist in his being the channel through which heaven 
flows to earth, in short, in the fulnes in which an ecstatical state takes place in him. It is 
pitiful to be an artist, when, by forbearing to be artists, we might be vessels filled with 
the divine overflowings, enriched by the circulations of omniscience and omnipresence. 
(MN 124-25 , emphasis added) 
While the parable failed to define ecstasy or to spell out the story’s main didactic or 
philosophical claim, it offered a set of rudimentary ideas from which Emerson later coined the 
main concepts of his natural philosophy. The first of these is ecstasy, which already in the 
parable no longer belongs to the religious register exclusively. Instead, it begins to emerge as a 
force that drowns the self, or induces madness. The second is the banyan-like Siphar tree which 
“The Method” reconceives as a human body channeling the vocal vibrations of the “unseen 
pilot” (nature/life), thereby generating ecstasy. Both texts liken ecstasy to an uncontrollable 




abandonment to the fullness of the “ecstatical state,” and a focusing “on the things to be done.” 
In both approaches, ecstasy is impossible to evade. In the latter approach, however, Emerson 
insists that an orientation toward a particular goal of action “dims” the strength of ecstasy’s 
force. This classification, as I will show in the second part of the chapter, acquires political 
consequences toward the end of “The Method,” when nature’s ecstatic method is identified with 
impersonal love, an affect Emerson takes up three years later as the central term of his essay 
“Politics.” 
Emerson delivered “The Method of Nature” in Waterville College in August 1841. The 
audience received it coolly and with confusion despite, as Robert Spiller points out, the 
considerable efforts Emerson had invested in it.
19
 David Robinson suggests that the oration’s 
density stems largely from “the intellectual pressure under which Emerson was propounding the 
doctrine of ecstasy”
20
 – the pressure detectable, among other causes, in the lecture’s 
undecidedness about its own topic. The title’s grammatical ambiguity suggests that the “method 
of nature” is equally about a method that organizes nature, as it is about the one that nature itself 
generates. The ambiguity aligns with the lecture’s conclusions: the very method that “works 
through” nature and makes it ecstatic, generates the standard according to which we measure 
our moral, emotional, political or artistic life. Hence the claim that “we can use nature as a 
convenient standard, and the meter of our rise and fall” (MN 118), which is only a repetition of 
what Emerson said a few years earlier in “The American Scholar” (“[Nature’s] laws are the 
laws of [man’s] mind. Nature then becomes to him the measure of his attainments,” AS 56), or 
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again, three years later, in the essay “Nature” (“We find nature to be the circumstance which 
dwarfs every other circumstance, and judges like a god all men that come to her,” N 541).  
But what is this standard that nature provides? Against which of its qualities does man 
measure his achievement and decisions? 
Nature can only be conceived as existing to a universal and not to a particular end, to a 
universe of ends, and not to one, – a work of ecstasy, to be represented by a circular 
movement, as intention might be signified by a straight line of definite length. … We 
can point nowhere to anything final; but tendency appears on all hands; planet, system, 
constellation, total nature is growing like a field of maze in July, is becoming somewhat 
else is in rapid metamorphosis. … [Nature] does not exist to any one or to any number 
of particular ends, but to numberless and endless benefit; there is no private will, no 
rebel leaf or limb, but the whole is oppressed by one superincumbent tendency, obeys 
that redundancy or excess of life which in conscious beings we call ecstasy. … Because 
ecstasy is the law and cause of nature, therefore you cannot interpret it in too high and 
deep a sense (MN 120, 121, 127)
21
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 The metamorphosis Emerson has in mind here does not, however, follow Goethe’s Gestalt morphology, 
according to which all vegetative life stems from, and is a variation of, one type, or archetypal form: 
“Plants are propagated in different ways, but these various methods are to be regarded as modifications of 
a single basic method. Propagation and prolification [occurs] through development of one organ from 
another. . . . [S]uch organs, though outwardly changed from similarity to the greatest dissimilarity, have 
virtual inner identity.” Also, for Goethe, “the chief concept underlying all observation of life . . . is that a 
creature is self-sufficient.” Johann Wolfgang Goethe, “Preliminary Notes for a Physiology of Plants” and 
“On Morphology,” in Goethe’s Botanical Writings, Translated by Bertha Mueller (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1952), 85, 80. In Emerson, on the contrary, life doesn’t stem from one center, but 
minimally from two. See, for example, Arsić’s note on the “fundamental difference” between duality and 
dualism: “Whereas dualism (for instance, Cartesian) supposes two irreducibly different substances; 
duality supposes a oneness traversed by its opposite. . . . Its opposite, then, has to be within it in order to 
be able to divorce it from itself. . . . Everything is thus composed of the two (of its own identity and its 
contrary), but the two, in this way of thinking, never reconcile in the third” (On Leaving, 376 n. 24). For a 
similar point on irreconcilable opposites in Emerson, see Paul Grimstad’s essay “Emerson’s Adjacencies: 
Radical Empiricism in Nature,” in The Other Emerson, edited by Branka Arsić and Cary Wolfe, 251-270. 




Nature’s method seems strangely unmethodical: nonlinear and without intentionality or 
particular goal, it cancels the possibility of a plan or a pre-given design. As the working of 
ecstasy, nature is traversed by the force under which it issues forms into their own beyond. This 
is what Emerson has in mind when, three years later, he inscribes the following lines at the 
beginning of the essay “Nature”: “Spirit that lurks each form within / Beckons to spirit of its 
kin; / Self-kindled every atom glows, / And hints the future which it owes” (N 539). Every 
form, traversed by the spirit of the future, “owes” a future irreducible to its present state. This is 
not, to be clear, Hegel’s dialectical model, according to which the negation is always already 
inscribed in the form, as an internal contradiction inseparable from it identity. The “owed” 
future in Emerson’s lines is unpredictable and uncharted by the present form. That a future lurks 
in every form of nature means not only that forms are impermanent, but that nature is subject to 
the same laws it itself generates, which the ambiguous title of “The Method of Nature” is 
reflective of: “In all animal and vegetable forms, the physiologist concedes that no chemistry, 
no mechanics, can account for the facts, but a mysterious principle of life must be assumed, 
which not only inhabits the organ, but makes the organ” (MN 119). To say that nature is “the 
work of ecstasy,” therefore, is to assert that nature is both the standard (the law) and a 
“circumstance” subjected to that same law: “The principle that seemed to explain nature will 
itself be included as one example of a bolder generalization,” as Emerson says in “Circles” (C 
405). 
 In the essay “Nature” Emerson introduces a crucial distinction between nature’s two 
characters: “natura naturata,” or passive nature and “natura naturans” active nature (N 543, 
546). The distinction, as Branka Arsić explains, originates in Spinoza’s “expressionist 




explicated through infinite series of finite modes, each of which is only a provisional site of 
impersonal expression.”
22
 Emerson condenses this explanation into a formula: “man [is] the 
form of the formless, the concentration of the vast” (MN 122). In his rendering, active nature 
operates as universal, impersonal life, a flow of matter and forces – “the quick cause, before 
which all forms flee as the driven snows, itself secret, its works driven before it in flocks and 
multitudes … and in undescribable variety” (N 546); passive nature, on the other hand, is 
natura naturans fleetingly and impermanently settled in individual forms or temporary 
“spheral” bodies (Comp. 942), which “The Method of Nature” calls “God in distribution, God 
rushing into multiform benefit” (MN 125): “The method of nature [ecstasy]: who could ever 
analyze it? That rushing stream will not stop to be observed. We can never surprise nature in a 
corner; never find the end of a thread; never tell where to set the first stone. . . . Its permanence 
is a perpetual inchoation” (MN 119).  
 The same year Emerson delivered “The Method,” his collection Essays: First Series 
were published, in which “Circles” rigorously interrogates the problem of life’s formlessness. 
The essay opens with a short poem that subsumes Emerson’s philosophy of nature: 
Nature centres into balls, 
And her proud ephemerals, 
Fast to surface and outside, 
Scan the profile of the sphere; 
Knew they what that signified, 
A new genesis were here. (C 401) 
Similar to the lines that will open “Nature” three years later (“Spirit that lurks each form within 
/ … hints the future which it owes” (N 539)), or to those from “Compensation” about the 
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essentially “unspheral” quality of nature, “Circles” argues for nature’s “ephemeral” and 
“superficial” character, whose “every action admits of being outdone,” and whose “law 
dissolves the fact and holds it fluid” (C 403). Under the law of ecstasy, nature is ceaselessly 




The pine-tree, the river, the bank of flowers before him, does not seem to be nature. 
Nature is still elsewhere. This or this is but outskirt and far-off reflection and echo of the 
triumph that has passed by, and is now at its glancing splendor and heyday, perchance in 
their neighboring fields, or, if you stand in the field then in the adjacent woods. The 
present object shall give you this sense of stillness that follows a pageant which has just 
gone by. (N 553, emphasis added)  
Again, distinct forms of natura naturata are actualized from natura naturans’ multitude of 
movement, and the “present object” is only motion momentarily arrested, an “outskirt and far-
off reflection.” Because, as “The Method of Nature“ establishes, the method that traverses 
nature and the method that nature itself generates are one and the same (“the power or genius of 
nature is ecstatic,” 126, emphasis added), nature’s created forms do not stem from some 
transcendent realm of Platonic ideas, as an emanatory shadow of their originary essence. Rather, 
nature’s essence, paradoxically, is elsewhere-ness, neighbor-ness, adjacent-ness, as the essay 
“Nature” asserts: “It is the same among the men and women, as among the silent trees; always a 
referred existence, an absence, never a presence and satisfaction” (N 553, emphasis added). 
Because nature as universal life is never a self-identity or form of closure (“never a presence 
and satisfaction”), language is incapable, even morphologically, of creating a noun (because of 
                                               
23
 In the 1836 journal entry: “Otherism. I plainly see the charm which belongs to alienation or otherism … 
The very sentiment I expressed yesterday without heed, shall sound memorable to me to-morrow, if I hear 




linguistic stasis) that would name a quality that always already escapes: “elsewhereness,” 




 This is where Emerson’s ontology of ecstasy extends into his epistemology, as not only 
language, but our reflections too reveal their impotence when they attempt to capture nature in 
word, image or thought. What we see is only a “spheral” snapshot of an unceasing, yet 
imperceptible change. Emerson ascribes this faltering of language and reflection to “the mind’s 
tyrannical unifying instinct”: 
Nature hastens to render account of herself to the mind. Classification begins. . . . and 
so, tyrannized over by its own unifying instinct, [the mind] goes on tying things together, 
diminishing anomalies, discovering roots running under ground whereby contrary and 
remote things cohere and flower out from one stem. . . . But what is classification but the 
perceiving that these objects are not chaotic, and are not foreign, but have a law which 
is also a law of the human mind? . . . The ambitious soul sits down before each 
refractory fact; one after another reduces all strange constitutions, all new powers, to 
their class and their law. (AS 55, emphasis added) 
The mind’s tyranny reduces to a single law life’s multifariousness and nature’s multiplicity, 
because it is unable to perceive the numberless rays and potentialities around it.
25
 Early on, 
Emerson addressed the same concern early on, in Nature: 
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 In a note the “Intellect and Natural Sciences,” Emerson echoes nature’s credo – “I grow” – from the 
“Method”: “In speaking of identity, I said, All things grow; in a living mind the thoughts live and grow, 
and what happens in the vegetable happens to them. There are always individuals under generals; not 
stagnant, not childless, but everything alive reproduces, and each has its progeny which fast emerge into 
light; or what seemed one truth presently multiplies itself into many” LL, I: 166). Or in the “Intellect and 
Natural Science”: “There is no fixture in the Universe. Everything moved, did spin, and will spin again … 




It is not so pertinent to man to know all the individuals of the animal kingdom, as it is to 
know whence and whereto is this tyrannizing unity in his constitution, which evermore 
separates and classifies things, endeavoring to reduce the most diverse to one form. 
When I behold a rich landscape, it is less to my purpose to recite correctly the order and 
superposition of the strata, than to know why all thought of multitude is lost in a tranquil 
sense of unity. (Nature, 24, emphasis added) 
While the mind’s unifying propensity reduces nature’s diversity to one form, it is the loss of 
man’s thought of nature’s multitude that Emerson is concerned with. He is not nostalgic for a 
faculty humans may have had before the advent of the modern age (nearness to nature, knowing 
the truth, etc.), as scholars who read Emerson as the follower of British Romanticism argue. His 
claim, rather, concerns the mind’s “tyrannizing” propensity to self-reflexively unify its 
otherwise ecstatic plurality into a coherent whole. But while the mind’s unifying faculty reduces 
many causes to a single law, thus rendering the mind separate from nature’s excessiveness, its 
operation is nevertheless remarkably similar to that of nature. So similar, in fact, that Emerson 
insists on their identity. 
In 1849 Emerson delivered a series of lectures on Mind and Manners of the Nineteenth 
Century. The series closed with a talk titled “The Relation of Intellect to Natural Sciences,” 
which Emerson had intended, quite appropriately, to title “Identity of Thought to Nature.”
26
 The 
                                                                                                                                                       
25
 Emerson makes the same claim already his early “Humanity of Science”: “The mind is reluctant to 
make many classes or to suppose many causes. This reduction to a few laws, to one law, is not a choice of 
the individual. It is the tyrannical instinct of the mind” (EL II, 23).  
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 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Later Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1843-1871, vol. 1: 1843-1854, 
edited by Ronald A. Bosco and Joel Myerson (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001), 155. All 
further references to Emerson’s later lectures are from this edition, abbreviated “LL” and followed by the 
volume and page number. Cf. also: “We feel that there is an occult relation between the very worm, the 
crawling scorpions and man. I am moved by strange sympathies” (EL I, 10); or in later lectures: “Intellect 




lecture opens with the following claim: “The first fact in the Natural History of the Intellect, is 
its similarity, in so many remarkable points, to the history of material atoms; indicating a 
profound identity with all the parts of nature. All seem to come of one stock. … The idea of 
Vegetation is irresistible in considering mental activity. Man seems a higher plant.”
27
 If 
epistemology, as Emerson asserts here, unfolds according to the same mode of operation as 
does ontology – if thought is identical with vegetation – thinking ought to operate ecstatically, 
the way nature does. The same argument equating thought with nature runs through the series 
on The Philosophy of History delivered fifteen years earlier. In the lecture “Humanity of 
Science,” delivered in December 1836, Emerson is explicit:  
A very curious and sublime subject of speculation is the identity of nature’s mind and 
man’s. . . . Indeed man may well be of the same mind as nature, for he too is a part of 
nature, and is inundated with the same genius or spirit. He lives by the same pulsations 
of her life. … One can feel that we are brothers of the oak and of the grass, that the 
vegetable principle pervades human nature also.
28
 
The brotherhood of trees and humans is reflected in their sharing the same ecstatic method. The 
year he delivered Mind and Manners of the Nineteenth Century, Emerson jotted down the 
following equation in his journal: “I hold that ecstasy will be found mechanical, if you please to 
say so, or, nothing but an example on a higher field of the same gentle gravitation by which 
rivers run.”
29
 The gesture unambiguously naturalizes ecstasy – equating it with the force of 
                                                                                                                                                       
“All our progress is an unfolding like vegetable bud. You have first an instinct, then an opinion, then a 
knowledge, as the plant as root, bud, and fruit” (EL II: 250).  
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 LL 1: 155. 
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 EL II: 34-35. Similarly in “The Intellect and natural Science”: A man is a developed animalcule; 
animalcule is an arrested Man, but animalcule, again, is made up of atoms, the same atoms of which 
water, fire, or sand are composed, and, on each atom, the whole atomic power is impressed” (LL I: 160).  
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 JMN 11: 53. The essay “Inspiration” (1879) contains the same assertion, with a slight emendation 




gravitation – and effectively wrenches it out of the realm of psychology and religious 
affectivity. But if, as Nature claims, the unity of ecstatic, disunited nature (or life) is the result 
of the mind’s imposition, and if all life, including human life, is traversed by nature’s ecstatic 
method, then the human mind, Emerson seems to suggest, imposes a tyrannizing unity on its 
own otherwise ecstatic life. “Circles” charts the mind’s inherent proclivity for arresting life’s 
movement – “This incessant movement and progression which all things partake could never 
become sensible to us but by contrast to some principle of fixture or stability in the soul” (C 
412) – while “Self-Possession” establishes precisely this correlation by claiming that the mind 
follows the same principle of impermanence as does the body; both, like natura naturata, are 
only momentary fixations: 
An individual body is the arrest or momentary fixation of certain atoms, which, after 
performing compulsory duty to this enchanted statue, are released again to flow in 
currents of the world. An individual Soul, in like manner, is a fixation or momentary 
eddy in which certain sciences and powers of immaterial force are taken up, and work 
and minister in petty circles and localities, and, then, being released, return to the 
unbounded soul of the World.
30
 
Both the atoms that create the body and the immaterial forces that govern the mind (or Soul) 
operate as momentary coagulations of matter and thoughts into what Emerson in 
                                                                                                                                                       
example on a higher plane of the same gentle gravitation by which stones fall and rivers run.” The 
Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson: Letters and Social Aims, vol. 8, Edited by Edward Waldo 
Emerson (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1886), 261. 
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 LL II: 119, emphasis added. See also in “The Method of Nature”: “The gnarled oak to live a thousand 
years is the arrest and fixation of the most volatile and ethereal currents” (MN 131); in “Circles”: “The 
natural world may be conceived of as a system of concentric circles, and we now and then detect in nature 
slight dislocations, which apprize us that this surface on which we now stand is not fixed, but sliding. 
These manifold tenacious qualities, this chemistry and vegetation, these metals and animals, which seem 
to stand there for their own sake, are means and methods only, — are words of God, and as fugitive as 
other words” (C 409); and in “History”: “Nothing is so fleeting as form; yet never does it quite deny 
itself. … Time dissipates to shining ether the solid angularity of facts. No anchor, no cable, no fences, 






 Once the material and the immaterial condense in a 
momentary fixation to form a body or a thought, they are released and returned to the 
surrounding flow. The “momentary fixation” and its subsequent “release” is the operation of 
nature’s ecstatic method which the mind, as does all life, follows. Let me repeat then: 
Emerson’s ecstasy is dissimilar from individual religiosity or the psychological state of elation. 
Even the passages in his work we would most readily identify as instances of ecstatic euphoria, 
when read through the lens of ecstatic life, refute this initial interpretative impulse. A famous 
passage from “Literary Ethics” is one such example. It offers an image of the “momentary 
fixation,” allowing an instant glimpse – a small epiphany – into the way all life operates: 
Whilst I read the poets, I think that nothing new can be said about morning and evening. 
But when I see the daybreak, I am not reminded of these Homeric, or Shakspearian, or 
Miltonic, or Chaucerian pictures. No; but I feel perhaps the pain of an alien world; a 
world not yet subdued by the thought; or, I am cheered by the moist, warm, glittering, 
budding, melodious hour, that takes down the narrow walls of my soul, and extends its 
life and pulsation to the very horizon. That is morning, to cease for a bright hour to be a 
prisoner of this sickly body, and to become as large as nature. (LE 102, emphasis added) 
With the mind’s unifying capacity momentarily suspended, the speaker is released from his 
subjective position of the “I” (which is why the “I” becomes as “large as nature”), whereby his 
unity with the rush and flow of matter and natural forces is revealed out of the impersonal 
position of ecstatic life. With the “I’s” momentary fixation interrupted, the self is discharged 
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 See also “The Spirit of the Times”: “Wisdom may even be said to consist in keeping the soul liquid, or 
in resisting the tendency to too rapid petrifaction” (LL II: 146). 
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II Politics: Banyan Tree vs. Oak 
When in “The Method of Nature” Emerson divides men into two groups – those who abandon 
themselves to ecstatic excess, and those who strive to arrest this excess in order to intervene 
politically – he is mapping out two approaches to politics: revolutionary and reformist. While it 
may seem counterintuitive to associate revolution with abandonment and ecstatic self-loss, in 
this part of the chapter I attempt to chart precisely the unorthodox terminology Emerson 
employs in articulating his politics.  
 I have indicated that “The Method of Nature” represents, in my reading, Emerson’s first 
serious elaboration not only of his philosophy of nature but of his political theory as well. Apart 
from the definition of nature and life as ecstatic, Emerson’s oration gestures toward some of the 
seminal political postulates he would later explicate in the essay “Politics” and “The Address on 
the Anniversary of the Emancipation of the Negroes in the British West Indies,” both published 
in 1844. These ideas concern, on the one hand, his association of reformist politics with the will 
to power, and on the other his yoking of the revolution with an affect of impersonal love. 
In the 1847 “Editors’ Address” to the first issue of the Massachusetts Quarterly, 
Emerson wrote: “We believe politics to be nowise accidental or exceptional, but subject to the 
same laws with trees, earths and acids.”
33
 The idea that ecstatic law governs inorganic 
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eight issues were reprinted in a two-volume book, Massachusetts Quarterly Review (Boston: Coolidge & 
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compounds as well as social formations permeates Emerson’s entire work. In “Wealth,” for 
example, it is articulated as a gradation in complexity:  
“[Power] passes through the sacred fermentations, by that law of Nature whereby 
everything climbs to higher platforms, and bodily vigor becomes mental and moral 
vigor. The bread he eats is first strength and animal spirits: it becomes, in higher 
laboratories, imagery and thought; and in still higher results, courage and endurance. 
This is the right compound interest; this is capital doubled, quadrupled, centupled; man 
raised to his highest power” (Wealth 836) 
And again in “Friendship”: “The Law of nature is alternation for evermore. … This method 
betrays itself along the whole history of our personal relations” (F 344); in “History”: “A man is 
a bundle of relations, a knot of roots” (H 254); in “Nature”: “So poor is nature with all her craft, 
that, from the beginning to the end of the universe, she has but one stuff, – but one stuff with its 
two ends, to serve up all her dream-like variety. Compound it how she will, star, sand, fire, 
water, tree, man, it is still one stuff, and betrays the same properties” (547); in “Self-Reliance”: 
“A man or a company of men, plastic and permeable to principles, by the law of nature must 
overpower and ride all cities, nations, kings, rich men, poets” (SR 272); and most explicitly in 
“Sovereignty of Ethics”: 
Since the discovery of Oersted that galvanism and electricity and magnetism are only 
forms of one and the same force, and convertible each into the other, we have 
continually suggested to us a larger generalization: that each of the great departments of 




plane; that the intellectual and moral worlds are analogous to the material. There is a 
kind of latent omniscience not only in every man, but in every particle.
34
  
Since the same ecstatic method applies to the minutest particle as it does to man, animal and 
plant, higher organization is obviously a matter of complexity and degree, rather than a 
difference in quality. Surprisingly, however, the same law permeates not just all material and 
organic compounds, but inorganic and immaterial structures as well – “the intellectual and 
moral worlds,” and by extension the realms of politics and ethics. But if those too are shot 
through by the law of impermanence, where does that leave political action, rights and 
obligations? 
Emerson recognized that prescribing a particular social order or form of government 
requires that life’s indigenous ecstatic method be overlooked. He, therefore, never openly 
favored any system: “Born democrats, we are nowise qualified to judge of monarchy, which, to 
our fathers living in the monarchical idea, was also relatively right. But our institutions, though 
in coincidence with the spirit of the age, have not any exemption from the practical defects 
which have discredited other forms” (P 563).
35
 The position that refuses to select one side over 
the other, especially in the age of slavery and brimming abolitionism, easily offends common 
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 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson: Lectures and Biographical 
Sketches, vol. 10, edited by Edward Waldo Emerson (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1907), 
183, emphasis added.  
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 The closest he ever came to proposing a form of community was the essay “Politics,” where a good 
state is said to be founded on love instead of force: “We live in a very low state of the world, and pay 
unwilling tribute to governments founded on force. . . . There never was in any man sufficient faith in the 
power of rectitude to inspire him with the broad design of renovating the State on the principle of right 
and love” (570). As love in Emerson is the ultimate impersonal force,
 
a state founded on love is one 
operating on unconscious affect: “What is Love, and why is it the chief good, but because it is an 
overpowering enthusiasm? Never self-possessed or prudent, it is all abandonment. Is it not a certain 
admirable wisdom, preferable to all other advantages, and whereof all others are only secondaries and 
indemnities, because this is that in which the individual is no longer his own foolish master, but inhales 
an odorous and celestial air, is wrapped round with awe of the object, blending for the time that object 
with the real and only good, and consults every omen in nature with tremulous interest. When we speak 
truly, — is not he only unhappy who is not in love? his fancied freedom and self-rule — is it not so much 




notions of social justice and duties. Emerson’s reservations about progressive political 
movements of the time are confusing: some ascribe them to his elitism, aloofness, or hatred of 
populism; others try to rescue his reputation by drawing attention to his public outrage against 
flagrant violations of the rights of women and slaves. Both critics and defenders of Emerson’s 
politics, however, overlook the centrality of ecstatic excess in his thought, which accounts for 
so many misreadings of his actual stance on the political. While I would argue that, in light of 
ontological ecstasy, Emerson’s criticism of state, society and contemporary utopian projects 
does not stem from his focus on individual liberties or natural rights, these questions do persist 
in his writings as a consequence rather than as the cause of his politics.  
As we have seen, Emersonian singular plurality is not rooted in a fixed set of properties, 
but is instead a site of volatile dispositions that, due to their impermanence, do not belong to it. 
Prior identitarian delineations are, therefore superfluous, and exclusions based on those 
delineations are redundant: our persons are always, and fundamentally, more than one – 
excessive and multiple (“There must be very two, before there can be very one,” Emerson says 
in “Friendship,” F 350). The structure of the subject’s indigenous multiplicity leads to important 
political consequences. If our persons are always already more than one, stable identity is an 
illusion. Accordingly, any organizing principle (or the method) of society and community 
necessarily figures as a structure of identitarian fixation and imposition. Further, because 
Emerson’s notion of “banyanesque” singular plurality emerges not from “ahistorical 
mysticism,” as Neil Dolan has suggested,
36
 but from a political conception of excessive, 
uncontained personhood, it may be argued, perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, that it is 
politics that informs Emerson’s ontology, rather than the other way around.  
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Emerson’s “Letter to the President Martin Van Buren” in 1838 against the Cherokee 
removal, his Address on the Anniversary of the Emancipation of the Negroes in the West Indies 
in 1844, his nominal backing of Alcott’s Frutidlands and George Ripley’s Brook Farm 
experiments, his public support for women’s rights in 1855, and for John Brown in 1860 all 
testify to his persistent care for the unrepresented and the silenced. But while he supported 
demands for recognition, Emerson also complicated the coordinates of standard identity-based 
politics by suggesting ways in which such demands were both problematic and circular. The 
thwarted voices that appeal for appreciation, he seems to suggest, are in fact inseparable from 
the very ideology that advances identity (racial, gender, class, human, religious) as its 
foundation. Inextricably implicated in the perpetrator-victim dialectic, this ideology, which 
presupposes differentiation based on individual or collective identifications, locks relations into 
a perpetual cycle of violence that can be broken, or at least weakened, Emerson proposes, only 
by conceiving of non-appropriative modes of being: 
He who aims at progress, should aim at an infinite, not at a special benefit. The reforms 
whose fame now fills the land with Temperance, Anti-Slavery, Non-Resistance, No 
Government, Equal Labor, fair and generous as each appears, are poor bitter things when 
prosecuted for themselves as an end. To every reform, in proportion to its energy, early 
disgusts are incident, so that the disciple is surprised at the very hour of his first 
triumphs, with chagrins, and sickness, and a general distrust: so that he shuns his 
associates, hates the enterprise which lately seemed so fair, and meditates to cast himself 
into the arms of that society and manner of life which he had newly abandoned with so 




When taken as an end in itself, reform stops short of revolutionizing the system against which it 
rebels. All it accomplishes is a temporary rearrangement, as one new heretofore disenfranchised 
identity is included in the rights-having group. But the structure that generates these 
dichotomies of power and injustice, empowerment and disempowerment, remains intact. This is 
precisely what Emerson acerbically refers to when in “The Address on the Anniversary of the 
Emancipation of the Negroes in the British West Indies” he points out that “the First of August 
marks the entrance of a new element into modern politics, namely, the civilization of negro. A 
man is added to the human family” (AA 988, emphasis added). The problem is not, Emerson 
seems to suggest, that some groups don’t belong to “the human family” but should; the 
problem, rather, is that the “human family” exists as a category of inclusion or exclusion in the 
first place. Someone or something, Emerson worries, will always remain outside “the family”: 
Tell me not how great your project is, the civil liberation of the world, its conversion 
into a Christian church, the establishment of public education, cleaner diet, a new 
division of labor and of land, laws of love for laws of property; – I say to you plainly 
there is no end to which your practical faculty can aim, so sacred or so large, that, if 
pursued for itself, will not at last become carrion and an offence to the nostril. … The 
ends are momentary. … Your end should be one inapprehensible to the senses. (MN, 
124, 127-28, emphasis added) 
When Emerson discusses politics, he is almost always understood to be focusing on 
social collectivity, institutional organization (state) and citizens’ rights. Scholars most often 
base these analyses on an axiomatic assumption that there is in Emerson something like a more 
or less complete individual, the zero degree of politics. With this reading in view, interpreters 




in his influential diagnosis of Emerson’s inner life as torn between optimism and “serenity” – 
between freedom and fate – organizes this division along Emerson’s earlier belief in, and later 
rejection of, “the infinitude of the private man.” In the later phase, the rejection of infinitude 
leads, according to Whicher, to a self-sufficient individual, withdrawn from society and 
activism.
37
 George Kateb defines Emerson as “the founder of the philosophy of democratic 
individualism,” and singles out self-reliance as “the true principle of Emerson,” the principle of 
individualism.
38
 Judith Shklar, on the other hand, sees him as a prophet of discrete 
individualism and representative democracy. Her reading of the place and role of representative 
men as those who reveal knowledge, who “teach a child” and “talk to the citizens,” is perhaps 
unilateral: “The only way to reform is to begin with oneself and then to deal only with others as 
discrete individuals, not ‘causes.’”
39
 Society is composed, Shklar suggests, of rounded atoms 
who can survive as individuals in isolation.
40
 In a similar vein, although disapprovingly, 
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Quentin Anderson in The Imperial Self criticizes Emerson for his loss of touch with social and 
communal dimensions of personhood. In his view, Emerson devises a self-absorbed, inflated 
individual, whose consciousness is the sufficient element for existence. Such self, in Anderson’s 
words, is imperial in that it “incorporates” and unifies in itself all external influences instead of 
maintaining the diversity of an outside world. Contending with this ahistorical portrayal of 
Emerson, and opposing, as he calls them, the “postmodernist,” “antifoundationalist” readers 
who emphasize Emerson’s ultimate dissolution of the subject, Neil Dolan more recently sets out 
to define Emerson as a propagator of “liberal culture.”
41
 Beginning from the premise that “only 
through the independent exercise of reason could one free oneself from the falsehoods 
promulgated by tradition and come to grasp real truths about nature, the self, and the cosmos,” 
Dolan presents not “a cloudy mystic with a deficient sense of reality,” but an advocate of 
“sanguine, temperate, historically alert political realism.”
42
 Common to all these readings is a 
view of Emerson as advancing liberal democratic values of individualism.
43
 
What I read in Emerson’s ecstatic ontology disagrees with these individual-centered 
interpretations, which take the individual to be the smallest communal unit, and build from that 
premise – critically or approvingly – a commonality that figures as something externally 
imposed or subsequently added onto the self. Closer to my understanding of Emerson’s 
conception of community are critics like Stanley Cavell and his notion of the invisible 
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community of Emerson’s readers;
44
 Richard Poirier and his conception of Emersonian self as 
“written off”;
45
 Sharon Cameron’s insistence on abandonment and impersonality in Emerson;
46
 
Branka Arsić for whom Emerson is a predecessor to the anarcho-socialist general strike;
47
 
Barbara Packer in whose reading Emerson is the philosopher of transition;
 48
 and Kerry 
Larson’s “illiberal” Emerson, resisting the tradition of liberalism.
49
 Different as these readings 
may be, insisting as they do on a variety of angles in Emerson’s rich political thought, they all 
share one common denominator, to which my reading subscribes, and that is the rejection of 
Emerson as a thinker of individualism.  
Emerson certainly didn’t hold liberalism’s essential values – freedom, justice and 
equality – to be inherently problematic. Nor was his primary contention with power as such. 
Rather, what he repudiated was the fact that liberal values were distributed within the system of 
power through the notion of rights-bearing individuals, normatively defined as self-identical 
human entities endowed with certain properties. For liberal democracy to exist, there must exist 
the notion of an autonomous, indivisible subject, which in turn entails an imposition of a set of 
(however loose and ever-expanding) identitarian delineations. It should be clear, though, that 
Emerson’s worry was not libertarian: he did not fear that the state apparatus or social 
institutions were too restrictive of the individual’s full expression of its individuality. Rather, 
his objection was two-fold: that individuals are an invention of the rights-giving political system 
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constituted by liberalism; and that, in granting rights to individuals, this system necessarily 
excludes those who fail to meet its standard of who counts as an individual person.
50
 
But that’s not all. While Emerson acknowledged and often publicly welcomed the 
reformist struggle for social justice, he also recognized that the view of politics this struggle 
rests on, while not necessarily wrong, is incomplete and self-serving, or “partial,” as he 
ambiguously calls it in “New England Reformers” (NER 596). It is incomplete because, 
conceived in this way, the zone of the political is defined as qualitatively monolithic: a field 
within which identities are allocated in advance, based on a supposedly “neutral” standard; a 
field enlarged only quantitatively by the addition of new rights and demands for recognition 
(women, former slaves, immigrants, religious groups, etc.). Thus, Emerson says in “Circles”: 
“There is no virtue which is final; all are initial. The virtues of society are vices of the saint. The 
terror of reform is the discovery that we must cast away our virtues, or what we have always 
esteemed such, into the same pit that has consumed our grosser vices” (C 411). Two issues 
emerge here: 1) because morality, like nature, is subject to constant change, the “terror of 
reform” makes virtue and vice indistinguishable; consequently 2) the field of political rights 
must be constantly enlarged, filled with new demands. Emerson draws chilling consequences 
from this rights-generating system: 
Each “Cause,” as it is called, — say Abolition, Temperance, say Calvinism, or 
Unitarianism, – becomes speedily a little shop, where the article, let it have been at first 
never so subtle and ethereal, is now made up into portable and convenient cakes, and 
retailed in small quantities to suit purchasers. You make very free use of these words 
“great” and “holy,” but few things appear to them such. Few persons have any 
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magnificence of nature to inspire enthusiasm, and the philanthropies and charities have a 
certain air of quackery. (Transcendentalist, 203, emphasis added). 
The logic of capitalism scaffolds this reformist system: as new demands are added to the field of 
politics, a demand for demand (like a desire for desire) emerges as its organizing principle. 
Rights become commodities; reform – the site of trade and exchange: “Under every leaf, is the 
bud of a new leaf; and, not less, under every thought, is a newer thought. Every reform is only a 




What Emerson wanted his readers and listeners to discern, was that politics and ethics, 
like stars, persons, stones, and all of nature (“the intellectual and moral worlds are analogous to 
the material”) are traversed by the force of ecstatic interruption, which ceaselessly reconstitutes 
them through pressures and influences that are not necessarily, and certainly not always, 
controlled by individuals, their intentions and actions. “The Present Age” articulates the 
possibility of such essentially impersonal action (Nature calls this action “active enchantments,” 
15): 
We must learn to respect inaction more than prodigious activity without. . . . Real action 
is in silent moments. The epochs of our life are not in the visible affairs of our choice of 
a calling, our marriage, our acquisition of an office and the like, but in a silent thought 
by the wayside as we walk, in a thought which revises our entire manner of life. … This 
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Because it is irreducible to political projects and programs, reform as a means of change is, at 
best, incomplete:  
Many a reformer perishes in his removal of rubbish, – and that makes the offensiveness 
of the class. They are partial; they are not equal to the work they pretend. … The 
criticism and attack on institutions which we have witnessed, has made one thing plain, 
that society gains nothing whilst a man, not himself renovated, attempts to renovate 
things around him. (NER 596).  
While reforms enlarge the list of rights-recipients yet fail to question the very categories on 
which the system of rights-allotment rests (“man is not renovated”), Emerson’s philosophy of 
ecstasy calls for Reform with a capital “R”: 
What is a man born for but to be a Reformer, a Re-maker of what man has made; a 
renouncer of lies; a restorer of truth and good, imitating that great Nature which 
embosoms us all, and which sleeps no moment on an old past, but every hour repairs 
herself, yielding us every morning a new day, and with every pulsation a new life? Let 
him renounce everything which is not true to him, and put all his practices back on their 
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The only reform Emerson holds viable, is the radical reform that follows nature’s ecstatic 
method. In fact, as I have suggested earlier, this same distinction between “reformers” and 
“Reformers” is restated in “The Method of Nature” as a division between those who focus “on 
the things to be done,” and those who abandon themselves to the “fullness” of the “ecstatical 
state” (MN 125). The first – reformers – subscribe to the discourse of rights and attend to the 
demands at hand. The latter – Reformers – embrace ecstatic impersonality and refuse, even 
while they participate in the projects of social reform, to take the discourse of rights as final or 
an end in itself.  
It goes without saying, I hope, that Emerson is not being prescriptive here: he is not 
preaching passivity in the face of slaughter and torture of slaves in ante-bellum America. To go 
back to the question from the beginning of this chapter – can we still call politics the 
considerations that undertake to redefine the premises that anchor the very concept of the 
political? – I answer, together with Emerson, in the affirmative, by adding that his political 
theory analyzes and describes, rather than prescribes. Instead of siding with a particular project, 
he criticizes precisely those progressives who come closest to his ecstatic ethics 
(transcendentalists, abolitionists, suffragists, founders of utopian projects), and reproaches them 
for their failure to recognize that persons are ecstatic prior to being socially or politically 
individualized (“prepolitical,” as Stanley Cavell says);
54
 that ecstasy is precisely the condition 
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of individuality rather than its outcome, and that it is both futile and dangerous to make oneself 
at home in a community of reductive identitarian essences. It is futile because the law of ecstasy 
disallows the solidity of form; and detrimental, because an attempt to preserve and maintain the 
solidity of form necessitates tyranny and violence. This is why a rhizomatic banyan, rather than 
an immovably arborescent oak, should be made the principle of society, as the essay “Politics” 
explicates: 
Society lies before [young man] in rigid repose, with certain names, men, and 
institutions, rooted like oak-trees to the centre, round which all arrange themselves the 
best they can. But the old statesman knows that society is fluid; there are no such roots 
and centres; but any particle may suddenly become the centre of the movement, and 
compel the system to gyrate round it. (P, 559, emphasis added) 
The passage is illuminating not only because it defines society as amorphous (fluid), but also 
because a center formed suddenly, from any given particle, points to at least three important 
conclusions: first, that in a society, whatever its formal organization, there are revolutionary 
forces, particles capable of dismantling the social system and its values by forming new centers 
unexpectedly; secondly, that a shifting center suddenly breaking out implies that the ecstatic 
force interrupts and traverses every system; and third, that such an imperceptible force is the 
system’s inherent weakness – or its revolutionary strength. Or, as Emerson clarifies in “Self-
Reliance,” where society’s operative mode resembles the lateral, rather than vertical movement 
of the banyan tree: “Society never advances. It recedes as fast on one side as it gains on the 
other. It undergoes continual changes; it is barbarous, it is civilized, it is Christianized, it is rich, 




▪ ▪ ▪ 
Having defined nature as “inexact and boundless” (MN 119), “a work of ecstasy,” “wasteful 
hospitality” (120), “excess,” “elelewhereness” (121), a “multiform benefit,” “the formless,” “the 
waste abyss of possibility” (122), “ravishing music” (124), and “a cup of enchantments” (126); 
and having equated all life, including ethics and politics, with ecstatic nature (127), Emerson 
concludes his oration, “The Method,” with an insight that politics ought not be organized around 
a “single end” (120): because “ends are momentary … let him beware of proposing to himself 
any end” (124-25). But then, in the last few pages, he reformulates this admonition in his 
characteristically enigmatic way: 
Your end should be one inapprehensible to the senses: then will it be a god always 
approached, – never touched; always giving health. A man adorns himself with prayer 
and love, as an aim adorns an action. What is strong but goodness, and what is energetic 
but the presence of a brave man? The doctrine in vegetable physiology of the presence, or 
the general influence of any substance over and above its chemical influence, as of an 
alkali or a living plant, is more predicable of man. You need not speak to me, I need not 
go where you are, that you should exert magnetism on me. Be you only whole and 
sufficient, and I shall feel you in every part of my life and fortune, and I can as easily 
dodge the gravitation of the globe as escape your influence. (128, emphasis added) 
While finite ends define action, man (like nature) is defined by infinitude which makes every 
man “whole and sufficient.” Strangely, other “whole and sufficient” men are not at all other, and 
not in the least whole, sufficient, or self-same, because they are assemblages of the same 




of nature (“I shall feel you in every part of my life and fortune”).
55
 This ecstatic ontological 
condition is the condition of love, Emerson says: “an overpowering enthusiasm. Never self-
possessed or prudent, it is all abandonment … because it is that in which the individual is no 
longer his own foolish master, but inhales an odorous and celestial air, is wrapped with awe of 
the object, blending for the time that object with the real and only good” (128), in a word – “a 
love impersonal” (129). The terms Emerson uses to define love are just as easily transplantable 
onto his definitions of ecstasy (although by now it should be clear that Emerson’s ecstatic love is 
not reducible to an affection between two persons in sexual or emotional ecstasy). Man’s 
condition of ecstatic love “is that in which the individual is no longer his own foolish master,” 
where constraints of personal identity are relinquished, the mind’s “tyrannizing unity” 
interrupted, and individual properties suspended. Emerson’s new language (love is impersonal, 
ecstasy is natural, reform is partial) is a call for a new political philosophy – one that would not 
be anchored in identitarian constraints that require violence and mastery over life’s excessive 
logic as well as over others. While we are individualized personalities, “momentary fixations” of 
matter, ideas and values, we ought to reject mastery and violence in our relations with others 
(others, who are, in fact, ourselves).  
It is not surprising, then, that Emerson should close his essay “Politics” with a call to 
build a state on the principles of “right and love”: 
The power of love, as the basis of a State, has never been tried. We must not imagine that 
all things are lapsing into confusion, if every tender protestant be not compelled to bear 
his part in certain social conventions: nor doubt that roads can be built, letters carried, 
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and the fruit of labor secured, when the government of force is at an end. Are our 
methods now so excellent that all competition is hopeless? Could not a nation of friends 
even devise better ways? … What is strange too, there never was in any man sufficient 
faith in the power of rectitude, to inspire him with the broad design of renovating the 
State on the principle of right and love. All those who have pretended this design, have 
been partial reformers, and have admitted in some manner the supremacy of the bad 
State. (P 569-70) 
The new state, of course, would no longer be a state in the usual sense, because it would be in a 
permanent state of revolution: impersonal love, like ecstasy, would interrupt all forms, 
disallowing the mastery of a “bad state,” or bad laws.  
“Bad state” is the central problem of Emerson’s “Address on the Fugitive Slave Law” 
and the “Address on the Anniversary of the Emancipation of the Negroes in the British West 
Indies”: in the face of bad laws that incarcerate and murder, is legal formalism acceptable? 
Emerson answers no, and on by now familiar grounds: “Here is something that transcends all 
forms. Let the senators and representatives of the State, containing a population of a million 
freemen, go in a body before the Congress, and say, that they have a demand to make on them so 
imperative, that all functions of government must stop, until it is satisfied” (AA 984, my 
emphasis). Because ecstatic life “transcends all forms,” including legal ones, it must not be 
injured, violated, tortured, killed, confined. To protect life, the law must be suspended, the state 
interrupted, “all functions of government must stop.” When the British slaveholders revolted 
against the laws of their country, relinquishing their power not only over the slaves, but also over 




This event was a moral revolution. The history of it is before you. Here was no prodigy, 
no fabulous hero, no Trojan horse, no bloody war, but all was achieved by plain means of 
plain men, working not under a leader, but under a sentiment. Other revolutions have 
been insurrection of the oppressed; this was the repentance of the tyrant. It was masters 
revolting from their mastery. The slave-holder said, I will not hold slaves. The end was 
noble, and the means were pure. (AA 986) 
The end is noble and the means pure because they align with nature’s method of ecstatic love – a 
form of “presumptive generosity”
56
 that stays attuned to the volatility and impermanence of life, 
and of personhood. Only this ethical openness to life’s amorphousness can, Emerson hopes, 
cultivate the politics of true Reformers, moral revolutionaries – those who, in relinquishing their 
power over others, abandon themselves to the “fullness of the ecstatical state in them” (MN 125).  
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“Earthly Mind”: Thinking through Pain in Margaret Fuller 
 
“Pain is very keen with me,” Margaret Fuller wrote to James Nathan in April 1845. “I cannot 
help fearing it.”
1
 At other times, however, fear is dismissed and pain eagerly embraced: “I wish 
to know and feel my pain, to investigate its nature and its source; I will not have my thoughts 
diverted, or my feelings soothed.”
2
 Fuller’s indecisiveness about whether the pain is to be 
dreaded and shunned, or accepted and scrutinized is reflective of her dual attitude to it: while 
attempting to alleviate the relentless migraines that plagued her entire life, Fuller was 
discovering that understanding pain – living alongside it rather than escaping it – yields a 
profound redefinition of the concept of personhood. 
 As her letters and journals corroborate, pain was Fuller’s central concern because she 
understood it to be inseparable from thinking. The two were, in her view, related by physical 
proximity, as pain, in her case, was most often located in the head. She writes about agonizing, 
debilitating headaches, and often views them as having been aggravated by the operation of 
thinking that is, in turn, immobilized by pain. Yet, because she held thinking in high esteem, she 
was determined to find a way out of this vicious circle and escape the pain in order to continue to 
think. Because the available medications provided either no relief or the kind of relief that 
disabled any activity, Fuller was forced to look for the cure elsewhere. Gradually, as I will 
suggest, she found it in a peculiar procedure which involved inducing a trance-like state through 
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 Margaret Fuller, The Letters of Margaret Fuller, vol. 2, edited by Robert N. Hudspeth (Ithaca, NY: 
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bodily exhaustion that dimmed consciousness and abolished the sense of self-presence. By 
wearing down the body through a set of repetitive practices, Fuller would wear down the mind’s 
ability to unify the perceptions into a coherent whole, which would in turn allow her to displace 
herself from pain. In other words, instead of weakening the headache, her alternative pain-
management method consisted of allowing the pain to go on, while the self’s capacity to feel was 
weakened. Over time, Fuller’s stupors solidified into a procedure of generating ecstasy that 
enabled her to temporarily abstract the self from itself – from its personal perspective, individual 
desires, expectations, values, hopes. During one such ecstatic exercise, the self would be 
disappropriated from its singular properties, and dissolved into its component sensing elements 
with no unifying structure of self-presence to hold it together.  
 In what follows, I describe how Fuller developed this method by way of sustained 
attentiveness to pain, and how it eventually led her to the notion of an impersonal “Ecstatica”
3
 – 
the idea of a self dislodged from personal identity. The argument proposed here is historical in 
that it takes into account the chronological trajectory of Fuller’s systematic attempts to alleviate 
her headaches.
4
 Fuller developed a practice of erasing personal identity through ecstasy in order 
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 “Ecstatica” is Fuller’s term for a woman in ecstatic and/or mesmeric trance, a state she sees as the 
enlargement of “intellectual resources,” which is to say – as a mode of thinking that is different from 
rational reasoning. Margaret Fuller, “The Great Lawsuit. Man versus Men. Woman versus Women,” The 
Dial 4, no. 1 (1843): 37. In the Appendix to his edition of the Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli, 
Fuller’s brother Arthur identifies her with an “exaltada”: “Margaret Fuller Ossoli lived above the world, 
while she lived in it. She was one of those exaltadas who are described in her Woman in the Nineteenth 
Century” (MMF 1:365).  
4
 My reading draws primarily on Fuller’s “private” writings – letters, journals, unpublished memoirs 
(“Autobiographical Romance” and the notes for it), the style and themes of which differ, sometimes 
vastly, from her “public” texts. The former are not as branded by contemporary rhetorical conventions, 
and are more interested in the status of the self, the problem of pain, the materiality of thinking, and its 
relation to suffering. However, the fact that Fuller allowed her journal to be read by her friends renders 
this distinction between private and public irrelevant. Joel Myerson, for example, points to a pencil mark 
Fuller made in her journal from August 17, 1842: “Will Mr. E[merson] mark the parts he intends to use. 
After Mr. E has used this, I would like it again.” “Margaret Fuller’s 1842 Journal: At Concord with the 
Emersons,” edited by Joel Myerson, Harvard Library Bulletin 21, no. 3 (1973): 322. Robert Hudspeth 




to achieve an impersonal perspective that would remove her subjective participation in her 
headaches, leaving the mind to succumb to the neutrally objective pain. Crucial for my reading 
are Sharon Cameron’s two meditations on pain: the novel Beautiful Work and “The Practice of 
Attention,” an essay on Simone Weil.
5
 Although Cameron has not written on Margaret Fuller, 
her attempts to distinguish pain from suffering through meditation and impersonality have been 
central to my own understanding of Fuller’s life-long wrestling with the pitfalls and potentials of 
pain.  
In Beautiful Work Cameron’s narrator Anna embarks on a series of meditation retreats 
during which she is initiated into the technique of depersonalization by way of abstracting her 
self from her own desires, expectations and hopes. The purpose of these exercises is to reach a 
momentary state devoid of personal perspective that enables one to register the distinction 
between what Cameron calls “seeing” the world as it is, and “remembering” it through an 
individual point of view. The procedure consists of “look[ing] at objects closely and practic[ing] 
seeing them clearly … where you try to recognize the difference between seeing and 
remembering” (BW iii). In disposing of personal viewpoint, one uncovers perspectivelessness, or 
                                                                                                                                                       
been written continuously from notes made in advance, for the writing flows smoothly over the sheets, 
showing no signs of having been taken up and put down as a diary or a commonplace book. The hand is 
clear and legible. The manuscript has a few pencil additions and changes (mostly corrected punctuation) 
added by Fuller at an unknown date.” Hudspeth’s description reveals Fuller’s editorial intervention 
tampering with the manuscript, as if she intended the text to be read by others. (“Margaret Fuller’s 1839 
Journal: Trip to Bristol,” edited by Robert N. Hudspeth, Harvard Library Bulletin 27, no. 4 (1979): 454). 
Lengthy segments of her journals and letters were published in two volumes shortly after her death, as the 
Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli (1852), and then republished by her brother Arthur Fuller (1884), in 
which Fuller’s correspondence and journals are placed alongside the segments from her published works 
and the reminiscences of her contemporaries often without any sign of separation or distinction, 
bestowing on all these texts an equally “public” status. The Memoirs have long been treated by critics as 
inseparable from Fuller’s published works. 
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 Sharon Cameron, Beautiful Work: A Meditation on Pain (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2000) – hereafter quoted parenthetically in the text and abbreviated as BW; and “The Practice of 
Attention: Simone Weil’s Performance of Impersonality” in Impersonality: Seven Essays (Chicago: 





what Cameron terms “a moment of innocence … before the burden of stories, and the belief in 
their causes and consequences” (BW 2). The result of that process is a state akin to ecstasy in 
which consciousness is eclipsed, and one is exposed to affects but without any capacity to 
appropriate them. Although Cameron calls this state “seeing clearly” and “lucidly” (BW iii, 2), 
the seeing is clear only insofar as it is unmarred by a personal vanguard.
6
 The clarity, in fact, is 
disorienting, even “shocking” (BW ii), because the standpoint from which the world makes sense 
is removed.  
Anna learns to attain this kind of lucidity by way of understanding pain. Pain, according 
to her, is impersonal because it is prior to concepts, distinctions, or definitions: “Pain is original 
and pure. It is the first thing” (BW 1). It becomes “my own” once the mind ascribes to it an 
experiential narrative of causality, quality, and duration. “Outside of a story,” Anna remembers, 
“pain didn’t look like my own. It was the narrative of pain that I recognized as mine. I did not 
recognize pain” (BW 2, 3). Once pain is enfolded in a personalized narrative, it becomes 
suffering: “Pain doesn’t come from action or inaction. Pain isn’t anything you know, or I know. 
No one can free himself from pain. But suffering is a house you can unbuild. You have to keep 
the house whole enough so it doesn’t fall in and crush you. With great care you must dismantle it 
piece by piece” (BW 120). Suffering is pain trapped in a narrative and embedded in the 
consciousness that unifies the self into a temporally coherent conglomerate of sensing, 
processing and interpretation. To distinguish pain from suffering, therefore, is to gradually 
dismantle the construction of personality through meditation that eventually eclipses 
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 Like Margaret Fuller, Simone Weil suffered from headaches and depression that brought her to the brink 
of suicide (SW 229 n4). Like Anna and Fuller, Weil, in Cameron’s reading, attempts to design the 
procedure of the “undoing of vantage” in order to rid herself of headaches: “To see outside a point of 
view is to inhabit a stance outside oneself and, notwithstanding the inhospitability of such a space, to 




consciousness and transforms the self. Cameron calls this process “work” because it resembles 
disassembling a house: 
How to see pain uncompounded? It would be like tearing down a house. I would have to 
start with the foundation in order to determine whether the house was dangerous to work 
on. … I would most certainly have to discover the sequence of the house’s construction 
in order to unbuild it. How to brace the walls while taking down the house? How to keep 
the standing walls from caving in on me? How not to be destroyed by this work? (BW 3-
4) 
The care with which the house is first studied and then dismantled suggests that the work of de-
creation is not merely destructive; instead, it is building in reverse – taking the self apart, step by 
step. Furthermore, this kind of work consists of laboring on the self as form: not on the content of 
consciousness, but on the formal structure that enables it. Because it is attentive to form – 
transformative – this kind of work may be understood to be aesthetic, that is to say “beautiful.”
7
 
Thus, the distinction between pain and suffering corresponds, for Cameron, to the initial 
distinction between seeing and remembering, where the former can be viewed as a 
depersonalized or immediate relation to the world, and the latter as the experience of the world 
mediated by personalized narrative. In other words, the practice of impersonality marks both the 
procedure of seeing neutrally and the procedure of understanding pain.
8
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 For this clarification I am indebted to Branka Arsić, who associates beautiful life in Emerson with the 
Stoic doctrine of “beautiful work” – a work that “intervenes in a life one leads in such a way as to form it” 
(Branka Arsić, On Leaving, 20; see also 332n1, and 297-98). Alternatively, the work could be understood 
to be beautiful because it is “disinterested” in the Kantian sense. For Margaret Fuller, too, life is an 
aesthetic endeavor: “What concerns me now,” she writes in the Woman in the Nineteenth Century, “is that 
my life be a beautiful, powerful, in a word, a complete life in its kind.” Margaret Fuller, Woman in the 
Nineteenth Century, and Kindred Papers Relating to the Sphere, Condition and Duties, of Woman, edited 
by Arthur B. Fuller (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1893), 177.  
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This is where Cameron’s association of pain with impersonality becomes relevant for my 
reading of Margaret Fuller. As I will argue, Fuller developed a similar practice of erasing 
personal identity through ecstasy in order to achieve an impersonal perspective that would 
remove her subjective participation in her headaches, leaving the mind to succumb to the 
neutrally objective pain. Although her ecstasies were not, like Anna’s, fostered by the technique 
of meditation, Fuller nevertheless arrived at similar inferences that helped her unfold ecstatic 
trances into a theory of what I will call material thinking and, consequently, a pain-management 
practice. The corollary to thus juxtaposing Cameron’s notion of impersonality with Fuller’s is 
significant beyond intertextual parallels and lines of influence, because it weighs heavily on our 
historical and critical positioning of Fuller within the American Transcendentalism. Fuller, like 
Weil and Anna, understands herself to be a mystic: “I grow more and more what they call a 
mystic,” she writes.
9
 But scholarship frequently identifies her mysticism with a type of 
individualism or idealism, failing to give it the serious consideration it merits.
10
 I take Fuller’s 
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 Margaret Fuller, Journal 1840, in The Essential Margaret Fuller, edited by Jeffrey Steele (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995), 12. Emerson, for example, remembers Fuller’s attraction to 
Balzac’s “disagreeable” trilogy Le Livre Mystique (MMF 1:229), which deals with themes typically 
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meditation and rapt ecstasy are perhaps the undeveloped germs of catalepsy” (Honore de Balazac, Louis 
Lambert, translated by Clara Bell and James Waring (Project Gutenberg, 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1943/1943-h/1943-h.htm).  
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 Even her friends didn’t take her mysticism seriously. In his memoirs of Fuller, Emerson writes, with a 
mixture of irony and admiration, about Fuller’s experimentation with mysticism as “occasional 
enthusiasm”: “I observed that, with her literary riches, her invention and wit, her boundless fun and 




mysticism to be essential to understanding her work, as a procedure of turning away from any 
notion of personality. Fuller’s routine of attaining weariness and exhaustion, disciplined by a set 
of repetitive bodily practices, aims at cultivating the ecstatic erasure of consciousness by 
separating the will from its object, and energy from desire. No self is to be left standing during 
one of these ecstatic exercises. Additionally, in its potential to transcend and abolish personal 
experience, such radical practice of impersonality raises obvious political questions about 
rational agency, responsibility and the possibilities for collective action, and complicates the 
feminist perspectives through which Fuller’s work has been traditionally viewed. Fuller’s politics 




▪ ▪ ▪ 
Throughout her life Fuller suffered from violent attacks of “nervous headaches.” Constant 
references to these painful states fill her journals and letters: “For nine long days and nights, 
without intermission, all was agony, – fever and dreadful pain in my head” (MMF 1:154); “My 
head still aches and aches. You are right to supposed I have been ill, in the month of January I 
                                                                                                                                                       
sentiment, and a march of character, threatening to arrive presently at the shores and plunge into the sea 
of Buddhism and mystical trances. The literature of asceticism and rapturous piety was familiar to her. 
The conversation of certain mystics, who had appeared in Boston about this time, had interested her. … 
Her aspiring mind, eager for a higher and still a higher ground, made her gradually familiar with the range 
of the mystics, and, though never herself laid in the chamber called Peace, never quite authentically and 
originally speaking from the absolute or prophetic mount, yet she borrowed from her frequent visits to its 
precincts an occasional enthusiasm, which gave a religious dignity to her thought” (MMF 1:309) 
11
 Although Fuller’s journals and letters abound in the references to pain, and although pain seems to have 
been a driving force behind some of her most original ideas, critics have not paid much attention to it. 
Three notable exceptions are Cynthia J. Davis’s “Margaret Fuller, Body and Soul,” American Literature 
71, no. 1 (1999), Deborah Manson’s “‘The Trance of the Ecstatica’: Margaret Fuller, Animal Magnetism 
and the Transcendent Female Body,” Literature and Medicine, 25, no. 2 (2006), and Bruce Mills’s Poe, 
Fuller, and the Mesmeric Arts: Transition States in the American Renaissance (Columbia, MO: 
University of Missouri Press, 2006). However, contrary to my argument, the two essays take Fuller’s 
experimentation with pain as conducive to, or as a defining aspect of, her thinking about gender, while 
Miller’s argument works precisely as a flipside of mine as he argues for “the era’s urge to spiritualize the 




lost too much blood in one of my nervous attacks and have been somewhat too ethereal and too 
pensive ever since” (LMF 2:206); and again: “A week of more suffering than I have had for a 
long time – from Sunday to Sunday – headache night and day! And not only there has been no 
respite, but it has been fixed in one spot – between the eyebrows! – what does that promise? – till 
it grew real torture” (MMF 2:135). Fuller’s aches and weak health are among her 
contemporaries’ most frequent memories of her. Emerson, for example, notes in his 
reminiscences: “She was all her lifetime the victim of disease and pain. She was in jubilant 
spirits in the morning, and ended the day with nervous headache, whose spasms, my wife told 
me, produced total prostration” (MMF 1:227). The severity of pain often led to immobility: both 
Fuller and her friends remember her body and mind being held captive by pain, while she was 
struck dumb during the assault. Emerson renders it in terms of victimization and bodily collapse; 
Fuller too identifies the seizures with “torture,” and calls pain her “black jailer” and a “tomb” 
(MMF 2:135), underscoring the condition’s near cataleptic dimension: “This last day before 
preparing for the March steamer has brought me one of my bad headaches, of which I have not 
before had one for some time, and I feel paralyzed, not myself.”
12
 Her paralysis was sometimes 
total (“I lay bound hand and foot,” MMF 1:40), and sometimes severely debilitating, preventing 
her from performing even the least demanding daily activities: “I avoided the table as much as 
possible, took long walks and lay in bed, or on the floor in my room. I complained of my head, 
and it was not wrong to do so, for a sense of dullness and suffocation, if not pain, was there 
constantly” (MMF 1:41).  
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Fuller’s “nervous headaches” were a popular name for tic douloureux, a chronic pain 
condition known today as trigeminal neuralgia.
13
 The condition involves an irritation or 
inflammation of the trigeminal nerve, which results in spasmodic attacks of harrowing pain in 
the head, face, jaw and neck, and which can last hours and even days. The American Association 
of Neurological Surgeons describes today the sensation associated with this disorder as “the most 
excruciating pain known to humanity.”
14
 In a similar vein, a 1856 medical study labels it a 
“frightfully morbid sensation”:  
[I]n the agonies of ‘tic’ the temple and forehead throb, the eye sparkles and flashes like a 
fiery meteor, while the tears trickle in gushes down the burning cheek; the deglutition 
becomes difficult, the tongue fixed and coated, and the jaws clenched, while the saliva 
copiously flows from the mouth; the piercing, throbbing, buzzing and lancinating pains 
shoot through the ear, whilst even a whispered sound tends but to add fuel to the fire; the 




Fuller gives similar accounts: “My head is oppressed and a dry feverish heat irritates my skin and 
blood so that each touch and sound is scorpions and trumpets to me” (LMF 2:83-84); or “I am 
tired now so that there is constant irritation in my head which I can only soothe by keeping it wet 
with cold water, and pain, such as formerly, in the spine and side, through not so acute. I have 
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also a great languor on my spirits, so that the grasshopper is a burden” (LMF 3:55). In the 
nineteenth century, trigeminal neuralgia was treated with rudimentary, often ineffective 
remedies. Fuller experimented with a number of them – from wet towels and cold patches, to 
various ointments, acids, bleeding, opium and mesmeric treatments. Most of them gave at best a 
temporary relief. One of Fuller’s accounts tells just how helpless this condition made her even 
when she had recourse to strong medications: 
I have been very ill; last night the pain in my neck became so violent, that I could not lie 
still and passed a night suffering and sleepless. There were in the house no remedies and 
none to apply them. I went crying into town this morning, my nerves all ajar and the pain 
worse than ever; it was a sort of tic douloureux. – I brought out a very strong remedy and 
since applying it, have been asleep. Now, waking almost free from pain, earth seems 
almost as good as heaven. Still, it hurts me to lean on my head and write. I must look 
rather out of the window on the soft shadowy landscape, which still me. (LLMF 74-75) 
A vivid portrayal of the condition’s paralyzing symptoms, this account chronicles Fuller’s state 
of mind during and after one of her seizures. With or without medications, she can’t think: when 
medicated, she is asleep; when in pain, she is unable to concentrate; and the aftereffect of a 
strong remedy is such that, when awake, she is neither entirely free from pain, nor focused 
enough to think. In the state in which she is “almost free from pain,” the difference between 
“earth” and “heaven” becomes inoperative, and so does her ability to make the distinctions 
necessary for the procedures of reasoning. Distinctions seem too sharp for her slow mind, and all 
she can do is diffuse attention into the monochrome “soft shadowy landscape” that is devoid of 
clarity and differentiating features. Monotonous sameness may calm her neuralgic attack but it is 




“I have passed a very bad night, my head is this morning much disturbed. I have bled a good deal 
at the nose, and it is hard for me to write.”
16
  
When her headaches worsened in the fall of 1837, she visited a blind clairvoyant Loriana 
Brackett.
17
 Fuller believed that a mesmeric subject can locate the pain in the head and remove it 
through the manipulation of the “universal fluid.” The encounter was ultimately dissatisfying, as 
Fuller acerbically testifies in the letter to Caroline Sturgis: “The blind girl said my head would 
never be better while I read so much. She has almost entirely lost the gift of clairvoyance (if she 
ever possessed it) and is good for nothing” (LMF 1:313).
18
 Brackett cured the headache 
temporarily, but recommended that Fuller stop reading, as if intellectual labor would aggravate 
the pain. Although this was in line with her own understanding of the effect of thoughts on the 
head, Fuller had to dismiss the advice because it threatened to put her entirely out of 
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 Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Margaret Fuller Ossoli (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 
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the blind girl. The latter instantly dropped it with an expression of pain, and complained that she should 
have been brought in contact with a person so sick, and suffering at that moment under violent nervous 
headache. This really was the case, but no one present could have been aware of it. After a while the 
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while holding it, attempted to magnetize the sufferer.” Margaret Fuller, “The New Science, or The 
Philosophy of Mesmerism or Animal Magnetism,” in Life Without, Life Within, or, Reviews, Narratives, 
Essays, and Poems, edited by Arthur Fuller (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1859), 172. 
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 Clarke was with Fuller on that occasion and recorded the visit in his journal: “She [Lorianna Brackett] 
was put in communication with S.M.F. and discovered the point in her head where she suffered from 




commission. As Charles Capper asserts in his biography of Fuller, regardless of the 
disappointing outcome, the visit sparked Fuller’s attraction to experimentation with 
consciousness,
19
 prompting her interest in the possibilities and methods of removing the pain 
without recourse to medications.
20
  
But although she made repeated attempts to alleviate her headaches, these would have 
been insufficient had they not been channeled through her unusual idea that pain was inherently 
linked to thinking. “My head is very sensitive, and as they described the Spina Christi,” she 
wrote in a letter from 1840. “I shuddered all over and could have fainted only at the thought of 
its pressure on his head. … It seems to me I might be educated through suffering to the same 
purity.”
21
 The comparison with Christ’s crown of thorns conjures up the image of the physical 
effects that thoughts have on the head. Not only does the headache feel like spikes piercing the 
head, but the mere thought of the thorns’ pressure may cause pain and fainting. Fuller’s 
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soul.” Dorri Beam Style, Gender and Fantasy in Nineteenth-Century American Women’s Writing 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010), 96. In my reading, on the contrary, soul is Fuller’s synonym for the 
mind, which is as corporeal as the body.  
21




inclination to ascribe physicality and corporeal qualities to thoughts reinforces the bond between 
thinking and headaches. That bond proved instrumental for her uncommon notion of the 
materiality of thinking, the final consequence of which was Fuller’s theory of impersonality.  
The claim that she can attain impersonality through exposure to suffering (“I might be 
educated through suffering to the same purity”) is significant because it emphasizes the radically 
transformative potentials of pain. As she explains in another letter, the absence of personality 
attained through physical pain is a form of death: 
On [the subject of death] I always feel that I can speak with some certainty, having been 
on the verge of bodily dissolution. I felt at that time disengaged from the body, hovering 
and calm. And in moments of profound thought or feeling, or when, after violent pain in 
the head, my exhausted body loses power to hem me in, I have felt changes more 
important than then. I believe that the mere death of the body has no great importance 
except when it is in no sense accidental, that is, when the mind, by operations native to it, 
has gradually cast aside its covering, and is ready for a new one. But this is very seldom 
the case. Persons die generally, not as a natural thing, but from extraneous causes; then it 
must be a change only one degree more important than going to sleep.
22
 
Death is important only insofar as it is the death of a mind profoundly transformed, in which case 
the reference is not to death in the usual sense, as termination of life. For Fuller, another kind of 
death – the termination of personality – is at work in the rare “moments of profound thought” or 
“after violent pain,” during which the mind dispenses with its “covering” of consciousness. 
(Covering is Fuller’s term for the consciousness that cloaks the mind into self-presence.) 
Consciousness may be forfeited only rarely, but its renunciation seems to be the only death that 
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matters to Fuller: indeed, it is welcomed and desired as much as it is feared. Other deaths are 
“general,” induced by the accidental and external causes that do not constitute the “native” 
property of the self. Paradoxically, then, the essential property of a person amounts to person’s 
capacity to be disappropriated of their personal identity. That kind of death is the state the 
mystics call ecstasy, a state in which the self is disassembled. 
Yet, despite Fuller’s explicit investment in the mystical tradition and explorations in 
ecstasy, and despite her numerous references to it, critics rarely give these tendencies the serious 
consideration they merit, choosing instead to identify them with a type of spiritualism, 
individualism or idealism. The diagnosis Larry J. Reynolds passed more than a decade ago – that 
Fuller’s “intense inner life, her mystical transports, her erotic fantasies, her prophetic visions, her 
moments of rapture, her ‘wildness’”
23
 had not been given the proper scholarly attention – still 
stands. Even the critics Reynolds praises as exceptions in this regard, Cynthia J. Davis and 
Jeffrey Steele, understand Fuller’s mysticism either as her way to spiritually transcend the 
contemporary notions of gender, or as “the bridge she needed to move from a specific sense of 
personal grief to a larger sense of political grievance.”
24
 In both cases her mysticism is 
normalized and, finally, trivialized – turned into a tool in the service of a larger political agenda.  
The prevalent normalization of Fuller’s mysticism is hardly surprising given the 
ostensibly counterintuitive link between her ecstasies and the pain of headaches. The link seems 
illogical because physical pain is centered in the body, whereas ecstasy is commonly understood 
as the spiritual endeavor of doing away with the body. But in Fuller’s ecstatic trances the mind 
(spirit) is collapsed into the body and rendered corporeal – a procedure of doing away not with 
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the body but with the ideal structure of the self. This seemingly implausible affiliation of ecstasy 
with pain emerged from Fuller’s equally unorthodox belief that her headaches were caused by 
the physical labor of thoughts on the mind. In the sections that follow, I unfold Fuller’s assertion 
about the mind’s ability to abandon consciousness. I will argue that this mental capacity, which 
results in the surrendering of self-presence, was particularly important to Fuller because it 
allowed for the possibility of assuaging the pain by minimizing the self’s capacity to feel it. 
Similar to the ecstatic procedures cultivated by mystics, Fuller’s avoidance of pain consisted of 
surrendering the personal perspective from which pain causes hurt as the narrative of “my own 
suffering.” But Fuller’s theory of impersonality, which can be reconstructed from the journals 
and memoirs of her childhood and which she began to explore by addressing the problem of 
pain, didn’t come about as an application of a generally acknowledged set of Buddhist or 
monastic practices. Instead, it emerged from her understanding of the mind as corporeal, and 
from her idea that headaches are the physical effect of thoughts on the mind.  
▪ ▪ ▪ 
In the “Autobiographical Romance,” Fuller traces the origin of her headaches to strenuous 
childhood discipline, through which her father strove to “bring forward the intellect as early as 
possible” (MMF 1:15). The rigorous daily regime he imposed kept her “feelings on the stretch,” 
“nerves unnaturally stimulated,” and the mind constantly agitated and “over-excited.” The 
routine finally led to  
a premature development of the brain, that made me a “youthful prodigy” by day, and by 
night a victim of spectral illusions, nightmare, and somnambulism which at the time 
prevented the harmonious development of my bodily powers and checked my growth, 




kinds. As these again re-acted on the brain, giving undue force to every thought and 
every feeling, there was finally produced a state of being both too active and too intense, 
which wasted my constitution and will bring me – even although I have learned to 
understand and regulate my now morbid temperament – to a premature grave. (MMF 
1:15) 
A peculiar materiality underlies her account. Although she knew that headaches were triggered 
by an irritation of a nerve (this is why they were called “nervous”), Fuller understood them to be 
inseparable from the activity of thinking. She associates an aching head with oversized thoughts, 
thoughts too big or too many to fit her small head. It is as if the brain swelled under the pressure 
of physically heavy thoughts,
25
 or as if it ached when thoughts impressed themselves on it – as 
when, in her reading Romeo and Juliet at a very early age, the story and its characters “thronged 
and burnt my brain” (MMF 1:27); or when Mariana’s “thoughts and presages” in the Summer on 
the Lakes are said to have “come too thick for her strength,” so that she “relapsed into fever and 
died”;
26
 or when, after reading Plato for days on end, Fuller’s head begins to hurt: “Theatetus I 
read with attention and great profit. In the midst of Philebus I was compelled to stop. My mind 
seems to be revenging itself for the force it was kept under so long by all sorts of freaks” (LMF 
2:106). The “freakish” thoughts that swarm and linger in her head ache by touching the mind 
which, in turn, hurts itself and produces headaches. That she viewed thoughts as tactile and 
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material is corroborated in a letter to Jane Tuckerman: “I took up the study of German, and my 
progress was like the rebound of a string pressed almost to bursting. My mind being then in the 
highest state of action, heightened, by intellectual appreciation, every pang” (LMF 1:347). Even 
if the first part of this account is a metaphor, the figural gives way to the literal in the second part 
where thoughts (“intellectual appreciation”) are identified with a stabbing sensation (“pangs”). 
Thoughts literally bruise her head by making the mind too tense.
27
  
 In the spring of 1834 Fuller read the enormously influential Remarks on the Influence of 
Mental Cultivation and Mental Excitement on Health by Amariah Brigham, a New York 
physician and founder of the periodical that would later evolve into the American Journal of 
Psychiatry.
28
 Brigham’s general concern in this many times reprinted book is the well-being of 
young Americans, especially girls, whose subjection to “dangerous” and “injurious” educational 
strategies has deleterious and irremediable impact on children’s minds:  
Very often, in attempting to call forth and cultivate the intellectual faculties of children 
before they are five or six or seven years of age, serious and lasting injury has been done 
both to the body and the mind. The danger arises from parents and teachers forgetting or 
disregarding this important fact, that, although the mind is immaterial and indestructible, 
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Brigham’s critique centers on over-ambitious parents and teachers who, like Margaret Fuller’s 
father, tend to expose young minds to ideas too serious and too complex for their capacity to 
process them. At its root, however, Brigham’s study is not a treatise on education, but a theory of 
the corporeal mind. In Section Two of the Remarks, which deals with three issues – “Condition 
of the Brain in Early Life; Effect of Excitement and Enlargement of the Brain by Disease on the 
Mind; and Mental Precocity Usually a Symptom of Disease” – Brigham unfolds the theory of the 
mind that guides his educational recommendations in the rest of the study. Because, according to 
him, “nature has prepared the brain for the performance of the important office of manifesting the 
mind,” the brain figures as the mind’s organ (“the brain, considered as a whole, is the instrument 
by which the mind operates”).
30
 While Brigham maintains that, because immaterial, the mind is 
indestructible and incorruptible, his insistence throughout the book on the invisibility of mental 
operation and the mind’s absolute dependence on the brain’s performance
31
 has a cumulative 
effect of equating the brain with the mind. Indeed, “what excites the mind, excites and stimulates 
the brain,”
32
 he asserts; but due to the mind’s insusceptibility to decay, mental disease of any sort 
is necessarily attributed to some kind of brain damage or its over-affectedness: 
Of the nature or essence of mind we are ignorant; we believe it is distinct from matter. 
We do know however that it manifests itself solely by the aid of material organs, and that 
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a well formed and healthy condition of these organs is as essential to correct and 
powerful mental action, as well developed and healthy lungs are for the performance of 
free and perfect respiration, or a sound state of the eye and the ear for seeing and hearing. 
In consequence of this intimate connexion between the mind and body, we cannot doubt 
that mental labor calls into action some organ, and that, if continued for a great length of 
time, it will fatigue, and may injure this organ, and unfit it for its accustomed duties, just 




What damages the brain, automatically damages the mind: a blow to the head that injures the 
brain will cause mental dysfunction – “deprivation of intellect,” “destruction of sensation and 
volition.”
34
 However, because of such “intimate connexion between the mind and the body,” the 
reverse is also true: “mental excitement produces increased flow of blood to the head,”
35
 which 
Brigham identifies as the main source of brain injury, apart from physical trauma. 
“Determination of blood to the head” was understood at the time to be the cause of the widest 
range of health conditions: from headaches and vertigo, to hysteria, epilepsy, apoplexy, delirium 
and insanity.
36
 Brigham’s argument is that sudden rush of blood to the head, which occurs when 
the mind is overstimulated by thinking, causes the swelling and enlargement of the brain: “If the 
mind of an adult has been long devoted to thought, if he has been engaged in constant study, his 
brain is usually increased beyond [its ordinary] weight.”
37
 A larger brain, often a sign of lively 
and faster mental activity, may not be too harmful in an otherwise healthy adult, but in a child, in 
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whom it “produces premature development of the intellectual faculties,” it can be “fatal.”
38
 
While at first it leads to precocity, enlarged brain soon proves to increase “the liability to disease, 
giv[ing] a tendency to convulsions, and to inflammation and dropsy of the brain, and other 
diseases of the nervous system, which are most common and fatal in childhood.”
39
  
 The striking similarities between Brigham’s language in the Remarks on the one hand, 
and Fuller’s in the “Autobiographical Romance” (quoted above) and in the 1834 journal entry 
(quoted below) on the other, testify to an unmistakably strong influence of Brigham’s materialist 
theories on Fuller.
 
In the journal entry that predates the “Romance”
 40
 Fuller seems to appropriate 
Brigham’s proposals by transferring them, at first sight, onto her childhood friend Elizabeth 
Randall, only to indicate, in the second part of the entry, her full identification with Elizabeth’s 
mental state: 
What did Elizabeth’s father gain by forcing her young mind – by constraining her 
attention long after the physical sense was weary – by keeping her, a delicate child, up till 
midnight whenever it suited him? – He did, as he proposed, sharpen her faculties, give 
her the power of attention, and bestow an intellectual tinge on a being born only to love 
eagerly and feel keenly – By the time gained then has been lost since fifty times over in 
the indulgence of a morbid sensibility created by this unnatural taxing of her faculties – 
her imagination is disordered; she is doomed to nervous horrors through life, her soul is 
constantly shaken by too aspiring thoughts on subjects she has not strength to 
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comprehend – Had she grown up an unmolested flower by the side of some secret stream 
she had been a thing all natural life, softness, bloom and fragrance –  
 What have I gained by my precocity? I have never been happy – my faculties 
have always been rather intensely in action and produced no harmonious result. … But I 
am confident that I should have been much superior to my present self had sense, 
intellect, passion been brought out in the natural order. 
 Many observations in this book gave me new light upon myself. From my own 
experience merely I should go great lengths with him – In childhood I was a 
somnambulist – I was very subject to attacks of delirium – I perceive I had what are no 
called spectral illusions. … When I was about twelve all these things left me – but were 
succeeded by a determination of the blood to the head. …
41
 
 If Brigham’s theory were correct it would be curious to trace the singular traits of 
mind I exhibited up to my twenty first year to this ugly and very painful flush in the 
forehead.
42
 … O, Amariah, that this was attributable to the maturity of character I had 
attained, to a command over my passions and thoughts, an acquired reliance upon the 
God of Truth. Can it be that I am doomed in accordance with thy fiat to be driven down 
the stream of time ere my summer is well begun or leaf too early dried from its natal tree. 
Forbid it ye immaterial philosophers. Forbid it – my own energies – Amariah! I defy thee 
– though I secretly confess with a quaking heart.
43
 
Fuller’s accusation of her father’s “bring[ing] forward the intellect as early as possible” and 
Elizabeth’s “forcing of her young mind” evokes Brigham’s “calling forth” of the intellect; “a 
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premature” versus “harmonious development of mental faculties,” references to “precocity,” 
“unnatural growth of the brain,” “nervous affections,” and “premature death” appear in both, as 
does the general view of the mind as identical with the brain, and thinking as associated with the 
onrush of blood in the head as a result of over-excitement. The “immaterial philosophers” Fuller 
invokes (though her “quaking heart” seems to doubt the validity of their philosophy) at the end 
of the journal entry are the idealists of Platonist stripe, for whom the mind’s incorporeal nature 
would render it immune to pain. Brigham’s unyielding materialist conclusion, that “in a severe 
headache, we perceive the pain to be increased by intense study or thinking, and that mental 
application determines more blood to the head,”
44
 was particularly disconcerting for Fuller 
because it either validated or generated her association of nervous headaches with cerebral 
operation. 
 The same sensorial quality ascribed to waking thoughts is attached to dreams – they, too, 
can cause headaches. In one of her journal entries Fuller recounts how she “went to bed with 
pain in the right side of my head. Could not sleep for a long time but when I did, dreamt that [a 
giant butterfly] settled on the left side of my forehead; I tried in vain to drive him away; he 
plunged its feet, bristling with feelers, deeper and deeper into my forehead till my pain rose to 
agony. I awoke with my hand on the left side of my forehead to which the pain had changed.”
45
 
As implied in the case with Spina Christi,
46
 vivid images can cause pain, or cause it to move 
from one part of the body to another, by being impressed on the mind. But, importantly, this 
happens when consciousness is absent. The butterfly dream, Fuller continues, seemed “very 
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illustrative of the influence of the body on the mind when will and understanding are not on the 
alert to check it.”
47
 Two points are worth singling out: that the dream depicts the situation in 
which consciousness is absent; and that the mind and the body, rather than being rendered 
separate, are seen as identical in situations when consciousness, or self-awareness (“will and 
understanding”), is absent. In being thus perceived as exerting physical pressure on the mind – 
dreams, thoughts, images, and ideas are given corporeal quality. But for thoughts to be impressed 
on the mind, the mind too must be understood to be corporeal. This is the point Fuller makes in a 
remarkable description of the effects of thinking on the “earthly” mind: 
I have long days and weeks of heartache; … this ache is like a bodily wound, whose pain 
haunts even when it is not attended to, and disturbs the dreams of the patient who has 
fallen asleep from exhaustion. There is a German in Boston, who has a wound in his 
breast, received in battle long ago. It never troubles him, except when he sings, and then, 
if he gives his voice with much expression, it opens, and cannot, for a long time, be 
stanched again. So with me: when I rise into one of those rapturous moods of thought, 
such as I had a day or two since, my wound opens again, and all I can do is to be patient, 
and let it take its own time to skin over. I see it will never do more. Some time ago I 
thought the barb was fairly out; but no, the fragments rankle there still, and will, while 
there is any earth attached to my spirit. Is it not because, in my pride, I held the mantle 
close, and let the weapon, which some friendly physician might have extracted, splinter 
in the wound? (MMF 1:197) 
Not only is thinking directly associated with headaches – the more intense the thought, the longer 
its migrainous effects – but the thought that causes it is seen as an object (“the barb,” “the 
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weapon”) injuring the head.
48
 The account is more of a report than a description, as there is 
nothing figural about it. There is a comparison but no metaphor. Fuller compares her hurting 
head to the wounded breast of the German; the parallels are drawn between his singing and her 
thinking; and between the permanence of their wounds (both only “skin over” and will get 
opened once again). But the accounts are literal because both wounds are corporeal. The 
unyielding materiality of thought and mind thus undermines the ideal, spiritual quality of the 
self, while fundamentally questioning the notion of consciousness, or self-presence, as the all-
encompassing, unifying structure that keeps the self together and makes sense of its disparate 
sensorial experiences and perceptions. I call these thoughts material because they are equated 
with sensation, whereas the mind, by extension, is a sensing organ: “I had headache two or three 
days. … The outlines of all objects, the rocks, the distant sails, even the rippling of the ocean 
were so sharp that they seemed to press themselves into the brain” (LMF 2:77). By rethinking 
the place of the mind in the hierarchy of the self, Fuller is deposing consciousness as the 
foundation of personal identity. If thoughts are corporeal and if the self is not ideal, she seems to 
be asking – who thinks? And if thinking is but a result of organic sensation, shouldn’t the self be 
understood as a collection of sense perceptions unified by nothing natural or essential, but by a 
narrative construct called “experience”? In other words, what remains in the aftermath of the 
mental eclipse is only the body. 
 The question, then, is not only who thinks but to whom the body belongs. For, if 
consciousness is a construction rather than the essential appropriative seat of the self, the body 
then belongs to no one in particular. In Beautiful Work Anna gradually learns this through 
meditation: “My body is there, but it is not there. It is there, but it is not mine. It is there, but 
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hollowed out” (BW 63-64) – a body emptied of its proprietor. Anna learns what Fuller intuitively 
knew all her life about attaining impersonality: she masters the technique of meditation that 
dismantles her self-presence and turns the mind into a “sense door” (BW 12) on a par with 
vision, hearing, smell, taste and touch: “I see the entity that is ‘myself’ break up and crumble. 
Then I see the piece of myself I call ‘thinking.’ ‘Thinking’ is independent of any consciousness, 
which is individual and intentional. ‘Thinking,’ ‘touching,’ ‘swallowing,’ ‘tasting,’ ‘seeing,’ 
‘hearing’ are separate as drops of rain are separate” (BW 100). Reduced to a sixth sense, the 
mind has no capacity to impose itself on the other five: “Once I see my body disappear like this, 
it’s impossible to say ‘I am that!’” (BW 51). Hence, when Anna defines the sensation of pain as 
“original and pure,” “the first thing,” having no cause (BW 1), she doesn’t mean to single it out 
as some pre-identitarian moment in time that precedes and conditions the construction of the 
person.
49
 The originary purity, the firstness of sensation is, on the contrary, the outcome of the 
unbuilding of the self – the abdication of self-presence, following which the sensations (of pain, 
heat, light, sweetness, joy, etc.) can no longer be attributed to one particular proprietor. Wearied 
by many hours of meditation, and sometimes by walking, running or chanting, Anna’s sense of 
self-presence gets annihilated: “I felt affectless. There was no place for affect to be located. In 
the place where a self was, I saw the contraption of the apperceptive mechanism shaking itself to 
pieces” (BW 103-104). Like Anna’s, Fuller’s ecstasies were induced by physical exhaustion and 
she designed them as an attempt to find relief from pain not by dodging and minimizing it 
through medications, but by placing herself, literally, alongside it, ecstatically abdicating her 
personal point of view. It is, therefore, important to clarify that Fuller’s pain-management 
practice cannot be more dissimilar from the psychological defense-mechanism known as 
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“dissociation,” whereby an individual exposed to a traumatic event becomes detached from 
herself in order, precisely, to preserve that self. Fuller is unconcerned with psychological 
interiority, much less with self-preservation. Her practice of separating pain from suffering by 
making the mind collapse into the body follows the logic of the religious experience of ecstasy, 
where the self is dissolved rather than preserved. 
▪ ▪ ▪ 
I turn now to certain behavioral procedures in order to exemplify the ways in which Fuller 
cultivated these attempts to displace herself from pain by forgoing consciousness. These 
procedures can be loosely divided into three general groups – spinning, strenuous physical 
exercises, and walking (including sleepwalking) – the common denominator of which is the 
relinquishment of self-presence through self-exhaustion. Although Fuller habitually practiced all 
these activities as a child, it was not until her late twenties that she began to understand their full 
potential as a pain-management technique.  
 
a) Spinning  
From as early as childhood Fuller had intuited that physical weariness was conducive to a state 
of mind she would later recognize as ecstatic. Her self-exhaustion procedures were distinctive: 
they resulted in prostration that led to the absence of consciousness during which the mind would 
continue to operate. A striking example is Mariana, Fuller’s fictional counterpart in the Summer 
on the Lakes, a girl characterized by a “love of wild dances and sudden song, freaks of passion 
and of wit.”
50
 Her love of intellectual and physical jitters is explained by a strange habit of 
excitable spinning that results in a loss of consciousness: 
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She had by nature the same habit and power of excitement that is described in the 
spinning dervishes of the East. Like them, she would spin until all around her were giddy, 
while her own brain, instead of being disturbed, was excited to great action. Pausing, she 
would declaim verses of others, or her own, or act many parts, with strange catchwords 
and burdens, that seemed to act with mystical power on her own fancy, sometimes 
stimulating her to convulse the hearers with laughter, sometimes to melt them to tears. 
When her power began to languish, she would spin again till fired to re-commence her 
singular drama, into which she wove figures from the scenes of her earlier childhood, her 
companions, and the dignitaries she sometimes saw, with fantasies unknown to life, 
unknown to heaven or earth.
51
  
Spinning releases the grip of consciousness and abolishes the mental focus. At the peak of 
ecstatic disorientation, Margaret/Mariana lapses into a kind of unconsciousness that doesn’t 
generate comatose blackouts or paralysis but instead fills her with the creativity of a 
powerlessness that doesn’t engage in interpretation – that doesn’t, in other words, favor one 
perspective over another. No longer solely her own self, she assumes the perspective without 
perspective that allows her to be everyone and no one simultaneously.
52
 In a journal entry from 
1840, in which Fuller tried to record one of her ecstatic moments, mental discontinuity is 
reflected in the discontinuous nature of her utterance:  
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 Thoughts of Makaria and her stellar correspondences But I cannot think of other 
souls now. Mine is too fresh and living Understood wreaths of stars and the wandering of 
the Elysian grove. 
 My head wrapped in my shawl I would listen to the music of earth then raise it 
and look straight into the secrets of the heaven. I fail the moon. Thoughts on lunacy. How 
could Swedenborg think children were in the moon. She makes me understand the 
attraction Sand finds in un front impassible I need to go wild when she rose and shriek 
No bliss for me. But now Nature suffices me, and often I rest in her centre as in the 
bosom of God! 
 Shapes move across the valley. Abandon thyself to second sight
53
 
 DISTANT SHOUTS of laughter. Reflexions on kindred. Michel Angelo’s Sybils. 
Where is my tripod? Clearest moon. Heaven without a fleck or mark.
54
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becomes fragile. Different voices disrupt the organizing system of meaning. Weeds between the paving 
stones. … This fragmentary ‘possession’ troubles, breaks, or suspends the autonomy of the speaker” 
(Michel de Certeau, “Vocal Utopias: Glossolalias,” translated by Daniel Rosenberg, Representations 56 
(1996): 29-30). It should be noted, however, that Fuller’s glossolalic strategy of unbilding the self has 
nothing in common with what Elaine Scarry terms the “unmaking” of the world in The Body in Pain. 
Pain, for Scarry is destructive because it disables expression, while the imagination, pain’s opposite, is 
constructive and therefore positive. The “central fact about pain,” according to Scarry, is that “intense 
pain destroys a person’s self and world. Intense pain is also language-destroying . … To witness the 
moment when pain causes a reversion to the pre-language of cries and groans is to witness the destruction 
of language; but conversely, to be present when a person moves up out of that pre-language and projects 
the facts of sentience into speech is almost to have been permitted to be present at the birth of language 
itself.” Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 35, 6). While I don’t share Cynthia J. Davis’s belief that Fuller utilizes pain for 
the purpose of becoming “literate and articulate,” I agree with her that Fuller’s pain-management 
practices challenge Scarry’s simplified dichotomies – in particular, I would suggest, by demonstrating 
that pain gives rise to a kind of expression that can be seen as neither constructive of the self nor self-




The language is fragmentary and nonsensically multivocal, so much so that it seems to have 
originated from various unrelated sources or from a single source speaking in tongues. 
Punctuation is almost entirely omitted; capital letters imply the beginning of a new sentence but 
a period is often missing at the end, suggesting that the discourse is not a series, but a host of 
incongruous thoughts in the form of overlapping or dispersed utterances that belong either to 
more than one mind, or to a mind that is not one with itself – an ecstatic mind lacking the 
unifying point of reference that allows coherent interpretation. Just as thinking continues without 
the necessity of being ascribed to one particular mind, so the pain can go on without being felt by 
one particular subject.  
 
b) Physical exercises  
The references to strenuous physical exercises, such as jumping, running, hitting, or climbing 
persist in Fuller journals and letters with a frequency that creates a pattern: “The peculiarity of 
my education had separated me entirely from the girls around,” she writes in the 
“Autobiographical Romance,” “except that when they were playing at active games, I would 
sometimes go out and join them. I liked violent bodily exercise, which always relieved my 
nerves” (MMF 1:41). These exercises brought exhaustion swiftly. By wearing down the body, 
they bring relief to the agitated nerves that produce her headaches and other pains. They 
sometimes even lead to a total blackout, such as when Mariana, in the Summer on the Lakes, 
overwhelmed by a strong feeling of anxiety, “suddenly threw herself down, dashing her head 
with all her force against the iron hearth, on which a fire was burning, and was taken up 
senseless.”
55
 At other times, the pain or anxiety are relieved by the activities that cause her to 
collapse into sleep: “Alone she went to her room, locked the door, and threw herself on the floor 
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in strong convulsions. For some hours terrible anxiety was felt, but at last nature, exhausted, 
relieved herself by a deep slumber.”
56
 Most often, however, the goal of exhaustion was to wear 
the body down in such a way that consciousness, rather than founder, could be uplifted without 
blocking the operation of thinking: “I had headache two of the three days we were [in Nahant] … 
I went out about six o’clock, and had a two hours’ scramble before breakfast. I do not like to sit 
still in this air, which exasperates all my nervous feelings; but when I can exhaust myself in 
climbing, I feel delightfully, – the eye is so sharpened, and the mind so full of thought (LMF 
2:76-77). Fuller doesn’t say whether her headache was removed, but the mind, after the body has 
been jaded by climbing, thinks clearly. 
 
c) Walking 
Of all the procedures aimed at abolishing self-presence, walking – getting exhausted slowly and 
gradually – was the one that most helped Fuller develop a theory of material thoughts, while 
allowing her to understand the link between bodily exhaustion and the removal of consciousness 
as a pain-management method. In one of her journal entries she records what seems like an 
ordinary day:  
A terrible feeling in my head, but kept about my usual avocations. Read Ugo Foscolo’s 
Sepolcri, and Pindemonti’s answer, but could not relish either, so distressing was the 
weight on the top of the brain; sewed awhile, and then went out to get warm, but could 
not, though I walked to the very end of Hazel-grove, and the sun was hot upon me. Sat 
down, and, though seemingly able to think with only the lower part of my head, 
meditated literary plans. (MMF 1:154) 
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The pain is not removed; it is only after a walk, which properly fatigues the body, that thoughts 
can be literally pushed to the other, “healthier,” side of the head. Hence, even if pain can’t be 
removed, thinking, material as it is for Fuller (“Thoughts move and push forth from my heart like 
young birds from the nest.”),
57
 can go on.  
At the age of twenty one Fuller experienced a strong ecstatic trance. The event made an 
impression so profound that it altered her relation not only to pain, but to the problem of 
personality as well. The episode, which she recounts in detail in a journal entry from 1840, can 
also be read as a reconstruction of the procedures she had been employing unknowingly all along 
and was to utilize regularly from then on in her struggles with pain. The entry describes how nine 
years earlier, in 1831, on Thanksgiving day, she left the church feeling “wearied out with mental 
conflicts,” “strange anguish,” and “dread of uncertainty.” Seeking fresh air and respite from 
discomfort, she began to walk fast in the field: 
This was my custom at that time, when I could no longer bear the weight of my feelings, 
and fix my attention on any pursuit; for I do believe that I never voluntarily gave way to 
these thoughts one moment. The force I exerted I think, even now, greater than I ever 
knew in any other character. But when I could bear myself no longer, I walked many 
hours, till the anguish was wearied out, and I returned in a state of prayer. To-day all 
seemed to have reached its height. ... I went on and on, till I came to where the trees were 
thick about a little pool, dark and silent. I sat down there. I did not think; all was dark, 
and cold, and still. Suddenly the sun shone out with that transparent sweetness, like the 
last smile of a dying lover, which it will use when it has been unkind all a cold autumn 
day. And, even then, passed into my thought a beam from its true sun, from its native 
sphere, which has never since departed from me. I remembered how, a little child, I had 
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stopped myself one day on the stairs, and asked, how came I here? How is it that I seem 
to be this Margaret Fuller? What does it mean? What shall I do about it? I remembered 
all the times and ways in which the same thought had returned. I saw how long it must be 
before the soul can learn to act under these limitations of time and space, and human 
nature; but I saw, also, that it must do it, – that it must make all this false true, – and sow 
new and immortal plants in the garden of God, before it could return again. I saw there 
was no self; that selfishness was all folly, and the result of circumstance; that it was only 
because I thought self real that I suffered. … This truth came to me and I received it 
unhesitatingly. … I was dwelling in the ineffable, the unutterable (MMF 1:140-41) 
Four temporal frames merge in this account: childhood, the period preceding the moment of 
ecstasy in November of 1831, the moment of ecstasy, and the time of writing in 1840. The earlier 
periods, marked by a similar set of events and actions, create a behavioral pattern. When upset 
and anxious, pressed by “the mental conflicts” that wouldn’t allow her to concentrate on 
anything, Fuller walked for hours in order to exhaust herself physically and reach tranquility. 
This was obviously the habit she had contracted inadvertently long before Thanksgiving in 1831. 
That particular occurrence is significant insofar as it was impressive enough that she could 
positively identify it, in hindsight, as a moment of ecstatic experience. In 1831 she remembered 
how different moments in the past had brought on the same ecstatic dissociation from the self. 
The journal entry from 1840 reveals Fuller’s awareness that her actions in these situations 
resembled something of a methodical succession of steps: pain and anguish – walking – 
exhaustion – tranquility. She associated the ecstasy of 1831 with a number of earlier instances in 
which her own thought literally took her by surprise, as if it hadn’t originated from her own 




thought, like a sensation, would come from outside into her head, a head evacuated of a 
reference point (“I did not think” because “there was no self,” and then “a beam … passed into 
my thought”). It would disorient her perspective (“How came I here? How is it that I became this 
Margaret Fuller?”) and deprave her of the anchor in her self-presence (the self “was all folly”). 
At that moment the point of view is erased, since Fuller realizes in retrospect that “there was no 
self, that selfishness was all folly and the result of circumstance.”
58
 What she remembers 
retroactively is a caesura, a break and discontinuity in her personality. Since perceptions cannot 
be gathered at a single interpretative point (“the limitations of space and time” have been erased), 
the glossolalic dimension of her mystical experience only emphasizes the evacuation of 
consciousness. She is unable to find words (I was dwelling in the ineffable, the unutterable”) not 
because the experience is inexpressibly sublime, as some critics who tend to view Fuller as a 
Romantic would suggest, but because the thought does not belong to her, and hence, like in the 
ecstatic utterance recorded in the journal, there is nothing meaningful to express.
59
 Whether by 
                                               
58
 Albert J. von Frank’s reading of this passage is symptomatic. While he understands Fuller’s handling of 
pain as exceptional, he normalizes is by interpreting it in socio-cultural terms: “This ambiguous resisting 
and accepting the limitations of time, space, and circumstance Fuller shared not only with the 
Transcendentalists, but with the generality of frontier Americans who knew these three fates for genuine 
enemies, Lords of Life whose function it was to enforce a spiritually intolerable isolation. But she went 
well beyond most other Americans when she realized that what makes for the psychic pain of isolation is 
the consciousness of selfhood; and if self is a function of circumstance, then the pain of isolation could be 
alleviated by doing away with one's circumstances or by rendering them innocuous.” Albert J. von Frank, 
“Life as Art in America: The Case of Margaret Fuller,” in Studies in the American Renaissance, edited by 
Joel Myerson (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1981), 7. 
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 The aim of Fuller’s walks parallels the goal of walking in Cameron’s Beautiful Work, although there, 
conversely, the mind is afflicted by the walker’s intense focus on the walk, which becomes a form of 
meditative attention (the mind gets “trapped in awareness without being able to exercise [its] will,” BW 
12). Withdrawn from the grip of consciousness, the body becomes estranged: “I walked … carrying my 
body as if it were an injured stranger. I guided myself with my hand along the wall. … As I walked, I had 
the sense that my body was held upright by a force that wasn’t my own. … My body had grown utterly 
strange.” (BW 86, 93). The strangeness of the body is owed to a temporary gap in consciousness induced 
by attention that blocks “will and understanding”: “My head disappeared into the space around it. There 
was no single consciousness to unify what happened. There was hearing-consciousness, seeing-
consciousness, feeling-consciousness, thinking-consciousness. These states of consciousness were distinct 




weariness or attention, walking or meditation, whether what withdraws is the body or the mind, 
the result is the same: thought (“thinking-consciousness”) is only one among many sense 
perceptions, and it belongs to no one.
60
 
 Fuller insists on this form of thought alienated from the self in a letter to Jane 
Tuckerman, from October 21, 1838, in which she recounts the same ecstatic episode from 1831. 
Having remembered how “seven years bygone” the “bitter months [of] a terrible weight had been 
pressing on me,” and how “at this time I never had any consolation, except in long, solitary 
walks and my meditations,” she continues: “One day lives always in my memory; one chestiest, 
heavenliest day of communion with the soul of things. It was Thanksgiving-day. I was free to be 
alone; in the meditative woods, by the choked-up fountain, I passed its hours, each of which 
contained ages of thought and emotion. I saw, then, how idle were my griefs; that I had acquired 
the thought of each object which had been taken from me (LMF 1:347). That objects are said to 
have been taken from her implies the conventional separation between me and not-me, a 
separation that etches out and defines our personhood in relation to the world. But at the moment 
of ecstasy, when consciousness is dimmed, Fuller assumes the position of every object around 
her while the contours of her self are erased and the distinction between thought and body, 
between herself and the objective world, disappears. This is the essence of the mystical 
experience of ecstasy. The account of it is prefaced in the letter to Tuckerman by a remarkable 
statement about pain: “I have lived to know that the secret of all things is pain, and that nature 
travaileth most painfully with her noblest products. I was not without hours of deep spiritual 
                                                                                                                                                       
the beads were separate pieces. But not like that at all. Nothing, no filament, held the beads together” 
(BW 98). 
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 In Simone Weil, the operation of erasing the viewpoint is similarly enacted by the state of “being 
dead,” in which affects cease to matter. According to Cameron, “in Weil’s topography one can arrive 
variously at being dead, which is not a physical state but which nonetheless relies on the depletion of the 
body’s energy. Therefore ‘physical labor is a daily death’ in that it transforms ‘a being who loves and 




insight, and consciousness of the inheritance of vast powers. I touched the secret of the universe, 
and by that touch was invested with talismanic power which has never left me, though it 
sometimes lies dormant for a long time” (LMF 1:347, emphasis added). That pain should be the 
“secret,” the underlying principle of all things, is unorthodox: pain, in other words, is the 
phenomenon of impersonality conceptually prior to consciousness, to the sense of self, and to 
personal suffering. Hence, Fuller’s crucial association of ecstasy with pain is only a reformulated 
insistence on the circumstantial nature of the self and the originary inevitability of pain. But 
Fuller, I want to insist, takes things a step further: she becomes all pain – pain in the absence of 
its experience. For if pain is the world (“the secret of all things”), Fuller’s dissolution into that 
world presupposes that she turn into pain itself. Though such a move of hyperbolizing pain may 
seem to contradict her initial impulse to alleviate her suffering from headaches, it in fact aligns 
with her peculiar philosophy of impersonality. In becoming pain itself, in ceasing to maintain the 
separation between sensations and a sensing subject, the distinction between pain and the 
absence of it ceases to exist as well.
61
  
The power of the ecstatic event from 1831 suggests the experience of conversion. Fuller 
identifies it in precisely those terms in her 1840 journal: “My earthly pain at not being 
recognized never went deep after this hour. I had passed the extreme of passionate sorrow. … 
When I consider that this will be nine years ago next November, I am astonished that I have not 
gone on faster since; that I am not yet sufficiently purified to be taken back to God” (MMF 
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 In “Literary Ethics” Emerson develops a similar idea about ecstasy as the point of tearing down the 
walls that separate one from the world: “When I see the daybreak … I feel perhaps the pain of an alien 
world; a world not yet subdued by the thought; or, I am cheered by the moist, warm, glittering, budding, 
melodious hour, that takes down the narrow walls of my soul, and extends its life and pulsation to the 
very horizon. That is morning, to cease for a bright hour to be a prisoner of this sickly body, and to 
become as large as nature” (Emerson, Essays and Lectures, 102). The upshot is different, however: while 






 The sense of a new beginning echoes through these confessions, suggesting the birth of 
a new self through a new insight into the nature of our relation to the world (“Still, I did but 
touch then on the only haven of Insight,” MMF 1:142). The new insight would enact Fuller’s 
pain-killing procedure by teaching her that ecstasy is the way to disengage pain from the self: 
“Since that day, I have never more been completely engaged in self. … but [I] am learning to be 
patient. I shall be all human yet; and then the hour will come to leave humanity, and live always 
in the pure ray. … Since then I have suffered, as I must suffer again, till all the complex be made 
simple, but I have never been in discord with the grand harmony” (MMF 1:142, emphasis 
added). The temporal caesura (“since that day”) suggests a lesson learned: total immersion in the 
self by way of self-consciousness is no longer necessary. Fuller realizes that a different relation 
to the world is possible.
63
 She will continue to experience pain, but it will no longer be hers since 
no discord, no distinction would enable her to feel it, as she explicitly says in a letter to William 
H. Channing in November 1840: “I feel just now such a separation from pain and illness – such a 
consciousness of true life, while suffering most, – that pain has no effect but to steal some of my 
time. And I believe it compensates me by purifying me. I do not regret it in the least” (LMF 
2:184). The compensation, much like her “learning to be patient,” may seem to be organized 
narratively, as waiting for something. But the waiting is, in fact, for the moment of purification 
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 Here too there is an aspect of “elementality,” as if Fuller’s purification presupposes the erasure of 
consciousness and its disintegration into compound elements – senses and matter – that then are returned 
to God, which in Fuller’s case is never clearly a transcendent, much less a Christian, divinity.  
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 In a letter to Elizabeth Hoar from March 20, 1842 she similarly writes: “I do not suffer keen pains and 
spasms as I used to do. … Then I constantly looked forward to death; now I feel there has been a crisis in 
my constitution. It is a subject of great interest to me as connected with my mental life, for I feel this 
change dates from the era of illumination in my mental life” (LMF 3:55, emphasis added). The 
constitutional “crisis” and “the era of illumination” refer to the moment of ecstasy on Thanksgiving in 
1831, although the realization didn’t come until much later. As if to reinforce the initiatory nature of this 
experience, in the journal from 1840 she compresses the description of this momentous experience in the 
exclamation “Selah!,” a liturgical mark in the book of Psalms designating the break or a pause between 
the poems or stanzas (MMF 1:142). It is as if the experience of ecstasy inaugurates a transformative break 




or disappearance into “the pure ray,” the point at which her human benchmark of consciousness 
and self-identity will have been abandoned. The waiting is for nothing in particular, then, since 
the purity of sensing that she is learning to be patient for is precisely what our lives are like 
ordinarily, when bodies are dislodged from “will and understanding.” Fuller’s patience is similar 
to Simone Weil’s, as Cameron reads it: not a desire for death, nor a desire at all. In Weil’s 
waiting “there is no differentiated sense of time, because the future is understood to be just like 
the past. … There is only pointless waiting – which is to say, waiting that is not waiting at all, 
but rather waiting that has become being. For once waiting is not intelligible in terms of any 
goal, there is only the automaticity of an elemental state, enough to satisfy any craving for 
lifelessness. But there is not here even a craving for lifelessness” (SW 142). Such waiting is 
endurance, an attempt “to suspend a person’s state of mind, with its frustrations, expectations, 
and above all hopes – that is, with its distinctions” (SW 141). For Fuller, too, ecstasy is devoid of 
particularities, preferences and desires, all of which she must come back to once the trance has 
subsided: “I have returned to the world of dust and fuss and conflicting claims and bills and 
duties. Yet through me flows the same sweet harmony and last night in such full strains that it 
seemed as if that must be the last of my human life” (LMF 2:163). The world of fuss and dust is 
the world of properties, narrative, and meaning, attainable only through a particular point of 
view. In the moment of ecstasy, on the contrary, temporality is abolished – and with it pain – as 
Fuller asserts in “Aglauron and Laurie”: “It is indeed the dearest fact of our consciousness, that, 
in every moment of joy, pain is annihilated. There is no past, and the future is only the sunlight 
streaming into the far valley.”
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 Margaret Fuller, “Aglauron and Laurie: A Drive Through The Country Near Boston,” in Woman in the 




 “Of the mighty changes in my spiritual life I do not wish to speak, yet surely you cannot be 
ignorant of them,” Fuller wrote to Caroline Sturgis on September 26, 1840:  
All has been revealed, all foreshown yet I know it not. Experiment has given place to 
certainty, pride to obedience, thought to love, and truth is lost in beauty. … When we 
meet you may probably perceive all in me. When we meet you will find me at home. Into 
that home cold winds may blow, keen lightnings dart their bolts, but I cannot be driven 
from it more. (LMF 2:158-59)
65
 
The “mighty changes,” a reference to the experience of ecstasy from 1831, or rather, to Fuller’s 
unexpected realization, in 1840, of its profundity, are also understood as having finally placed 
her “at home.” The home she speaks of, however, is neither a typical house, nor a homey feeling 
of sheltered inviolability. Resembling Thoreau’s cabin at Walden, Fuller’s house is open on all 
sides – the winds howl through it as the storm dashes the locks. It would seem as though, instead 
of protecting, it exposes the tenant to the lashes of the outside world. Yet, it does neither, as it 
provides no interiority, nor even a distinction between the inside and the outside. The ontological 
insight into the ecstatic nature of being dismantles rather than unlocks this house of the self, 
making Fuller at home in homelessness: 
“From the brain of the purple mountain” flows forth cheer to my somewhat weary mind. I 
feel refreshed amid these bolder shapes of nature. Mere gentle and winning landscapes 
are not enough. How I wish my birth had been cast among the sources of the streams, 
where the voice of hidden torrents is heard by night, and the eagle soars, and the thunder 
resounds in prolonged peals, and wide blue shadows fall like brooding wings across the 
valleys! Amid such scenes, I expand and feel at home. … This majesty, this calm 
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 In a letter to a friend from 1837 she writes: “I have learned too, at last, to rejoice in all past pain. In 




splendor, could not but exhilarate the mind, and make it nobly free and plastic. (MMF 
2:132-33) 
To feel at home, paradoxically, is to expand, because this expansion is into the mind’s plasticity 
and dissolution rather than into more space. Fuller’s pull to become one with the world is a far 
cry from the Burkean sublime, through which her mysticism is sometimes explained, and which 
presupposes an observing subject detached from the landscape before it. Here, “mere landscape 
is not enough,” as “the brain” of the mountain intrudes into Fuller’s own, while home is 
identified with a becoming-stream. The exhilarated mind is decomposed into the elemental state 
of a mountain, stream, and valley. It is not insignificant that in the description of her expansive 
self Fuller includes a quote from Tennyson. “From the brain of the purple mountain,” which 
opens the above passage, is a line from “The Poet’s Mind,” a poem published in Tennyson’s 
1830 collection Poems, Chiefly Lyrical. “The Poet’s Mind” is announced as “a companion to the 
preceding” poem – called “The Poet,”
66
 which concerns the elements that make the poet. The 
supplemental “Poet’s Mind” explicates the conditions that enable this making-of-a-poet by 
focusing on the operations of the poet’s mind. In order to be poetic, the mind must be bereft of 
content, as transparent as Emerson’s eyeball which “see[s] all” and is “nothing” in itself: 
Vex not thou the poet’s mind; 
 For thou canst not fathom it. 
 Clear and bright it should be ever, 
 Flowing like a crystal river; 
 Bright as light, and clear as wind. 
… 
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Dark-brow’d sophist, come not anear; 
 All the place is holy ground; 
… 
In the heart of the garden the merry bird chants, 
 It would fall to the ground if you came in. 
In the middle leaps a fountain 
 Like sheet lightning, 
 Ever brightening 
 With a low melodious thunder; 
 All day and all night it is ever drawn 
 From the brain of the purple mountain 
 Which stands in the distance yonder. 
… 
And the mountain draws it from Heaven above, 
 And it sings a song of undying love.
67
 
Evacuated of reason (the “dark-brow’d sophist”), the poet’s ever-brightening mind is being 
emptied of logic and human language, progressively reduced to a bird’s chant, the fountain’s 
flow and low thunder. As the self-effacing mind becomes indistinguishable from the mountain’s 
brain toward the end of the poem, the separateness not only of the poet from the mountain, but 
also of the ideal mind from the corporeal brain is being questioned.
68
 Originating in “the brain of 
the purple mountain,” which is itself drawn “from heaven above,” the poet’s mind-fountain 
pours into a depersonalized openness of the “holy ground,” a bareness bereft of prior concepts 
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 Ibid., 27-28. 
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 For a similar reading of Tennyson’s poem, see: Gregory Tate, The Poet’s Mind: The Psychology of 




and ideas (“bright as light and clear as wind”).
69
 In the context of Tennyson’s poem, Fuller’s 
desire to find home “among the sources of the streams, where the voice of hidden torrents is 
heard by night … and the thunder resounds in prolonged peals” becomes a clear desire for 
homelessness understood as impersonality.  
Translated onto political terms, the homelessness Fuller advances here cannot be squared 
with identity-oriented ideologies that propagate exclusivist enclosures, however progressive their 
policies and agendas. Her conception rejects centeredness in particularity or distinction, seeking 
instead to abandon the essentially human point of view circumscribed by consciousness. In so 
doing, it strives to let go of the safety of a guarded perspective, the standpoint from which the 
world makes sense as separate from the self. In confronting the ideology of sovereign 
individuality by erasing the distinction between self and the world, and in equating both herself 
and the world with ecstatic pain, Fuller perhaps runs the risk of carving out yet another 
metaphysics – one whose sovereign principle is pain. But she also understands this position of 
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 Fuller’s decision to quite Tennyson is important for another, equally important reason. Tennyson was 
known to have had ecstatic trances, often self-induced, throughout his life. “The Poet’s Mind” may be 
understood as an account of the mind’s operation during one of them. For a description of his “waking 
trances” that closely resembles Fuller’s own account of hers, see Tennyson’s letter to Paul Benjamin 
Blood from May 7, 1874, in response to the latter’s pamphlet “Aneasthetic Revelation” published the 
same year: “I have never had any revelations through anaesthetics, but a kind of waking trance – this for 
lack of a better word – I have frequently had, quite up from boyhood, when I have been all alone. This has 
come upon me through repeating my own name to myself silently, till all at once, as it were out of the 
intensity of the consciousness of individuality, individuality itself seemed to dissolve and fade away into 
boundless being, and this not a confused state but the clearest, the surest of the surest, utterly beyond 
words – where death was an almost laughable impossibility – the loss of personality (if so it were) 
seeming no extinction, but the only true life.” Lord Alfred Tennyson, “Appendix to Tennyson’s Princess,” 
in The Princess, edited by George Edward Woodberry (New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1898), 134). 
In a letter to Tennyson’s son Hallam, John Tyndall relates one of Tennyson’s accounts of his ectsatc 
trances: “With great earnestness Tennyson described to me a state of consciousness into which he could 
throw himself by thinking intently of his own name. It was impossible to give anything that could be 
called a description of the state, for language seemed incompetent to touch it. It was an apparent isolation 
of the spirit from the body. Wishing doubtless to impress upon me the reality of the phenomenon, he 
exclaimed, ‘By God Almighty, there is no delusion in the matter! It is no nebulous ecstasy, but a state of 
transcendent wonder, associated with absolute clearness of mind.’” Hallam Tennyson, The Life and 




homeless impersonality to be politically relevant because it is ultimately linked with freedom. 
Evicted from its shelter, the ecstatic self gets propelled into spontaneity. In a letter to Channing, 
Fuller distances herself from what she understands as the unified, goal-oriented politics of 
projects and proclamations: 
We have different ways of steering the ship. Yours is to seek conclusions, which as you 
often hasten to, you must afterward modify, mine to give myself up to experiences which 
often steep me in ideal passion, so that the desired goal is forgotten in the rich present. 
Yet I think I am learning how to use the present, and were my calendar published, it 
might lead to association too. An association, if not of efforts, yet of destinies. In such an 
one I live with several, feeling that each one by acting out his own casts light upon a 
mutual destiny, illustrates the thought of a master mind. It is a constellation, not a 
phalanx to which I belong. (LMF 3:154) 
Neither a form of associationism, which Alexis de Tocqueville diagnosed as the hallmark and 
specificity of American democracy, nor the Fourierist utopianism of George Ripley’s Brook 
Farm experiment, Fuller’s political inclination, in keeping with her ontological concerns, veers 
toward a constellation of “destinies” – a conglomerate of disparate, discontinuous elements that 
form impermanent associations not under the prior presupposition of a mutual interest or 
predetermined goals, but circumstantially. In thus coming together, these elements must coexist, 
however temporarily, until a new constellation is formed, and subsequently dismantled. 
Translated from the plane of self onto the plane of the political, Fuller’s conception of 
unpredictable constellations – both a risk and a promise – prefigures Sheldon Wolin’s call for 
advancing but also rethinking the concept of democracy as ultimately ecstatic: “as something 




doomed to success only temporarily, but as a recurrent possibility.”
70
 Fuller can be said to 
advance a conception of ecstasy as a mode of being, and it is in this sense that her ecstatic 
ontology can be understood as democratic. 
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“Perfect Self-Forgetfulness”: The Interrupted Community in Sarah Orne Jewett 
 
On December 4, 1889 Jewett wrote to her friend Annie Fields: 
I wrote until after dark this afternoon, and then went out to walk in the early moonlight, 
down the street by the Academy, and even up on the hill back of the Academy itself. 
There was a great grey cloud in the west, but all the rest of the sky was clear, and it was 
very beautiful. When one goes out of doors and wanders about alone at such a time, how 
wonderfully one becomes part of nature, like an atom of quick-silver against a great 




Jewett’s state appears to be a combination of Emerson’s active enchantment and Fuller’s self-
induced ecstatic trance. Like Emerson in Nature, transfixed by the glory of the landscape at day-
break (“The long slander bars of cloud float like fishes in the sea of crimson light. … I seem to 
partake its rapid transformations: the active enchantment reaches my dust, and I dilate and 
conspire with the morning wind” (Nature 15), Jewett is mesmerized by the clear night sky. Like 
Fuller’s consciousness, Jewett’s is befogged during a walk, and she begins to feel herself as 
almost indistinguishable from the world around her (“how wonderfully one becomes part of 
nature, like an atom of quick-silver against a great mass”). In a way, Jewett’s state is 
characterized by a simultaneity of “self-enlargement” and “self-surrender”: like Emerson’s 
protocol of enchantment (“I am nothing; I see all”), Jewett’s claim that she is “becoming part of 
nature” entails a dissolution of self-presence (“I hardly keep my separate consciousness”).  
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 More than half a century divides Jewett from Emerson and Fuller, a period fissured by 
the Civil War and the frustrated hopes of the Reconstruction Era. It is a different political 
landscape, one in which America’s nation-building is now firmly, irreversibly it seems, anchored 
in imperial expansion and assimilationist violence. This historical context informs what I explore 
as Jewett’s strategy of self-enlargement through self-surrender. In this chapter, I set about to 
uncover Jewett’s eclectic, non-religious recourse to mysticism’s notion of “self-surrender,” 
which she rearticulated as “self-forgetfulness” and developed into an original strategy of 
forgetting (or surrendering) of one’s identity, values and origin in order to allow other voices and 
values that structure the self to resurface. Jewett understood that our persons are composed of 
multiple, often conflicting and disparate, elements. She also perceived our personal – and by 
extension, communal and collective – identities to be too often stratified by repressive 
procedures and structures. In the context in which the United States began to understand its post-
Civil War national identity as an all-inclusive proliferation of cultural diversities and “regions”
2
 
– a procedure that, however democratic, is still organized around a specific notion of identity – 
Jewett’s strategy of enlarging the self by way of forgetting it marks, I argue, an original 
revaluation of the coercive procedures of any identity-formation (personal or collective). In what 
follows, I look at three stories from Jewett’s The Country of the Pointed Firs (1896) which, by 
foregrounding different strategies of self-surrender, bring to the fore the violent foundation of 
America’s national homogenization. I preface this analysis with what I see as the intellectual 
genealogy of Jewett’s notion of “self-forgetfulness.” 
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Enlargement as Surrender 
The central story in The Country of the Pointed Firs, “Where Pennyroyal Grew,” introduces the 
central concepts of Jewett’s philosophy of self-surrender: “mindreading,” “surrender,” “tact” and 
“self-forgetfulness.” During the visit to Mrs. Blackett and her son William on Green Island, Mrs. 
Todd reports on the latest news from the town. Meanwhile, the narrator observes Mrs. Blackett: 
Her hospitality was something exquisite; she had the gift which so many women lack, of 
being able to make themselves and their houses belong entirely to a guest’s pleasure, – 
that charming surrender for the moment of themselves and whatever belongs to them, so 
that they make a part of one’s own life that can never be forgotten. Tact is after all a kind 
of mindreading, and my hostess held the golden gift. Sympathy is of the mind as well as 
the heart, and Mrs. Blackett's world and mine were one from the moment we met. 
Besides, she had that final, that highest gift of heaven, a perfect self-forgetfulness.
3
  
Contrary to most readings of this passage, Mrs. Blackett’s self-forgetfulness must be read here as 
something other than a form of empathy. This self-forgetfulness is not merely a characterological 
ability to identify with others in order to understand them better, as Marcia McClintock Folsom 
argues in her influential essay. There, Folsom defines Jewett’s “self-forgetfulness” as one’s 
psychological “capacity to anticipate and grasp another’s feelings,” which the narrator too must 
use in her literary calling: “Mind-reading requires intelligent curiosity, mental activity, specific 
knowledge. … ‘Self-forgetfulness’ allows the narrator freedom to enter other lives even as it 
denies her full fictional presence in the book.”
4
 When this mechanism of empathy is in place, 
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according to Folsom, we are capable of “imagining the needs, feelings, and intentions of an 
absent person”; and the ability to do so is “the result of the familiarity with the other’s routines, 
and of an affectionate desire to know and visualize someone else’s life, however islanded and far 
from ordinary communication it may be.”
5
 On Folsom’s view, mind-reading and self-surrender 
create a coherent world of the Dunnet Landing archipelago: “The chief source of the enduring 
appeal of Sarah Orne Jewett’s The Country of the Pointed Firs is its presentation of a world 
which seems to us touchingly coherent. … Mrs. Todd and the narrator are both acute observers 
who habitually penetrate and interpret external facts, and both are able to reconstruct the whole 
through active interpretation of details.”
6
 
 My argument works in the opposite direction. Although self-forgetfulness may well be 
seen as empathy, in the context of Jewett’s strange communities it produces strange effects: it is 
an instigator of confusion, rather than a factor of social cohesion. For, while the community of 
Dunnet Landing may seem coherent and rounded, it is not a happy place. Populated by the 
elderly and the mad, the disappointed and the lonely, widows, spinsters and widowers, often 
childless or forgotten, the static archipelago of these small Maine islands, arrested in time and 
futureless, often resembles a retirement home or a madhouse.
7
 The genre of The Country reflects 
this stasis: composed as a series of short sketches, with not much in the way of narrative to 
advance the plot, the work as a whole resembles, as Bill Brown suggests, a series of museum 
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“tableaux of the everyday … an uncanny arrangement of life-group exhibits.”
8
 From this 
barrenness, smoothed over by the narrator’s serene voice, there erupts from time to time, often in 
the moments of a character’s self-forgetfulness, an uncanny flash revealing the exclusion and 
violence that anchor the “touching coherence” and homogeneity of this white New England 
community. My own reading of this collection of sketches shows how the states of self-
forgetfulness and “charming surrender” of the characters lead to the emergence of an otherwise 
invisible coercive foundation of any identity, whether personal or collective. While Folsom is 
right on the whole that self-surrender may generally “imply that the artist relinquishes a personal 
point of view in order to enter into the spirit of the other people or even of objects,”
9
 the problem 
with her reading is more basic: she sees self-forgetfulness as the narrator’s characteristic, while 
the passage explicitly refers to it as Mrs. Blackett’s “highest gift” of hospitality. More 
importantly, on Folsom’s reading, sympathy is a willful capacity to read another person’s 
thoughts and feelings, yet she omits a crucial element: Jewett’s concept of “sympathy” should be 
read alongside the other four terms – mindreading, self-forgetfulness, charming surrender, and 
tact – with which it shares the connotation of withdrawal and “the non-violent refusal of 
reduction.”
10
 I, therefore, depart from Folsom’s interpretation of self-forgetfulness as an aspect 
of individual character, and proceed to read it as Jewett’s non-psychological concept of 
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hospitality, the concept she developed through her life-long intellectual investment in some of 
the mystical theologies of self-surrender. 
 More than two decades before she wrote The Country Jewett began reading two mystics 
who left a profound and consistent influence on her thinking: Emmanuel Swedenborg and 
François Fénelon. Although not mystically inclined herself, and not even particularly religious,
11
 
Jewett began reading Swedenborg early on, at the urge of Theophilus Parsons, the founder of the 
Boston New Church and one of the leading figures in Swedenborgian circles of the time. In 
1853, Parsons became the co-editor, with Sampson and Caleb Reed, of the New Jerusalem 
Magazine, the official organ of the New Church.
12
 Jewett met Parsons in the summer of 1872 
when she was twenty-three; she maintained correspondence with him until 1881 (he died a year 
later), and read his The Infinite and the Finite (1872) and the Outlines of the Religion and 
Philosophy of Swedenborg (1876) several times.
13
 Sarah Sherman points out that “through 
Professor Theopilus Parsons, Jewett had been introduced to the mystic’s theory of a spiritual 
world similar to our own, in which angels carry on their lives in pure and perfect sympathy.”
14
 
Sherman is referring to Swedenborg’s doctrine of correspondences, which implies a correlation 
between the material and the spiritual world. Its importance for Jewett lies in the doctrine’s 
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teaching that invisible forces govern the visible world. Jewett cultivated an interest in the 
invisible all her life, which inspired her not only to write a number of ghost stories, but also, I 
believe, to constantly seek in the visible world invisible, albeit non-transcendent, causes.
15
 As 
Paula Blanchard documents, Parsons was instrumental not only for Jewett’s choice of literary 
vocation, but also for the way she linked writing with her communal focus.
16
 But it is also 
important not to overstate Parsons’s influence and to emphasize that, as she was entering a more 
mature phase in her writing career in the 1880s, Jewett abandoned his rigid moralism and began 
to form more independent interests. She continues to read Swedenborg beyond Parson’s death, as 
her 1884 letter to Annie Fields testifies: “I wonder how far you have got in the Swedenborg 
book? I keep a sense of it under everything else. How such a bit of foundation lifts up all one’s 




In her twenties Jewett also discovered François Fénelon and read his meditations, 
miniature parables, and pedagogical reflections. Decades later, in 1891, in a letter to her friend 
Louisa Dresel, she wrote that The Selections [from the Writings of Fenelon] are “the religious 
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book of my life.”
18
 Likewise, Helen, the narrator of Jewett’s first novel Deephaven (1877), 
mentions this book with admiration: “We each have our pet books,” she says towards the end of 
the novel, listing the books she and Kate had read over the summer. “It is very hard to make a list 
of the books one likes best, but … I am sure we had ‘Fenelon,’ for we always have that” (NS 
138).  
In the seventeenth century, Fénelon’s theology helped bring about what Michel de 
Certeau called a new “science of the extraordinary,” which became a new manner of speaking 
(speaking in the so-called “extraordinary style”). This consequently enacted a novel way of 
interpreting the world.
19
 This new “epistemology of enunciation”
20
 wedged itself somewhere 
between visible and invisible reality, and set about to give an account of what is absent, 
transcendent, and elusive as being on a par with a scientific perception of reality. Expressing the 
inexpressible was the striving of mystics, not by way of instituting a separate system of 
designations and corresponding meanings, but rather, as Certeau suggests, by transmutations of 
the standard language. The significance of this new linguistic epistemology resides not in 
discovering and naming the hidden, nor in fixing it within the network of signification. Rather, in 
an attempt to express the inexpressible, mystic utterance – like poetic language – aims to create 
the images on the basis of which a new experience of the world is generated. In so doing, 
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mystical language, inseparable from a set of corporeal and mental practices, destabilizes the 
solidity and wholeness of any form by illuminating the invisible forces at work in it. Mystical 
experience thus enacts a new hermeneutics, which sees the world as consisting of what is 
inexpressible, thereby generating a spectral ontology of absence and of the ghostly; the world is 
imperceptibly haunted by an invisible part of it. I emphasize this ontological orientation of 
mysticism in order to point to the traces of Swedenborg’s and Fénelon’s thinking in Jewett’s 
writing. After all, Fénelon’s is the book of Jewett’s life. So what was so appealing in it for her?  
The Selections from the Writings of Fenelon with a Memoir of his Life were first 
published in Boston in 1828. The book was immensely popular: it went though six editions in 
twelve years and kept being reprinted until the early twentieth century. William Ellery 
Channing’s lengthy 1829 review of it from the Christian Examiner was reprinted in a shorter 
version as “Introductory Remarks to the Fourth Edition” (1835) and appeared in several 
subsequent editions. An extended selection of Fénelon ’s writings was published in Boston in the 
1870s, around the time Jewett was discovering mystical literature.
21
 Fénelon’s theology revolves 
around one central injunction: unconditional “self-surrender” to God, which leads to radical 
annihilation of individual personality:  
The more perfect is our self-surrender, the more perfect is our peace.”
22
  
They surrender themselves to God, no longer dwelling in themselves, or trusting in their 
own strength. In their silent suffering and moment by moment dependence on grace, an 
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They renounce all and find hundredfold in this renunciation.
24
  
 According to that disposition of self-surrender which Thou dost grant me, I neither 
desire nor refuse anything. I am ready for everything, and I consent to be useless to all. 
Sought or rejected, known or unknown, applauded or opposed, what is it to me?
25
 
To repeat, Jewett was neither a mystic nor religious. Fénelon’s theology of radical self-
abdication would not have been appealing to her as a way of life. Something else attracted her to 
it, and as we will see, this attraction found its way into her stories and novels, which repeatedly 
stage self-forgetfulness and self-withdrawal as a political strategy that allows others to speak.  
In his “Introductory Remarks to the Fourth Edition” of the Selections, Channing 
summarizes Fénelon’s theology in the following way: “The great duty on which [Fénelon] insists 
is the absorption of the human will in the Divine. Nothing would satisfy him but entire self-
immolation. … To promote … entire freedom from by-ends and from subtle references to self, 
was his aim.”
26
 Like all mystics, and like Swedenborg after him, Fénelon aims at dismantling the 
boundaries of the self and giving up self-possession as a way of becoming one with God: 
“’Blessed are the poor in spirit,’ who have taken the vow of spiritual poverty,” Fénelon writes, 
“who live from day to day by continual alms, and by absolute self-surrender to Providence.”
27
 
But this philosophy of self-impoverishment by self-surrender is, Channing protests, “sometimes 
open to objection”: 
He was distinguished by genius, devotion, and his thirst for perfection, rather than by 
logical accuracy of thought and expression. He utters great truths, but often without due 
qualifications or restraint; and accordingly his writing may mislead readers of much 
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sensibility and little reflection. … His philosophy belonged more to the heart than the 
head, and his language cannot always stand the test of rigid criticism.
28
 
Channing is genuinely disturbed by Fénelon’s insistence on the heart’s inability to be the object 
of rational criticism and the agent of reasoning, as well as by his pursuit of the abdication of the 
self, the “surrender of every thing to the will of God.” As Fénelon writes in “Self-Renunciation 
as the Only Way to Peace,” “the only remedy is to come out of one’s self in order to find peace. 
We must renounce ourselves, and lose all self-interest, that we may no longer have anything to 
lose, to fear, or to contrive.”
29
 Channing finds it unacceptable that Fénelon would “brand as sins 
those references to our own good, which are not only innocent but necessary to our preservation, 
and condemn that respect to future rewards.”
30
 Channing finds it unacceptable because it runs 
contrary to his insistence on the strong individual: “a false philosophy of human nature guided 
[Fénelon’s] perceptions. … However highly we may reverence Fenelon, his writings are not to 
be exclusively studied, if we would avoid a partial development of our nature.”
31
 The nature 
Channing has in mind, is a self-preserving, autonomous, and independent rational agent (who is 
disinclined to follow Fénelon’s “philosophy of the heart”), and who is hostile to or, at best, 
dismissive of anything that obstructs his development. A rational agent who is self-assertive, in 
other words. And yet, despite Channing, Fénelon’s “false philosophy of human nature,” which 
negates self-preservation as a precondition of an individual self, and strives toward weakness and 
self-surrender – the self that keeps forgetting itself – is precisely what seems to draw Jewett to 
his writing.  
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In “On Wandering Thoughts and Depression” Fénelon suggests: “If anything is capable 
of enlarging and freeing the heart, it is this entire surrender.”
32
 The maxim sounds oxymoronic 
only if we take enlargement to mean expansion into more space. The militaristic connotation that 
aligns enlargement with the act of conquering makes surrender its contrast. Yet, Fénelon and 
Jewett, like Emerson and Fuller in the previous two chapters, understand the two gestures to be 
congruent. Jewett’s experience of eclipsed consciousness during a night-time walk, described in 
the letter to Annie Fields, is also akin to Fénelon’s procedure of enlargement through surrender, 
or of expansion in self-forgetfulness: it is only on the condition that the “I” is dismantled and 
merged with what constitutes it, that the self can be “enlarged” into what it is not.  
In the sections that follow I focus on three stories from The Country of the Pointed Firs 
that exemplify three different instances of Jewett’s self-forgetfulness. I proceed inductively, from 
personal, to communal, to general, in order to show what happens to an identity – any identity – 
when self-forgetfulness is its modus operandi.  
 
Self-Forgetfulness as Remembering the Native American  
Three consecutive sketches in The Country of the Pointed Firs
33
 tell the story of a “peculiar 
person” Joanna Todd, “crossed in love” and known in her town of Dunnet Landing for her 
solitary retreat to an uninhabited nearby island. Stricken by grief after her fiancée had abandoned 
her for another woman, Joanna retires from society and goes to live on Shell-heap Island not too 
far from the shore, never setting foot on the mainland again. The island is described in the story 
as mere “thirty acres [of] rocks and all” (430) and only eight miles away from the shore; it is a 
shell heap, barren, “a bad place to get to” and difficult “to make a landing” (429). Joanna’s 
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elusive hermitage becomes the object of local attention because the island used to be the 
settlement of Abenakis, a Native American tribe about which all kinds of stories circulate in 
Dunnet Landing: 
“Some o’ the old folks was kind o’ fearful about it. ‘Twas ‘counted a great place in old 
Indian times; you can pick up their stone tools ‘most any time if you hunt about. There’s 
a beautiful spring o’ water, too. Yes, I remember when they used to tell queer stories 
about Shell-heap Island. Some said ‘twas a great bangeing-place for the Indians, and an 
old chief resided there once that ruled the winds; and others said they’d always heard that 
once the Indians come down from up country an’ left a captive there without any bo’t, 
an’ ‘twas too far to swim across to Black Island, so called, an’ he lived there till he 
perished. … Anyway, there was Indians, – you can see their shell-heap that named the 




In the white imagination of the nineteenth century, the Abenaki Algonquin Indians had 
“vanished” from the area and seemed to have survived through two forms of inscription: the 
communal narratives of Maine inhabitants,
35
 and the archeological refuse on deserted shell heaps 
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heaps revealing traces of cannibalism on the York River, Maine,” Publications of the University of 
Pennsylvania, Series in Philology, Literature and Archaeology 6 (1897): 111-137. The cannibalistic 
practices of Abenakis have since been decisively refuted by scholarship. 
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 For more on this method of preservation, see Jacqueline Murphy, “Replacing Regionalism: Abenaki 




off the coast of Maine that preserve the material traces of their habitation.
36
 Jewett wrote the 
story about “poor Joanna’s” hermitage in the period framed by several extensive explorations of 
the shell heaps in Maine. One of the first was in the late 1860s, conducted by a Harvard College 
professor and the first curator of the Peabody Museum, Jeffries Wyman;
37
 another was in 1886, 
when the museum purchased the rights to inspect and collect the prehistoric material discovered 
in the Damariscotta River valley in Maine;
38
 the third took place in the summer of 1909 and was 
led by Frederic Brewster Loomis, a biology professor at Amherst College.
39
 These excavation 
expeditions unearthed the archeological and geological fragments that were then used as 
anthropological and ethnological material for the reconstruction of the life and everyday 
practices of the Abenaki tribe.  
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A common phenomenon in Massachusetts and Maine,
40
 shell-heap islands, also known as 
“(kitchen) middens,” are large deposits of shells, human remains, animal bones, decayed 
vegetation, clothing, pottery shards and food, accumulated by indigenous peoples at the place of 
their early settlements. These heaps were layered accumulations of discarded shells, on which a 
native people had fed for hundreds, sometimes even thousands of years.
41
 As Jeffries Wyman 
explains in his seminal “An Account of Some Kjoekkenmoeddings,” 
A savage tribe, dwelling for a long period on one and the same place, would inevitably 
leave vestiges of the manner in which they lived, 
though these would, of course, be fewer in kinds 
just in proportion hunting and fishing. … The 
clam, the quahog, the scallop, and the oyster, 
entered largely into their food, and the castaway 
shells of these, piled up in many years, have not 
only become monuments of their sea-shore life, but 
have largely aided in the preservation of the bones 
of the animals on which they fed, and also of some 
of the more perishable implements used in their 
rude arts.
42
                Damariscotta, Maine
43
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 Though fictional, the landscape and topography of Dunnet Landing, like most Jewett’s locales, is 
modeled on the Maine landscape, as her letter from January 1899 corroborates: “I cannot tell you just 
where Dunnet Landing is except that it must be somewhere ‘along shore’ between the region of Tenants 
Harbor and Boothbay, or it might be farther to the eastward in a country that I know less well. It is not 
any real ‘landing’ or real ‘harbor’ but I am glad to think that you also know that beautiful stretch of 
seacoast country” (Jewett, Sarah Orne Jewett: Letters, 116) 
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These early settlements were incredibly well-preserved due to the shells’ alkalinity, which 
slowed down the process of decay in organic matter, and kept the inner layers of the piles dry 
and relatively intact, along with everything caught between them. Thus, the shells, in a way, 
serve as a natural preservative and a cultural archive. As sites of valuable archeological research, 
disclosing the hidden history of a place, shell heaps are, as one contemporary reporter describes 
them, a “curious diary written unconsciously in the negligencies [sic] and commonplaces of the 
everyday”: 
Bone by bone and shell by shell, the biological department of Amherst college is 
translating a diary written a thousand years ago. It was written by summer boarders all 
along the coast of Maine. To most people it is a shell heap. But to Professor Frederic B. 
Loomis of Amherst college it is a legible, intimate narration. … The running commentary 
on the pleasures and business is the story of a people hitherto almost unknown – the 
“poverty poor” Abenakis. … A new race came and the Abenaki vanished. Dirt, grass, 
trees covered the rubbish piles. The sea crept up, biting the mainland into islands, and set 
its teeth in the Abenaki dumps. People saw that the heaps were not just dirt.
44
 
In fact, the shell mounds are dirt that testifies. They are a text of a people’s intimate history – the 
practice of their everyday life (hence, a diary). Fossilized relics, caught between the shells, 
inscribe a stratified story of the Abenaki tribe.
45
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 From Harold Webber Castner, A Story of the Mystifying, Prehistoric Oyster Shell Heaps of the 
Damariscotta River, Containing records of Explorations by Scientists and All Known Data on this Man-
Made Wonder of Antiquity (Lincoln: Lincoln County News, 1950). 
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 Jeffries Wyman writes of this transformation of history into geology in his report on the Maine 
excavation: “Shell-heaps have become intimately associated with the question of the age of the human 
race, a question which has passed out of the domain of the written, into that of geological history.” 




“People on top of a shell mound,” Saint Petersburg, Florida (1903)
46
 
In Jewett’s story, Joanna comes to Shell-heap Island to make a minimalistic life there, a 
“voluntary hermitage”: “There was something medieval in the behavior of poor Joanna Todd 
under a disappointment of the heart. … Joanna was like one of the saints in the desert” (442). 
The description of Joanna as a hermit, I suggest, is not simply a metaphor for her secluded life. 
She becomes a hermit, not a Robinson, as Bill Brown argues.
47
 Robinson Crusoe is a paranoid 
man, shuddering in horror at every sign of otherness, and walking around the island with a 
mission to subdue it to the needs and values he had brought with him. In addition to that, as 
Gilles Deleuze reminds us, everything Robinson has was taken from the ship,
48
 and in a way, he 
never really left England. Joanna’s relation to the island is very different: 
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 “Robinson’s vision of the world resides exclusively in property; never have we seen an owner more 
ready to preach. The mythical recreation of the world from the deserted island gives way to the 
reconstitution of everyday bourgeois life from a reserve capital. Everything is taken from the ship. Noting 




Joanna took a poor old boat that had been her father's and lo’ded in a few things, and off 
she put all alone, with a good land breeze, right out to sea. … No, ‘tis a dreadful small 
place to make a world of; it has a different look from any of the other islands, but there’s 
a sheltered cove on the south side, with mud-flats across one end of it at low water where 
there’s excellent clams, and the big shell-heap keeps some o’ the wind off a little house 
her father took the trouble to build when he was a young man. They said there was an old 
house built o’ logs there before that, with a kind of natural cellar in the rock under it. He 
used to stay out there days to a time, and anchor a little sloop he had, and dig clams to fill 
it, and sail up to Portland. ... There was a few sheep that belonged to her brother an’ her, 
but she bargained for him to come and get them on the edge o' cold weather. … He come 
home with the sheep an’ left the other things by the house, but she never so much as 
looked out o’ the window.” (430-31) 
Like a hermit, she brings “a few things” from home and builds a new life with what she finds on 
the Shell-heap, a life not entirely dissimilar from the Abenakis’ lives hundreds of years ago: 
“There was always plenty of driftwood thrown up, and a poor failin’ patch of spruces 
covered all the north side of the island, so she always had something to burn. She was 
very fond of workin’ in the garden ashore, and that first summer she began to till the little 
field out there, and raised a nice parcel o’ potatoes. She could fish, o’ course, and there 
was all her clams an’ lobsters. You can always live well in any wild place by the sea 
when you’d starve to death up country … Joanna had berries out there, blackberries at 
least, and there was a few herbs in case she needed them. … There was a little piece o’ 
swamp on the island where good rushes grew plenty, and she’d gathered ‘em, and braided 
                                                                                                                                                       
capital to produce benefit as the outcome of work. And the providential function of God is to guarantee a 
return.” Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974, translated by Michael Taormina 




some beautiful mats for the floor and a thick cushion for the long bunk. She’d showed a 
good deal of invention; you see there was a nice chance to pick up pieces o’ wood and 
boards that drove ashore, and she’d made good use o’ what she found. There wasn’t no 
clock, but she had a few dishes on a shelf, and flowers set about in shells fixed to the 
walls, so it did look sort of homelike. (432, 437) 
Not a Robinson-like character at all – Joanna has no aspirations to expand or her domain or to go 
back home. She works with what she finds on the island, and unlike Robinson, accommodates 
her knowledge and skill to what she discovers and finds. Brown’s characterization of Joanna as 
Crusoe has a faint colonial and assimilationist ring to it as well: “The story [Jewett] tells about 
Shell-Heap Island, the story of the hermit Joanna, displaces any account of Indian history or of 
the relics lodged in Native American mounds, while nonetheless assuming – appropriating – the 
tragic aura of the Native Americans’ fate.”
49
 I agree with Brown that some kind of appropriative 
displacement is at work on the level of narration. It is the way Joanna’s story is used in the 
sketch by the narrator that makes it, in Brown’s account, appropriative. By the end, the narrator 
pushes Joanna aside, along with the mounds and relics, and turns her into a universal symbol of 
“human nature.”
50
 Yet, like the layers of the shell heaps Joanna had settled on, the text of her 
story registers at least two other layers of meaning – two different appropriations – that silently 
haunt the story despite the narrator, and perhaps even despite Jewett herself. 
The very presence of the mound in Jewett’s story brings to the fore a kind of 
appropriation inseparable from the cultural one Brown is referring to: the industrial incorporation 
of Native American life and culture into the United States. As early as 1839, geologist Charles T. 
Jackson suggested that oysters and clam shells could be used as fertilizers:  
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From our measurements, it will appear that there are no less than 44,906,400 cubic feet of 
shells in [the Maine Damariscotta River] bed; and since they are generally of large size, 
they may be easily burned, and will make about ten million casks of lime. Hence it will 
appear that this bank may be drawn upon quite extensively without exhaustion, while the 
lime is a most valuable article for the improvement of soils. It will be easy also to grind 
the shells to fine powder, in mills – an operation which will answer better for agricultural 
purposes, since the amendment will remain more permanently in the soil. Good mill sites 
may be obtained, and if the shells are reduced to fine powder and packed in casks, it 
might be advantageously exported to other places for sale.
51
  
In 1881 Jackson’s idea came to fruition when the first kilning furnaces for burning shells and 
transforming them into fertile matter were built in Virginia; in 1885, the Damariscotta Shell and 
Fertilizer Company from Massachusetts erected a mill in coastal Maine and launched a five-year 
project of processing shell-heaps into fertilizer and chicken feed. As one report suggests, 
decomposing shells from the region were “also extensively employed in some sections in 
building roads and in paving streets.”
52
 In fact, in late 1890s and early 1900s, the time Jewett 
writes and publishes The Country of the Pointed Firs, the exploitation of shell-heaps along the 
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In the lodge pockets of the shell-heaps, 
mixed in with what would soon be exhausted to 
fertilize the US soil and pave the streets of its 
cities, lay stone tools, arrow heads, bone 
implements, pottery shards, animal remains and 
human skeletons – a layered autopsy of a race 
brought to the verge of extinction by genocidal 
practices of expulsion and assimilation.
54
 Like 
the wasteful bodies of foreign laborers that 
“enriched” the Peruvian guano in mid-nineteenth 
century, as Eduardo Cadava has shown,
55
 the 
Abenaki culture – having fertilized not only the 
soil of the United States, but also its anthropological, geological and ethnographic knowledge of 
what had become the history of its territory
56
 – was incorporated, literally, into the bodies, 
                                                                                                                                                       
“Another Shell Heap in Maine”: “It is reported that a large shell heap as been discovered at Falmouth 
Foreside, on land owned by the Underwood Water company. It is apparently about 30 feet deep at the 
thickest point, and runs back, as far as has been traced, about 100 feet. … Shells have been removed that 
must have been buried many hundred years, upon which the marks of fire are as fresh as if made but 
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by the owners of the land who expect to reap a rich harvest of Indian relics” (reprinted in: The New York 
Times, September 11, 1884). Joanna, too, becomes a potentially lucrative tourist attraction: “‘Talk about 
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culture, science and living habits of the American nation. It is this industrial incorporation of 
Abenaki culture into the belly of the United States that Jewett’s story silently, perhaps 
unwillingly – by virtue of its strange setting (because any other island would have worked for a 
story about a “generality,” as Brown says) – registers as the second genocide against Native 
Americans that sutures together American identity.  
 Yet there is another kind of incorporation, less violent but just as haunting and just as 
revealing of the violent foundation of the US national identity in Jewett’s story. As an outcome 
of Fénelonian self-forgetfulness, I would call it palimpsestic or idiorrhytmic, in order to stress 
the aspect of simultaneity it effectuates, rather than exclusion.  
When the local minister of Dunnet Landing and Almira Todd, the narrator’s host in The 
Country of the Pointed Firs, visit Joanna on the island one year after she has left the community, 
she seems already detached from her Christian culture: 
“The minister found it hard,” confessed Mrs. Todd; “he got embarrassed, an’ he put on 
his authority and asked her if she felt to enjoy religion in her present situation, an’ she 
replied that she must be excused from answerin’. … I thought he might have seen the 
little old Bible a-layin’ on the shelf close by him. … She kep’ a nice respectful manner 
towards him, and when there come a pause she asked if he had any interest about the old 
Indian remains, and took down some queer stone gouges and hammers off of one of her 
shelves and showed them to him same ’s if he was a boy. … I see then that she’d made 
her some kind o’ sandal-shoes out o’ the fine rushes to wear on her feet; she stepped light 
an’ nice in ‘em as shoes.” (438) 
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From Mrs. Todd’s glimpse at Joanna’s rush sandals there flashes for a moment an uncanny 
image of Joanna-as-Indian. Native Americans used to make their sandals from rush and were 
known for their light, inaudible steps them, as with Joanna now. While I am not claiming that 
Joanna somehow becomes Indian, I nevertheless disagree with interpretations that read this scene 
as her straightforward colonial appropriation of Native American practices. The text is rendered 
more complex by the ambiguity of two important moments in the passage. It remains unclear 1) 
whether or not Joanna had renounced her Christian faith, and kept the Bible on the shelf 
decoratively, along with other Indian relics; and 2) whether or not the “queer stone gouges and 
hammers” she took “off of one of her shelves” were in fact tools she was using in everyday life. 
The question draws attention to the fact that both the Bible and “the old Indian remains” are on 
Joanna’s shelf, and it could be that she is using both or neither, or only one or the other. I insist 
on this seemingly small point because I see it as indicative of the palimpsestic quality of 
Joanna’s relation to the remains of the Native American culture she comes to inhabit on the 
island. This relation is palimpsesitc or – to remain within the monastic register and Joanna’s 
characterization as hermit – idiorrhytmic.
57
 Through the forgetfulness of a self centered in its 
cultural or social identity (as white, as woman, etc.), both of these modes of existence allow the 
identities gathered in one’s self to live side by side simultaneously, to co-exist according to their 
respective rhythms. By forgetting her self, by letting go of the set of practices that structured her 
previous identity, Joanna is able to invite the Native American voice to speak not through her but 
with her. In this way, Jewett’s version of Fénelon’s self-enlargement through self-surrender 
registers that some identities and voices have been repressed, assimilated, incorporated, eaten, 
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and used to pave the streets. Or, as Eduardo Cadava asks: “What kind of purity can there be if 
America’s prairies and crops are composed largely of foreign bodies: the seeds that are imported 
from England, the fertilizer imported from Peru and elsewhere, the bodies and blood of people 




What remains, finally, when the narrator visits Shell-heap Island in the third sketch, is the 
foundation of Joanna’s house: “Poor Joanna’s house was gone except the stones of its 
foundations, and there was little trace of her flower garden” (444). What remains in the end, 
then, is the bare foundation of Joanna’s house, the house built by her father on the remains of 
Native American life, laying bare the foundation of white identity, palimpsestically preserving 
the memory of its violent constitution. 
 
Bringing Back the Foreigner 
In 1899, three years after she had published The Country of the Pointed Firs Jewett visited the 
Caribbean on a cruise ship, and spent two months in Haiti and Jamaica. A year later, she 
published a short story “The Foreigner” in Atlantic Monthly, a sequel to The Country. While in 
the Caribbean, Jewett sent home at least one rather disturbing letter. To Louisa Dresel on January 
30, 1899 she wrote from Kingston, Jamaica:  
Then we went to Hayti, which was oh, so funny with its pomp of darkeys. Port au Prince 
was quite an awful scene of thriftlessness and silly pretense – but one or two little 
Haytian harbours and the high green coast were most lovely. And then Jamaica, with all 
its new trees and flowers, and its coolies, Loulie! with their bangles and turbans and 
strange eyes. You would like Jamaica immensely. … The roads are so fine her, winding 
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Jewett’s racist patronizing and her happy oblivion to the violent legacy of English colonial 
presence in Jamaica had occupied a blind spot in critical commentaries, and were systematically 
neglected by scholarship until two decades ago. Sandra Zagarell, Mitzi Schrag, Susan Gillman, 
among others, began to change that trend in the mid-1990s by focusing on elements of race, 
gender and class in Jewett’s work,
60
 where they persistently found expressions of Jewett’s 
“nostalgic dream of a benevolent American empire at the turn of the century.”
61
 It is true, as the 
more recent readings suggest, that Jewett’s visit to the Caribbean casts a fresh and interesting 
light not only the text of the “Foreigner” but also The Country, by enabling certain obliquely 
stated elements to resurface from the two texts. For example, juxtaposing Jewett’s letters from 
Haiti with the story about the “strange-looking” character in “The Foreigner,” “Mis Cap’n 
Tolland,” accentuates Mrs. Tolland mother’s “dark face” (553) and emphasizes the racial 
dimension of the narrative. And while Jewett’s politics is certainly unacceptable, I am not sure 
how productive, or interesting even, our reading of her texts will be if we take the racist views 
from her letters as an end-point in reading her fiction. I suggest, rather, that we consider those 
views as possible inroads into The Country and “The Foreigner” that would move us away from 
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Jewett’s person, and move use closer to what her texts actually “do” with such views. My 
strategy, in other words, is not to downplay or disregard Jewett’s racism, but to show how her 
texts create challenging, and sometimes even progressive, networks of meaning despite her 
racism.  
“The Foreigner” is a curious “afterthought,” as Paula Blanchard has called it.
62
 It 
performs its titular function by intruding, like a foreigner, into the seemingly homogenous 
texture of The Country, disrupting it from without and revealing the phantasm of the novel’s self-
sufficient narrative integrity. It operates not just on the formal but on the semantic level as well, 
and figures as both a structural sequel to the novel, and an additional clue to the relations 
established in it.  
The story’s frame narrative takes place in Dunnet Landing, Maine, on a stormy August 
evening, when the local herbalist healer Almira Todd, reminded of a similarly tempestuous night 
some forty years earlier, relates to her summer visitor (the story’s and The Country’s narrator) an 
event involving a ghost. Almira Todd’s narrative – the main story of “The Foreigner” – centers 
on Mrs. Captain Tolland, a homeless “mulatto” from one of the Windward Islands, whose 
children and first husband all died in Kingston. Four seamen from Dunnet Landing (among 
whom Mrs. Todd’s father), transporting sugar from the West Indies plantations to Maine find the 
destitute woman in Jamaica, and one of them, Captain John Tolland, eventually brings her to 
Maine where he marries her. Within several months, Captain Tolland dies in a shipwreck, and 
the news hits his wife so suddenly and unexpectedly that, overwhelmed with illness, grief and 
loneliness, she rapidly wilts. Mrs. Todd tends to the dying woman for a few days, and one night, 
just moments before Mrs. Tolland passes away, both women see the ghost of Mrs. Tolland’s 
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mother appear briefly in the room. The story concludes with a kind of anticlimactic 
reconciliation, when this marginalized “stranger in a strange land” (540) finally finds peace in 
the ghostly presence of her mother.  
The supplementarity of “The Foreigner” complicates the seemingly homogenous 
structure of The Country’s world. At the heart of the novel’s Dunnet Landing society stands 
Almira Todd from whom the narrative unfolds “in a radial or circular manner.”
63
 Positioned as 
the narrator’s host and guide, the novel’s inside knowledge and source of wisdom, Mrs. Todd is 
the anchor not only of Dunnet Landing, but of the narrative about it as well. All side-stories 
framed by the friendship between the narrator and Mrs. Todd, and all the narrator’s visits and 
field-trips to neighboring houses, towns, and islands, either germinate directly from, or are 
inextricably linked with, the presence of Mrs. Todd. She is both the narrator’s and the narrative’s 
host. A herbalist and healer, Mrs. Todd is also the very venter of her community’s life. Her 
pharmacopoiesis, as the narrator calls the botanical record of Dunnet Landing’s collective health, 
keeps the community alive, just as the narrator’s literary poiesis keeps the record of community’s 
history.
64
 But at the center of Mrs. Todd’s healing skills, as one learns in The Country’s sequel, 
stands a “foreign person an’ a stranger” (540). Almira Todd had acquired her herbalist 
knowledge from the foreign Mrs. Tolland: 
“She come a foreigner and she went a foreigner, and never was anything but a stranger 
among our folks. She taught me a sight o’ things about herbs I never knew before nor 
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since; she was well acquainted with the virtues o’ plants. She’d act awful secret about 
some things too, an’ used to work charms for herself sometimes. (NS 541) 
Crucially, the story places the life of its community in the hands of an outsider, a person racially 
other and unacquainted with the language of Dunnet’s society: “Mis’ Tolland was good-looking, 
though she had […] a sort of foreign cast, and she spoke very broken English, no better than a 
child” (NS 539). Almira Todd may hold the community together, but this hold is not 
autochthonous. The life and health, the very heart of the community, originate in the foreigner.
65
 
At the same time, the knowledge about Mrs. Todd’s background comes neither from the 
community itself, nor from the novel, but from an exterior, resting on an outside(r) – on the story 
written as an “afterthought.”  
 The elsewhereness of Dunnet Landing’s narrative and communal core is further 
problematized by the generic character of “The Foreigner,” as the community’s essence comes to 
be revealed through what is announced as a ghost story. The ghost of Mrs. Captain Tolland and 
the ghostliness of her story signify, some critics claim, a haunting reminder of New England’s 
colonial past, expansionism and slave trade. But, as Donald Anderson notes, following Marjorie 
Pryse, “The Foreigner” can be classified as a ghost story only tangentially, since the ghost does 
not appear in a vengeful fashion, as a revenant, nor does it infuse the reader or the protagonists 
with horror. It never achieves the generic effect of a ghost story, as it doesn’t culminate in a 
disruption of the order of normalcy.
66
 Quite the contrary, the ghost brings closure to the dying 
woman and restores her familial bond.  
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If Mrs. Tolland’s mother is a ghost of a generically uncharacteristic spectral order, “The 
Foreigner” is an atypical ghost story: it “dramatizes not the appearance of the ghost,” as Marjorie 
Pryse suggests, “but rather Mrs. Todd’s attempt to translate the experience of being ‘foreign’ for 
her listener, our narrator.”
67
 Although Pryse does not put it in those terms, the foreignness is 
translated into the experience of being ostracized, as Mrs. Tolland is eventually banished from 
the community. A few months after her arrival to Dunnet Landing, at “a social circle in the 
meeting house vestry,” Mrs. Tolland was asked to sing for the congregation. Feeling more and 
more at home in her new community, “up she got,” remembers Mrs. Todd, “poor creatur’,” 
“an’ sung a lovely little song standing in the floor; it seemed to have something gay about 
it that kept a-repeatin’, an’ nobody could help keepin’ time, an’ all of a sudden she 
looked round at the tables and caught up a tin plate that somebody’d fetched a 
Washin’ton pie in, an’ she begun to drum on it with her fingers like one o’ them 
tambourines, an’ went right on singin’ faster an’ faster, and next minute she begun to 
dance a little pretty dance between the verses, just as light and pleasant as a child. You 
couldn’t help seein’ how pretty ‘twas; we all got to trottin’ a foot, an’ some o’ the men 
clapped their hands quite loud, a-keepin’ time, ‘twas so catchin’, an' seemed so natural to 
her. There wa’n’t one of ‘em but enjoyed it; she just tried to do her part, an’ some urged 
her on, till she stopped with a little twirl of her skirts an’ went to her place again by 
mother. … Bu the next day there was an awful scandal goin’ in the parish. (537-38) 
The “scandal” described in this passage has everything to do with the ecstatic manner of Mrs. 
Tolland’s performance, and with the way her dance gathers others into it. Soon after the disgrace 
in the church, the woman is excommunicated from the town’s life. Her foreignness seems to 
have become a problem only when it revealed the power to lure the community into its trance 
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and make it lose, at least for a moment, its firm ground. The loss of the community’s solid 
footing is indicative precisely of its phantasmagoric origin. 
The church scene compresses the gesture of double banishment. The appearances of the 
ghost in “The Foreigner” and of the spectral “Foreigner” in The Country are both generated as 
the effect of narrative and communal strategies of exclusion, because in order to complete the 
story and frame it, and in order to enclose the community and delineate its identity, the act of 
encircling must necessarily cordon off idiosyncratic elements that in one way or another disturb 
the homogeneity of the whole. Every enclosure is founded on an act of cordoning off, but what 
has been sequestered survives eventually as what Chantal Mouffe has called “‘the constitutive 
outside’ – an exterior to the community that makes its existence possible.”
68
 A resilient 
remainder inscribed on the fringes of the novel, the ghost intrudes both as an effect and the 
condition of the community, while the phantasmal autochthonism of Dunnet Landing comes to 
be revealed through an aesthetic device. As in the story of “poor Joanna,” the voices suppressed 
by the communal homogenous identity come to haunt it and ask questions about its purity.  
 
Self-Forgetting the Human 
The Country of the Pointed Firs reveals spectral autochthonism to be constitutive of every 
community and every identity. If, as “The Foreigner” and Joanna testify, the community’s 
anchor is placed outside of it, the community is, then, never wholly identical with itself. In other 
words, its identity, or what makes it different from other communities, is not located inside it. 
But if the foundational question of the community’s being, one that concerns its differentia 
specifica, is inseparable from the question of how the community came to be (the question of 
autochthonism), then its origin must be seen as central to and inseparable from its essence.  
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Of all Jewett’s works, the story that most radically poses the question of community’s 
misplaced origin and, relatedly, the multiple origins of a single community, is the narrative of 
Captain Littlepage in The Country of the Pointed Firs. In fact, his story was the very germ of The 
Country, begun initially as a tentative sketch (“The Last of the Captains”), from which the whole 
novel evolved.
69
 Coincidentally or not, then, the three consecutive sketches in The Country,
70
 
which revolve around the “strange and unrelated person” of Captain Littlepage (384), concern 
precisely the complex knot of questions about the problem of origin, its discovery, and 
constitution. The narrative of this man, rumored to have “‘spells’ of some unexplainable nature” 
and “suffer[ing ] from loneliness and misapprehension” (388),
71
 interests me as yet another 
example of an atypical ghost story, which demonstrates that any taxonomic act that discursively 
constructs an origin (of race or identity) is necessarily exclusionist and generative of ghostly 
multiplicities inscribed in the very moment of the origin. The origin, Jewett’s story seems to 
suggest, is always inhabited by ghosts – many of them. 
Captain Littlepage’s narrative is convoluted and important, so I recount it in full: many 
years ago, while transporting cargo to a port in Canada’s Hudson Bay, the winds and strong 
currents pulled Captain Littlepage’s ship Minerva up north and wrecked it on a rock. The few 
men that survived, the Captain among them, managed to reach a piece of land, something that at 
first looked like “a barren island,” and was soon discovered to be populated by native 
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 The narrator’s musing about this “mysterious old man” emerges slowly while she is watching from the 
schoolhouse window a group of mourners in the funeral procession – like all Jewett’s communities, the 
procession “looked futile and helpless on the edge of the rocky shore” (NS 385). Captain Littlepage 
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“Esquimaux” and Moravian missionaries. (Obviously, they landed in Labrador). It is in the 
context of the shipwrecked Minerva, which had already been “getting old and leaky,” that the 
“strange events” of this story unfold. When reason and wisdom, which Minerva represents, get 
crushed, strange things happen. I want to accentuate this allegorical shipwreck of reason, which I 
read as tightly linked with the problem of origin and the appearance of ghosts in the story, but 
also because the story as a whole revolves around the clash of reasonable and unreasonable 
discourses which shape the novel’s ghostly theories of race, identity, the nation, and origin.  
While waiting in that “useless place” where “everything was uncertain” for a supply 
steamer to arrive and take him home, the Captain befriended “an old seaman, a Scotchman,” 
named Gaffett, who acquainted him “with strange events” he had experienced in the past (393-
94). Gaffett’s story – awkwardly similar in its trajectory to Littlepage’s
72
 – revolves around a 
discovery expedition to the north pole, which ended in a shipwreck off the Greenland coast, with 
only Gaffett and two of his crewmates surviving. While crossing the ice across the Arctic Ocean, 
the men are caught in a warm current “flowing north, far up beyond the Fox Channel,” which 
they followed until they “struck a coast that was n’t laid down or charted,” “a town two degrees 
farther north than ships had ever been” (395). In that town, in which they find some inhabitants, 
they find found 
an awful condition of things. It appeared, as near as Gaffett could express it, like a place 
where there was neither living nor dead. They could see the place when they were 
approaching it by sea pretty near like any town, and thick with habitations; but all at once 
they lost sight of it altogether, and when they got close inshore they could see the shapes 
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of folks, but they never could get near them, – all blowing gray figures that would pass 
along alone, or sometimes gathered in companies as if they were watching. The men were 
frightened at first, but the shapes never came near them, – it was as if they blew back; and 
at last they all got bold and went ashore, and found birds’ eggs and sea fowl, like any 
wild northern spot where creatures were tame and folks had never been, and there was 
good water. Gaffett said that he and another man came near one o’ the fog-shaped men 
that was going along slow with the look of a pack on his back, among the rocks, an’ they 
chased him; but, Lord! he flittered away out o’ sight like a leaf the wind takes with it, or a 
piece of cobweb. They would make as if they talked together, but there was no sound of 
voices, and ‘they acted as if they didn't see us, but only felt us coming towards them,’ 
says Gaffett one day, trying to tell the particulars. They couldn’t see the town when they 
were ashore. One day the captain and the doctor were gone till night up across the high 
land where the town had seemed to be, and they came back at night beat out and white as 
ashes, and wrote and wrote all next day in their notebooks. … Say what you might, they 
all believed ‘t was a kind of waiting-place between this world an’ the next. (396-97) 
Gaffett managed to leave this ghostly land of fog-shaped creatures, but when his mates died on 
the way back, he was the only one left to relay the story to the world. Overwhelmed by this 
otherworldly experience, “he had all his directions written out” and “was always talking about 
the Ge’graphical Society, but he never took proper steps” to submit his report, fearing that he 
would be locked away as mad. He eventually bequeathed the story to Captain Littlepage to make 
his discovery known. The Captain sent numerous letters to “scientific men” but never received 





 Gaffett’s is a narrative of discovery: he and his men detect a land no one knows about. 
Though it begins as an official royal expedition, similar to William Edward Parry’s explorations 
of the Northern Passage, to which Captain Littlepage himself refers at the beginning of his story 
(393), it ends in a discovery of a different kind of land that Gaffett obviously holds far more 
valuable than he does the original expedition. That at stake is this explorative scientific endeavor 
is hinted at already in the frame story, when the narrator, observing Captain Littlepage, says to 
herself: “He had the refinement of look and air of command which are the heritage of the old 
ecclesiastical families of New England. But as Darwin says in his autobiography, ‘there is no 
such king as a sea-captain; he is greater even than a king or a schoolmaster!’” (388, emphasis 
added). It is striking to see Darwin ushered into a ghost story, but especially that he is brought in 
through this textual source. The quote, namely, is a slightly modified sentence from Darwin’s 
letter to his friend Charles Whitley, written on July 23, 1834 while Darwin was in Valparaiso, 
Chile, on his South American expedition.
73
 Through an explicit reference to Darwin, the theme 
of a discovery voyage subtly creeps in. But more interestingly, the name of Valparaiso, derived 
from Valle Paraiso, or “Paradise Valley,” conjures up in Jewett’s story two other paradises. The 
first is Milton’s Paradise Lost, most directly invoked by Captain Littlepage, who cites from it in 
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his first appearance in the novel: “‘A happy, rural seat of various views’… My quotation was 
from Paradise Lost: the greatest of poems, I suppose you know” (387). Having introduced 
himself to the narrator by ventriloquizing a piece of fiction on the origin of man, Captain 
Littlepage, through the trope of paradise, announces in a compressed riddle The Country’s 
preoccupation with discovery and origin.  
The second paradise called forth by the references to Darwin and to Paradise Lost is a 
book by William F. Warren, titled Paradise Found: The Cradle of the Human Races at the North 
Pole, published in 1885 and anonymously reviewed the same year in the Atlantic Monthly.
74
 It is 
not unlikely that Jewett had access to the book (it was published by her own publisher and close 
friends), and she most certainly read the extensive review in the Atlantic, the journal to which 
she regularly contributed.
75
 Another reason to believe that Warren’s book underlies Gaffett’s 
narrative is that its main argument, which concerns precisely the origin of life, found its way into 
Jewett’s story as a crucial thematic element.  
Paradise Found put forth a hypothesis that paradise was located at the north pole and that 
all life originated there. In uncovering the home of paradise, the book sets about to discover the 
beginnings of man; or as the anonymous reviewer summarizes: “Coming to the day when 
scientific methods were more critical, [one] will see that the question of the geographical seat of 
paradise became involved with the problem of the origin of the genus homo.”
76
 Warren develops 
and supports his argument in a 500-page long elaboration – a mixture of theological and 
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scientific argumentation – according to which warm ocean currents rose from the Equator to the 
north pole and brought on favorable conditions for the creation of life: 
The birth-memories of mankind conduct us not to “the equatorial belt,” but to the polar 
world. … Hot air being lighter than cold, the heated air of the northern equatorial belt has 
always risen and passed mainly toward the North Pole in an upper current, while the 
cooler and heavier currents from the north have swept southward. … We have at the 




Warren’s central theory about warm oceanic currents and edenic conditions for life around the 
north pole finds its direct translation in Gaffett’s description of “a warm current … flowing 
north, far up beyond Fox Channel” which gradually thawed the ice and took him and his men 
after the shipwreck “out of sight of the ice, and into a great open sea. … There was no snow and 
ice, he said, after they had sailed some days with that warm current, which seemed to come right 
from under the ice that they’d been pinched up in and had been crossing on foot for weeks” 
(395). Through an echo of Warren’s theory and the still reverberating presence of Darwin, the 
theme of discovery and the origin of life solidifies between the lines of Jewett’s text, like the 
Abenaki traces lodged in a shell heap.  
 But instead of paradise, Gaffett and his men found in that northernmost town “an awful 
condition of things” (396), the awfulness of which had nothing to do with the scarcity of food or 
provision, as one would think. As we learn that the men “found birds’ eggs and sea fowl, like 
any wild northern spot where creatures were tame and folks had never been, and there was good 
water” (396), the place is described as a paradise. Untouched by civilization, it resembles one of 
Darwin’s journal descriptions of uninhabited islands in South America. What appears to be 
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“awful” are its inhabitants, whom Gaffett never refers to in any definitive way as either humans 
or animals, but only as immaterial “shapes,” “gray figures,” “fog-shaped men” (396), “the 
human-shaped creatures of fog and cobweb” (399) or even “common ghosts” (397). That these 
apparitions are not entirely human is further verified by their inability to speak or to see: “They 
would make as if they talked together, but there was no sound of voices, and they acted as if they 
didn’t see us, but only felt us coming towards them” (396). There is sound – a cry or howl 
perhaps – but no voice, no complexity of human communication; their shape is human, but they 
are blind and have only an instinctual feeling of their surroundings. They are not animals either, 
but only resemble them. When Gaffett and his men finally decide to leave, “those folks, or 
whatever they were, come about ‘em like bats; all at once they raised incessant armies, and come 
as if to drive ‘em back to sea” (397, emphasis added). Somewhat human, though indeterminately 
so, these shapes come closest to bats – blind, nightly, liminal creatures. 
But the scene of three European explorers surrounded in a “virgin” land by hostile 
presences immediately conjures up another image of European colonial horror – an impression 
that Gaffett and his men were in fact besieged by “natives.” Their human-like yet non-human 
shape, and their ability to communicate but not in human language, bring these fog-shaped men 
very close to nineteenth-century perceptions of “savage aborigines.” The parallel is no accident 
either. In the same letter from Valparaiso that Jewett’s narrator quotes from upon seeing Captain 
Littlepage, Darwin describes his first encounter with the native: 
I have seen nothing which more completely astonished me, than the first sight of a 
Savage; It was a naked Fuegian, his long hair blowing about, his face besmeared with 




seen it, must be inconceivably wild. Standing on a rock he uttered tones and made 
gesticulations, than which the cries of domestic animals are far more intelligible.
78
  
The motif of indigenous people and discovery of a new land was already alluded to in Captain 
Littlepage’s reminiscence of the “Esquimaux” and the Moravian missionary station in Labrador, 
where he had met Gaffett. One must remember, then, that the narrative setting of Geffett’s story 
is the land of the aboriginal Inuit of today’s Canada, or more precisely – the Moravian settlement 
on the land taken from the native peoples and granted to the missionaries by the British empire.
79
 
And one must not forget, further, that Gaffett’s story, by virtue of the place in which it is being 
told, is palimpsestically traversed by the context of colonial violence, cross-Atlantic trade, 
expropriation of land, missionary labor, exploitation, scientific exploration, indigenous rights 
(and by extension, of course, human rights) – in short, by the whole history of racism, racial 
extermination, and genocide. And if genocide is a destruction of an entire race – of genus, from 
which it is derived
80
 – then it is also an extermination of that race’s generic specificities and its 
“germ” or origin. By way of the context it is placed in, Gaffett’s story invokes the etymological 
reverberations of genocide, bringing forth the related questions of “race” and “origin.” Whose 
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land was it originally? Who has the right to claim it – those who autochthonously originated 
from it or those who discovered it? 
The question of a discovery and origin of genus emerges in Jewett’s story through a 
series of silent as well as overt associations. To summarize: the explicit reference to Milton’s 
Paradise Lost invokes the theme of the origin of the world and of the creation (“generation”) of 
man through the Fall. This affiliation opens the door to Warren’s Paradise Found, whose 
ambition to discover “the cradle of the human races,” as the book’s subtitle explicates, propels its 
explorations into the location of a paradise. For Warren, discovering the paradise at the north 
pole is equivalent to discovering the incipient moment of the human (“the origin of genus homo,” 
as the anonymous reviewer explains). Finally, the spirit of Darwin and his Origin of Species is 
conjured up by a quote from his letter; by Gaffett’s mention of the Royal Geographical Society;
81
 
and by silent allusions to the indigenous “savage,” occasioned by Darwin’s explorations in the 
1830s of the South West America, which in a crucial way prepared his life work on the theory of 
evolution. Laced into Jewett’s story, these voices weave a complex network of questions about 
how races (genera) are discovered and their origins constituted.  
But the story remains ambiguous about any empirical parameters concerning this terra 
nova and the genus (or perhaps even the species) of its inhabitants. Gaffett’s most precise 
definition of the polar paradise is that it is “a kind of waiting-place between this world an’ the 
next”; his most conclusive statement about its population is that they are “common ghosts”; and 
his most scientific explanation of the conditions of life in that part of the world involves 
deceptive natural phenomena which render scientific tools useless: 
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‘T was some condition o’ the light and the magnetic currents that let them see those folks. 
‘T wa’n’ a right-feeling part of the world, anyway; they had to battle with the compass to 
make it serve, an’ everything seemed to go wrong. Gaffett had worked it out in his own 
mind that they was all common ghosts, but the conditions were unusual favorable for 
seeing them. (397) 
Amid this all-encompassing uncertainty, how significant is it that Jewett’s story is cast in 
the form of a ghost story? The generic properties of the narrative – its genus – are in fact 
decisive. This being a story about a discovery of a new land and a new class of beings (genus), it 
is also, or even more fundamentally, a story about the discourses on origin. Every taxonomic 
classification of genus must deal with the question of its origin first: how it came to be 
distinguished from other genera. In that sense, the question of genus is always the question of the 
origin, which is anyway inscribed in its etymology and derivatives. But as every discourse on 
origin is an ontological stipulation of the essence of being (what is), as well as the proclamation 
of its defining principles (how what is exists or lives), every discourse on origin is necessarily an 
attempt to distinguish what is (being) from what is not (non-being). In that sense, the problem of 
genus is always the problem of what counts as existing, or what counts as being alive. 
Defining the parameters of this distinction depends largely on the discursive register one 
has recourse to. Three such registers merge in the background of Jewett’s story: literary (Milton), 
scientific (Darwin) and theological (Warren). From the clash of these mutually exclusive 
“truths,” there emerges a ghost story, the generic characteristic of which is to present different 
discursive registers as equally valid. While playing on this categorial ambiguity – does the land 
Gaffett discovers exist; are the fog-shaped men human or not; are they alive, are they beings, 




fundamentally problematized. By insisting on the shapelessness of the new land and its 
inhabitants, it asks how origins come to be, how they are constituted, how authentic and original 
they are. This is why Gaffett’s land, like any new land, is “a waiting place”: uncharted and 
unnamed. Its inhabitants are “common ghosts” waiting to be solidified into a category and 
assigned a genus. In that sense, every taxonomic discourse on being and genus is populated by 
yet-to-be-shaped apparitions. And every theory of origin, identity and race (genus) is, at its very 
origin, a ghost story, generating spectral multiplicities. 
But like Warren’s paradisiac origin of man and Darwin’s theory of evolution, Gaffett’s 
“fog-shaped men” are ghostly in one more sense: in order to be shaped into a class, every genus 
must first assert its identity by excluding all other possibilities that swarm, like bats, savages or 
ghosts, in the vestibule of its origin. Once ostracized, these ghosts don’t vanish, but remain to 
sporadically erupt as a reminder of the history of that exclusion. For example, when the 
anonymous reviewer of Warren’s book dedicates most of his report to the methodological 
impurity of Paradise Found, his main criticism is not that the book is unscientific, but that it is 
“a mixture of proof and assumption”: 
The author seems to be laboring under a grave misapprehension as to the scientific 
method, – a misapprehension common to many writers who, without training in the 
method of physical research, try to cast the data of science into a form to support their 
theories. They make avail of the scientific method in part alone. They see that the 
naturalist uses hypotheses in groping for truth, therefore they proceed to construct 
hypotheses also; but they fail to apprehend the checks which the well-trained student of 




his facts before him, using due criticism to exclude imperfect observations … then he 
tries to imagine some known cause … which may explain the phenomena
 82
 
The problem with Warren’s methodology is that it does not eliminate enough, and so the 
difference between the naturalist (the reviewer explicitly mentions Darwin) and a non-naturalist 
(his example is Swedenborg) is that the former is careful not to be “captivated by the offspring of 
his mind,” while the latter “make[s] avail of the scientific method in part alone” (the other part 
being generally non-empirical).
83
 The scientist is able to control and confine, by way of 
exclusion, the shapeless apparitions that gather in the limbo of his hypotheses: “The natural 
world contains an infinite variety of facts; each of these facts will take shape according to the 
mind that views it. … Swedenborg says sadly that the spirits about him were prone to deceive 
him; so, too, it was in science until a few learned how to bring these treacherous witnesses to 
book.”
84
 In other words, before they can become scientifically acknowledged, facts are spirits 
that witness – albeit unreliably, treacherously, spectrally – the process by which a hypothesis is 
amalgamated into a theory.  
For a hypothesis to “take shape” from the infinite variety of facts, only the fittest facts 
can survive. The resonance of Darwin’s theory of the survival of the fittest through what he calls 
“divergence of character” and elimination of detrimental elements is all the more poignant here 
when one recalls that his theory of natural selection is founded on the premise of the common 
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genetic origin of all life. Starting from a single “primordial form,”
85
 and by way of the 
“preservation of favourable variations and the destruction of injurious variations,” life is 
propelled into numberless multiplicities. The survival of an organism/species/race/genus is 
premised on its capacity to adapt to altered conditions of life, but “variations neither useful nor 
injurious would not be affected by natural selection, and would be left either a fluctuating 
element … or become fixed.”
86
 The parallels between Darwin’s theory of natural selection, the 
rules of scientific reasoning regarding the way a cluster of facts gets hardened into a theory, and 
Jewett’s narrative about the constitution of origin demonstrate that it is through the protocols of 
reason that discourse on the origin is instituted as an exclusive explanatory register of being, the 
only modus loquendi appropriately equipped to decide what is and what is not alive, human or 
non-human.  
Jewett’s story begins with the shipwreck of Captain Littlepage’s Minerva not because it 
strives to announce the story’s supernatural element through an allegory of the destruction of 
reason, but because the shipwreck as this destruction of reason announces the collapse of the 
logic of rational discourse by which a heterogeneity is reduced to a homogenous identity. This is 
why Gaffett’s land is necessarily a waiting place. Populated by yet-unformed ghosts, it is much 
like the “virgin” land of scientific theories in which facts, observations, “offsprings of the mind,” 
and hypothetical gropings for truth wait to be given delineation, or like Warren’s Paradise, 
conflate the various discursive registers (theological, literary, scientific and historiographical). 
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Hence, when origin is delineated as origin and when genus is given name, the ghosts excluded 
from the empirical nomenclature, like other repressed voices in Jewett’s Country, don’t simply 
disappear. They have nowhere else to go. They linger and abide, futureless, like Jewett’s Dunnet 
Landing community, reminding us that a different theory was perhaps possible, that the origin 
may have been elsewhere, that different genera and races and some other identities could have 
congealed if other facts had been included, and that even then the genus and its origin is still 
surrounded by apparitions. Once the dominant identity (white, human, American) is surrendered, 
dislocated, or disturbed – Jewett would say “self-forgotten” – spectral multiplicities swarm in to 
interrupt it and voice their excluded claim to identity-formation. And while it is impossible to 
conceive of a world without identities or forms, Jewett’s Country invites us to at least ethically 
remember, through Fénelonian self-enlargement and self-forgetfulness, that we are never one, 







“I ain’t anything”: Henry James’s Art of Conversion  
 
In February 1886 Henry James wrote to Grace Norton: “England is interesting at present – 
because it is heaving so, and cracking and fermenting. But the fissures are mainly political and 
exhalations often foul.”
1
 At this point, his Princess Casamassima – the novel about the 
“perpetual smothered ferment” of London’s “anarchic underworld, heaving in its pain”
2
 – was 
being serialized in the Atlantic Monthly, and James, as his notebook indicates, had not yet 
finished it. The period of writing and serializing The Princess (1884-1886) was filled with for 
James rather extraordinary interest in politics, and the anxiety of not knowing what the political 
future would bring seems to have merged with his anxiety of how the novel would end.
3
  
As Leon Edel reminds us, James saw three changes of government while The Princess 
was in the making
4
 and, as his correspondence records, expressed vivid interest in political and 
social turmoil:  
“We are up to our necks in the Irish question”;
5
 “Nothing lives in England today but 
politics. … We are evidently on the edge of an enormous political cycle, which will last 
heaven knows how long. I should hate it more if I didn’t find it so interesting. … The air 
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is full of events, of changes, of movement (some people would say of revolution, but I 
don’t think that)”;
6
 “The ministry is still in office, but hanging only by a hair, Gladstone 
is ill and bewildered, the mess in the Soudan unspeakable, London full of wailing widows 
and weeping mothers, the hostility of Bismarck extreme, the danger of complications 
with Russia immanent, the Irish in the House of Commons more disagreeable than ever, 
the dynamiters more active, the income tax threatening to rise to its maximum, the 
general muddle, in short, of the densest and darkest”
7
; “The air, here, of course, is full of 
the Russian imbroglio. … England is distinctly breaking down and her loss of room in the 
world will be proportionate. I have lost all patience with Gladstone, who is an incurable 
shirker and dodger. … The slap in the present case [Britain’s dispute with Russia over 
Afghanistan] will resound all over India”;
8
 “The civil war seems to me to be really in the 
air. … The air here is positively putrid with politics”;
9
 “If I had nothing else to do I think 
I should run over to Ireland: which may seem strange to you on the part of one satiated in 




Not only James’s correspondence, but even more so the novels written in the period bear a strong 
imprint of his concern with global politics.
11
 But although The Princess Casamassima is set in 
London’s revolutionary underworld and enveloped in the atmosphere of the politically restless 
Europe of the 1870s and 1880s, the nature of James’s general interest in social matters – and, 
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more particularly, the interest manifested by his writing of the period – remains an object of 
critical disagreement.
12
 James’s own prefatorial explication, that The Princess is decidedly not 
about social revolution, but about the “strange experience” of its protagonist’s “lively inward 
revolution” (AN 72), renders its revolutionary setting superficial or, at best, politically 
inconsequential – a suitable polygon for the protagonist’s “change of heart.”
13
 However, the 
novel’s invocations of anarchism and political radicalism are so incessant that they seek to be 
interrogated as more than a mere atmospheric backdrop. In what follows, I set about to unravel 
the question of the extent to which, if at all, James’s Princess Casamassima engages anarchism’s 
political theory. I make the case that it does, and that it does so by turning to anarchist’s notion 
of amorphism – a total interruption of all forms (social, political, natural). My interest is not 
directed at rescuing James from the accusation of political aloofness. My aim, rather, is to 
explore the unexpected yet vital role anarchism played in shaping James’s aesthetics. 
The Princess Casamassima, I argue, inaugurates James’s novelistic method, which 
revolves around what James describes as a mind in “a state of bewilderment” (AN 66) – a 
bewildered mind that processes the bewildering sensations and perceptions. The lineage I am 
pursuing may at first seem surprising because The Princess is commonly understood to be 
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indifferent to its constitutive aesthetic conditions.
14
 I counter this reading by charting the novel’s 
composition as having taken place under the pressure of two seemingly unrelated contemporary 
influences: William James’s theory of corporeal emotion, and Bakunin’s anarchist ideas of 
Amorphismus. It is through the representations of the protagonist’s numerous “inward 
revolutions” in The Princess that James begins to construct his bewildered, narratively central 
filters (“reflectors”)
15
 who decisively inform the method of his mature works – The Wings of the 
Dove and The Ambassadors in particular. In them, organized around a single consciousness, 
pressured by sensations that render it bewildered, the narrative itself becomes bewilderingly 
vague – an “accretion of moments kept free of final interpretation and the sense of origin and 
end,” as Millicent Bell puts it
16
 
I unfold this argument through three segments. Part One – “Ontology” – reads The 
Princess Casamassima alongside William James’s contemporary theory of the material mind, 
and shows how the latter’s conception of personhood as ceaselessly converted informs the 
multiple “inward revolutions” of The Princess’s protagonist. Part Two – “Politics” – traces the 
correlations between ontologically de-centered self and Mikhail Bakunin’s political doctrine of 
Amorphismus. Part Three – “Aesthetics” – extends the onto-political considerations of the 
previous two parts into James’s narrative method, and makes the claim that the conception of the 
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self as bewildered, and of politics as amorphous, converge in James’s experimentation with the 
novelistic form as one incessantly exposed to and traversed by interruptions of formlessness.  
Since The Princess Casamassima is read relatively infrequently, even among Jamesians, 
I preface my reading with a few introductory remarks about its plot. The novel takes place in 
London, in the 1880s, and revolves around Hyacinth Robinson, a bastard son of an English 
nobleman and a French plebeian woman. It is assumed, though never finally confirmed in the 
novel, that Hyacinth’s mother had stabbed to death the Duke who fathered her child, for which 
crime she was sentenced to life in London’s Milbank prison, where she died when Hyacinth was 
about six years old. The boy was raised in one of London’s working-class districts by his 
mother’s friend, a woman from the lowest class, the seamstress Pinnie. In the course of the 
novel, Hyacinth becomes a skillful bookbinder, and through an acquaintance at work befriends 
Paul Muniment, a young worker who, in Hyacinth’s view, appears to be the leader of one of the 
local revolutionary cells of England’s underground (this, too, is never confirmed). Impressed by 
Paul, and himself enraged by poverty and inequality, Hyacinth takes it upon himself to commit 
an act of political assassination (the exact task or significance of which is never revealed or 
specified), by vowing his loyalty to Diedrich Hoffendahl, a German whom everyone believes to 
be the very mastermind of the Revolution. (Hoffendahl’s master-mindedness is never confirmed 
either; indeed, he remains the absolute absence, as he never appears before the readers.) 
Meanwhile, Hyacinth is introduced to a beautiful young woman, the novel’s title-character, 
Princess Christina Casamassima, who, wishing to become a revolutionary herself, uses Hyacinth 
to get closer to Paul, whom she also perceives to belong to the leadership of the revolutionary 
movement. Through his friendship with the Princess, Hyacinth becomes acquainted with the 




Princess at her aristocratic estate outside of London, and later during his visit to Paris and 
Venice, Hyacinth gradually falls in love not only with Christina Casamassima’s beauty, but with 
the beauty of the world, as well. As he undergoes this profound change of heart – from a 
revolutionary to an aesthete – Hyacinth begins to doubt his radical allegiances. Unable to choose 
between his political and aesthetic duty, he commits suicide. 
While the novel is most often read either as James’s satirical denunciation of radical 
politics (“our friend Hoffendahl … would cut up the ceilings of the Veronese into strips, so that 
every one might have a little piece”)
17
 or as a meditation on the nature of power (centralized, 
absent, dispersed), my method in the pages that follow consists in tracing out the consequences 
of James’s own delineation of his novel’s thematic scope (Hyacinth’s “lively inward 
revolution”). This focus, as will become apparent, yields an unorthodox overlap of personal with 
social revolution, and establishes a strong link between James’s aesthetics with politics. In 
showing that politics and aesthetics are not separate monolithic fields, but instead 
interdependent, the interconnections I lay out below cast a new light on James’s novelistic 
method, and carve out his peculiar theory of amorphous self.  
 
I Ontology: Interstitial Self via William James 
The Princess Casamassima is a conversion narrative, centrally preoccupied with what James 
describes in the novel’s preface as Hyacinth Robinson’s personal transformation. The peculiarity 
of James’s description lies in its merging of the protagonist’s personal conversion with social 
revolution on the one hand, and the novel’s thematic register on the other:  
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I had had for a long time well before me, at any rate, my small obscure but ardent 
observer of the “London world,” saw him roam and wonder and yearn, saw all the 
unanswered questions and baffled passions that might ferment in him – once he should be 
made both sufficiently thoughtful and sufficiently “disinherited”; but this image, however 
interesting, was of course not by itself a progression, an action, did n’t by itself make a 
drama. I got my action however – failing which one has nothing – under the prompt sense 
that the state of feeling I was concerned with might develop and beget another state, 
might return at a given moment, and with the greatest vivacity, on itself. … I recognised, 
as revealed and prescribed, the particular complexion, profession and other conditions of 
my little presumptuous adventurer, with his combination of intrinsic fineness and 
fortuitous adversity, his small cluster of “dingy” London associations and the swelling 
spirit in him which was to be the field of his strange experience. Accessible through his 
imagination, as I have hinted, to a thousand provocations and intimations, he would 
become most acquainted with destiny in the form of a lively inward revolution. (AN 71-
72, emphasis added) 
Hyacinth’s “lively inward revolution” is synonymous with the “strange experience” of his 
conversions (“develop[ing] and beget[ting] another state”). He undergoes several such 
interruptions of personality – ruptures instigated by “a thousand provocations and intimations” 
that stir the passions and make his spirit “swell” during his many walks and observations of the 
“London world.” The impressions he inadvertently acquires work a revolution in him, bringing 
about a change Hyacinth neither willed nor participated in:  
The London mysteries (dense categories of dark arcana) … the lower manners and types, 




and the vice … would have formed, fundamentally, from the first, [Hyacinth’s] natural 
and immediate London. But the reward of a romantic curiosity would be the question of 
what the total assault, that of the world of his work-a-day life and the world of his 
divination and his envy together, would have made of him. (AN 61, emphasis added) 
If the novel’s central concern is one of Hyacinth’s conversion occasioned by the “assault” that 
literally “makes” him, the conversion located at the very center of the novel seeks to be read as 
its structural and thematic center. Hyacinth’s conversion into a political radical splits the novel 
into the “before” and “after” of his activism, and as such supplies James with the necessary 
“action.” This central scene takes place at the “Sun and Moon,” the meeting-place of local 
revolutionaries, when Hyacinth unexpectedly leaps on a chair and delivers a short speech, 
declaring his unconditional devotion to the revolutionary cause: 
The room surged round, heaving up and down, while he was conscious of a loud 
explosion of laughter and scorn; … The next moment Hyacinth found that he had sprung 
up on a chair, opposite to the barber, and that at the sight of so rare a phenomenon the 
commotion had suddenly checked itself. It was the first time he had asked the ear of the 
company, and it was given on the spot. He was sure he looked very white, and it was 
even possible they could see him tremble. He could only hope that this didn’t make him 
ridiculous when he said, “I don’t think it’s right of him to say that. There are others, 
besides him. At all events, I want to speak for myself: it may do some good; I can’t help 
it. I’m not afraid; I’m very sure I’m not. I’m ready to do anything that will do any good; 
anything, anything – I don’t care a rap. In such a cause I should like the idea of danger. I 
don’t consider my bones precious in the least, compared with some other things. If one is 




The moment of his declaration is part of a larger scene which culminates in Hyacinth’s vow to 
Hoffendahl, the Master of the revolution, to whom he shortly thereafter promises “that he should 
hold himself ready, for the next five years, to do, at a given moment, an act which would in all 
probability cost him his life” (333). Hidden from view,
18
 and thus intimated as a secret oath-
giving ceremony, Hyacinth’s promise to Hoffendahl is labeled “an oath” (503) as well as the 
taking of “a vow of blind obedience, as the Jesuit fathers did to the head of their order” (333). 
This comparison exacts several conjectures. The Jesuits imposed on their faith a rigorous 
structure of a series of spiritual exercises designed to bring about the conversion of the heart and 
the mind. Only after they have been converted, reborn in the purity of their faith, were they 
allowed to take one of the four vows, the vow of obedience to the Pope being the highest. The 
yoking of Hyacinth’s oath with the Jesuits’ implies a metonymic merging of Hoffendahl with the 
figure of the Pope and, consequently, the suggestion that Hoffendahl’s power is as centralized as 
the Vatican’s, with the structure of his revolutionary movement as rigidly hierarchical. While 
most critical assessments of The Princess engage in speculations about the nature and goals of 
Hoffendahl’s network, it is important to register the novel’s deliberate and insistent ambiguity 
about the nature of its radical underworld – so insistent, in fact, that whether the movement even 
exists or in what form is never clarified. The point I’m advancing is that we have to work with 
what we have. What we don’t have is the novel’s statement that the revolutionary movement is 
there (everything we know about it is filtered through Hyacinth’s bewildered mind), or that the 
novel is about James’s particular take on the practices and values of anarchist political theory. 
What we do have, on the other hand, is a detailed description, at the very heart of the novel, of 
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Hyacinth’s profound change of heart – his transformation into a revolutionary – which urges a 
re-reading of the central “Sun and Moon” episode in the context of a discourse of conversion. A 
strong influence, it is plausible to maintain, came from William James’s contemporaneous 
explorations into the nature of the mind and the experience of conversion.  
Henry James began to collect the material for The Princess in 1884,
19
 the same year 
William published two seminal essays on the nature and the operations of the mind: “On Some 
Omissions of Introspective Psychology” and “What is an Emotion?”
20
 These essays later became 
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refreshing in Prof. James’s vigorous and homely style. His writing smacks of the polished, closely 
observant man of the world, rather than of the professor. But, unless he take care, his readers will begin to 




the backbone of The Principles of Psychology (1890): Chapter XXV, on the “Perception of 
Time,” for example, is virtually a verbatim rendering of “What is an Emotion?”; the other essay 
was disseminated into Chapters VII, IX and XII. (Importantly, “On Some Omissions” and its 
echoes in Chapter IX of Psychology develop a theory of “The Stream of Thought,” the basic 
operation of which Henry had tried out as his literary method as early as 1881 in The Portrait of 
a Lady.) The overlapping genealogies are no coincidence: as many scholars have concurred, 
William’s theories, especially later ones, and Henry’s later fictions converge on the larger 
questions of consciousness, thinking, and subjectivity.
21
 My interest is in the writings of the 
earlier Jameses, those of the early 1880s, which lend themselves to the exploration of the 
genealogy of Henry’s narrative method. I thus proceed from looking at the ways in which 
Henry’s brief “naturalist” phase (1883-1886), from which I suggest his method of a bewildered 
reflecting consciousness will later emerge, intertwines with William’s investigations into the 
corporeal nature of the mind, which will prove instrumental for his later elaboration and 
naturalization of the experience of conversion in The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). 
My claim, however, that “What is an Emotion?” influenced the writing of The Princess, or that 
The Princess may have impacted some of William’s positions in The Varieties, does not aspire to 
determine the chronological line of influence (whether Henry borrowed from William, or the 
other way around). Rather, in laying out a map of traces I aim to explore the consequences on 
Henry’s articulation of the concept of personhood (and concurrently, of his literary method), as it 
might emerge from the reading of Hyacinth’s conversions in The Princess in conjunction with 
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William’s seminal ideas about emotional impersonality and conversion as life’s universal 
procedure.  
William James begins his deliberations on the corporeal nature of the mind in “On Some 
Omissions of Introspective Psychology,” where he proceeds from criticizing psychology’s 
failure to “discriminate between the immediate feltness of a mental state and its perception by a 
subsequent act of reflection.”
22
 The introspective psychologists (James names Comte and 
Brentano, among others) conflate the two by effectively discarding “feltness,” arguing that it is 
not a quality in itself. It becomes so a posteriori, according to them, when qualified by reflection, 
remembering, naming, recognizing, or by “relating to other facts of the same order.”
23
 James is 
disturbed by psychologists’ dismissal of what he calls “the immanent and intrinsic feltness,” 
which “at the moment of [its] being experienced has nothing to do with the way in which future 
conscious acts may feel about it.”
24
 The fetlness is, thus, a kind of pure or immediate experience 
of a sensation before the mind, with its reflecting tools, has come to understand it. It is termed 
“feltness” rather than “feeling,” because it designates the experience one has but doesn’t feel or 
consciously register. The feeling comes later, a result of the mind’s interpretative activity:  
There are, it is true, cases in which we appear to be naming our present feeling, and so to 
be experiencing and observing the same inner fact at a single stroke, as when we say “I 
feel tired,” “I am angry,” &c. But these are illusory, and a little attention unmasks the 
illusion. The present conscious state, when I say “I feel tired,” is not the direct feeling of 
tire; when I say “I feel angry,” it is not the direct feeling of anger. It is the feeling of 
saying-I-feel-tired, of saying-I-feel-angry – entirely different matters, so different that the 
fatigue and anger apparently included in them are considerable modifications of the 
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fatigue and anger directly felt the previous instant. The act of naming them has 
momentarily detracted from their force. The only sound grounds on which the infallible 
veracity of the introspective judgment might be maintained, are empirical. If we have 
reason to think it has never yet deceived.
25
 
James’s starting position unfolds toward a radical conclusion: the self is a synchronic bundle of 
sensations, images and impressions related to each other through their “fringes” or “halos.”
26
 
From this mental stream of relations, the mind’s reflective activity abstracts separate objects 
(“substantive parts”) – i.e. feelings and states recognizable through language
27
 (“It is a vicious 
use of speech to take out a substantive kernel from [a thought’s] content and call that its object; 
and it is an equally vicious use of speech to add a substantive kernel not articulately included in 
its content, and to call that its object.”).
28
 The “feltness,” with which James opens this essay, is 
by the end conceptualized as the experience that, while being intrinsic to the mental stream, 
remains unregistered, and therefore unclassified, by the conscious mind. Unclassified, that is to 
say – inarticulate (oscillating between stupid and silent), which James also registers as “dumb”: 
“All dumb psychic states have, owing to this error [of having gone unrecognized by the mind 
and, therefore, by science], been coolly suppressed” by the mind and, therefore, by introspective 
psychology.
29
 It is significant that James calls these states dumb, as the term more than just 
accidentally mirrors Henry James’s conception, in the preface to the Spoils of Poynton, of “life” 
as “stupid” and “clumsy”:  
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Life persistently blunders and deviates, loses herself in the sand. The reason is of course 
that life has no direct sense whatever for the subject and is capable, luckily for us, of 
nothing but splendid waste. Hence the opportunity for the sublime economy of art, which 
rescues, which saves, and hoards and “banks,” investing and reinvesting these fruits of 
toil in wondrous useful “works” and thus making up for us, desperate spendthrifts that we 
all naturally are, the most princely of incomes. … I [see] clumsy Life again at her stupid 
work. (AN 120-21, emphasis added) 
Stupid and clumsy – without complexity, self-reflexive depth, aim or form – life is inarticulate 
and, thus, impossible to represent in and out of itself. A reflecting consciousness is needed to 
give meaning to this blind and amorphous idiocy, which would effectively recycle the stupid 
work (“waste”) of clumsy life into artistic gain (“useful works”). Life, then, for Henry James, 
remains incoherent until sculpted into artistic form. The Preface to The Princess Casamassima 
squares this claim into a simple equation according to which art mediates life by converting “the 
immediate field of life” into “the reflected field of life”: “The affair of the painter is not the 
immediate, it is the reflective field of life, the realm not of application, but of appreciation” (AN 
65). The raw life is converted into comprehensible form by Jamesian “reflectors” – characters 
through whose consciousness the bewildering plane of raw sensations (what William James 
called “pure experience … undifferentiated and undifferentiable into thought and thing”
30
) is 
reflected and sieved into a narrative. 
But what Henry James’s conception of life as blind and stupid seems to overlook is the 
fact that, dumb as it may be, life is nevertheless a living force of impressions and sensations (it 
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“blunders and deviates”), the labor and movement of which form, deform and transform every 
body and every mind alike. Nothing can stand outside of life: even the Jamesian reflector, 
however lucidly he may purport to register it, or any of his narrators, or James himself for that 
matter, are necessarily caught in the directionless deviations of its wasteful logic. The real 
question, therefore, is this: if, in converting the reality of blind perceptions into a comprehensible 
realization, a mind (reflecting consciousness) responds with a delay – who performs the 
conversion? Who thinks in the interlude during which “the immediate field of life” is transmuted 
into “the reflected field of life”? And more importantly: to whom does the “stupid life” of 
sensations and impressions belong before consciousness has filtered the “splendid waste” into 
logical thinking? The same set of questions and the same duality drive William James’s “On 
Some Omissions.” Henry’s “reflected field of life” corresponds to William’s view of sensation 
“qualified by reflection,” while Henry’s “immediate field of life” (or the “stupid life”) becomes 
in William’s rendering “the immediate feltness” or its “bare immediacy.”
 31
 The controlling term 




                                               
31
 William James, “On Some Omissions,” 1. 
32
 William James’s notion of unmediated sensation may seem unorthodox, especially the era following 
Freud’s psychoanalysis. Yet, it should be made clear that although James was familiar with Freud’s early 
ideas, he remained unmoved. In The Varieties he acknowledges “the wonderful explorations by Binet, 
Janet, Breuer, Freud, Mason, Prince, and others, of the subliminal consciousness of patients with 
hysteria,” acknowledging thus his familiarity with contemporary psychology’s explorations in the 
unconscious. But despite praise, James didn’t take it to be universal: “The subliminal region, whatever 
else it may be, is at any rate a place now admitted by psychologists to exist for the accumulation of 
vestiges of sensible experience (whether inattentively or attentively registered), and for their elaboration 
according to ordinary psychological or logical laws into results that end by attaining such a ‘tension’ that 
they may at times enter consciousness with something like a burst. It thus is ‘scientific’ to interpret all 
otherwise unaccountable invasive alterations of consciousness as results of the tension of subliminal 
memories reaching the bursting-point. But candor obliges me to confess that there are occasional bursts 
into consciousness of results of which it is not easy to demonstrate any prolonged subconscious 
incubation. … I shall keep myself as far as possible at present to the more ‘scientific’ view; and only as 
the plot thickens in subsequent lectures shall I consider the question of its absolute sufficiency as an 




In “What is an Emotion?”, an essay published in the same journal a few months after 
“Some Omissions,” William James sharpens his previous conclusions. “What is an Emotion?” 
argues for reducibility of the affective to the somatic, and ultimately for the corporeal quality of 
emotions. Emotions, James contends, are the result of a bodily change, rather than, as is 
commonly thought, its instigator or origin: 
Our natural thinking about these standard emotions is that the mental perception of some 
fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives 
rise to the bodily expression. My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow 
directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes 
as they occur IS the emotion. … We feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, 
afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, 
angry, or fearful, as the case may be.
33
  
James’s reversal of the usual order of sequence significantly counters the prevailing theories of 
self that prioritize reflection as the mind’s faculty responsible for deciding on what we feel.
34
 
Hence, if our bodies feel ahead of our minds’ emoting – if emotion is the result of our becoming 
                                                                                                                                                       
no doubt” (The Varieties, 218, emphasis added). For James, the meditating subliminal consciousness, as a 
repository of mental content, accounts for a large number of cases – though obviously not for all, and as 
such cannot constitute the basis for a universal theory about the operations of psychological mechanism. 
Reality, for James, is non-dual in every way, and the difference between the material object and the object 
in the mind is non-essential. Cf. “How Two Minds Can Know One Thing?” and “The Place of Affectional 
Facts in the World of Pure Experience,” in Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York Longman Greens 
and Co., 1912). 
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 William James, “What is an Emotion?”, 189-90 – emphasis and capitalization in the original. By way 
of preempting the expected refutations of his hypothesis, James claims that emotion precedes bodily 
reaction only in those cases in which we anticipate a particular reaction on the basis of our previous 
experience of it. The body, in other words, remembers its original reaction to a perception (see: William 
James, “What is an Emotion?”, 197 and passim). 
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 Antonio Damasio sees in this particular passage the revolutionary potential of William James’s thought: 
“William James had seen through the problem with his characteristic clarity and produced an account 
that, in spite of its incompleteness, remains a cornerstone. … Feelings are largely a reflection of body-
state changes, which is William James’s seminal contribution to this subject.” Antonio Damasio, The 
Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (San Diego: Harcourt, Inc., 




aware of the bodily change – then bodily perceptions, rather than our minds, are what govern our 
response to the world. In claiming that “the emotional-brain-processes” are nothing but “the 
ordinary sensorial brain-processes,” James maintains that our perception of objects and situations 
“fatally calls forth most particular mental and bodily reactions, in advance of, and often in direct 
opposition to, the verdict of our deliberate reason concerning them.”
35
 Our bodies, in sum, are 
conscious of the world before our minds are, and this “bodily consciousness,” as James dubs it,
36
 
is a reformulation of the “feltness” he defended in “Some Omissions.” The affective protocol 
unfolds as follows: 
An object falls on a sense-organ and is apperceived by the appropriate cortical centre; or 
else the latter, excited in some other way, gives rise to an idea of the same object. Quick 
as a flash, the reflex currents pass down through their pre-ordained channels, alter the 
condition of muscle, skin and viscus; and these alterations, apperceived like the original 
object, in as many specific portions of the cortex, combine with it in consciousness and 
transform it from an object-simply-apprehended into an object-emotionally-felt.
37
 
The difference between the two compound words at the end of the passage is roughly analogous 
to the difference, in James’s example in “Some Omissions,” between “the direct feeling of tire” 
and “the feeling of saying-I-feel-tired” (or to Henry’s distinction between “immediate” and 
“reflected field of life”). Yet, what gives rise to our emotions is the conversion – which James in 
The Varieties of Religious Experience calls “interstitial alteration”
38
 – of the “simply-
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apprehended” into the “emotionally-felt” (of “the direct feeling” into “the feeling of saying-I-
feel”). Hearkening back to my question above – who thinks in the interstice of this silent 
conversion? – two important answers issue from William’s 1884 essays: 1) our persons are 
delivered by bodies unconscious of the selves they produce; and 2) our persons are a contrivance 
of spacing, manufactured in the gap between the perception of an object and the mind’s response 
to it. William’s enumeration of the affective protocol registers a series of conversions: the object 
transforms into a perception or idea which transforms into an emotion which gives rise to 
decision and action. The transformation of an object into emotion, mediated by the body, will 
figure as the germ of James’s later deliberations on the problem of conversion, as he develops 
them in The Varieties of Religious Experience. But they will also, as I show below, intersect with 
Henry’s framing of conversion in The Princess Casamassima. 
Generally understood as transformation of one state into another, conversion shares 
important properties with such concepts as turning, change, rebirth, and revolution.
39
 In the two 
lectures on “Conversion” (IX and X) in The Varieties William James cites Saint Augustine’s 
Confessions as an exemplary instance of conversion experience in general, and one that 
historically institutes conversion as a narrative account.
40
 The schematized design of Saint 
Augustine’s story, as a series of life-transforming steps, is problematized by its genre: 
Confessions are an autobiography.
41
 Because they detail a number of transformative moments in 
Saint Augustine’s life, the point that would mark the very inception of his voyage toward 
conversion remains obscure. In other words, any stage prior to what Saint Augustine himself 
singles out as the very moment of conversion – the words “Tolle lege” (“Pick up and read”) he 
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hears uttered in a child’s voice in the Milan garden
42
 – may count as a credible link in the 
conversion chain.
43
 Confessions thus exact more problems than solutions: does his conversion 
begin with birth?;
 
or with intellectual transformation? with social interactions? through reading? 
or, finally, through unmediated sensory perception and Jamesian “feltness”?
44
 It is precisely this 
series of questions, which ultimately tone down the religious specificity of Confessions – leaving 
the book suspended between an extraordinary spiritual narrative and an ordinary life story of a 
man undergoing a series of personal transformations – that, in my view, draw William James to 
Saint Augustine. And it is this same set of question, which normalize the exceptionality of Saint 
Augustine’s account (while rendering our understanding of ordinary life extraordinary), that 
allow one to read The Princess Casamassima as a conversion narrative.  
The Princess advances the protocols of religious conversion with one crucial difference: 
religious transcendence is replaced in it by the materiality of the “bare immediacy of feltness.” 
As Saint Augustine’s supernatural structure is removed, conversion unfolds on a single plane. 
The scene analyzed earlier, of Hyacinth’s central conversion, seeks therefore to be read in its 
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larger context – the context of Hyacinth’s subliminal registering of the atmosphere in the “Sun 
and Moon” which paves the way to his conversion.  
The “night [was] of intenser vibration” (283): 
Hyacinth listened, with a divided attention, to interlaced iterations, while the talk blew 
hot and cold; there was a genuine emotion, to-night, in the rear of the “Sun and Moon,” 
and he felt the contagion of excited purpose. But he was following a train of his own; … 
The loud, contradictory, vain, unpractical babble went on about him, but he was 
definitely conscious only that the project of breaking into the bakers’ shops was well 
before the assembly. … He was in a state of inward exaltation; he was seized by an 
intense desire to stand face to face with the sublime Hoffendahl, to hear his voice, to 
touch his mutilated hand. He was ready for anything. … a breath of popular passion had 
passed over him, and he seemed to see, immensely magnified, the monstrosity of the great 
ulcers and sores of London. … In such a mood as this Hyacinth felt that there was no 
need to consider, to reason: the facts themselves were as imperative as the cry of the 
drowning. … If Hyacinth had needed warrant to-night for a faith that transcended logic, 
he would have found it in his recollection of this quiet profession; but his friend’s words 
came back to him mainly to make him wonder what that friend had in his head just now. 
… He felt hot and nervous; he got up suddenly, and, through the dark, tortuous, greasy 
passage which communicated with the outer world, he went forth into the street. The air 
was foul and sleety, but it refreshed him. … The puddles glittered roundabout, and the 
silent vista of the street, bordered with low black houses, stretched away, in the wintry 
drizzle, to right and left, losing itself in the huge tragic city, where unmeasured misery 




the heated human cockpit behind him. Ah, what could he do? … He finally returned to 
the noisy club-room, in a state of tormented wonder. …  
[One of the revolutionaries gave a speech.] … This little oration affected Hyacinth like a 
quick blow in the face; it seemed to leap at him personally, as if a three-legged stool, or 
some hideous hob-nailed boot, had been shied at him. The room surged round, heaving 
up and down, while he was conscious of a loud explosion of laughter and scorn. … The 
next moment Hyacinth found that he had sprung up on a chair, opposite to the barber, 
and that at the sight of so rare a phenomenon the commotion had suddenly checked itself. 
… He was sure he looked very white, and it was even possible they could see him 
tremble He could only hope that this didn’t make him ridiculous when he said … “I’m 
ready to do anything that will do any good; anything, anything – I don’t care a rap. In 
such a cause I should like the idea of danger. I don’t consider my bones precious in the 
least, compared with some other things. If one is sure one isn’t afraid, and one is accused, 
why shouldn’t one say so?” … It appeared to Hyacinth that he was talking a long time, 
and when it was over he scarcely knew what happened. He felt himself, in a moment, 
down almost under the feet of the other men; stamped upon with intentions of applause, 
of familiarity; laughed over and jeered over, hustled and poked in the ribs. He felt himself 
also pressed to the bosom of Eustache Poupin. (291-94, emphasis added)  
A veritable exemplification of the “immediate feltness” of sensations unregistered and 
unmediated by the mind, Hyacinth’s gradational anguish and bewilderment echo the steps 
prefacing the ecstatic culmination of Augustine’s conversion. The tumultuous sensations of the 
night’s “intenser vibrations,” the “contagion of excited purpose,” the “breath of popular 




reciprocate what James refers to in the Preface to The Princess as the “thousand provocations 
and intimations” – impersonal assaults
45
 on Hyacinth’s already “lacerated personality” (283).
46
 
In fact, the novel’s ubiquitous emphasis on the air and its penetrating qualities is so insistent that 
Hyacinth is said to be “a product of the London streets and the London air” (104-105).
47
 Under 
the pressure of these aerial assaults, his mind gives way and fashions forth an ecstatic vision of 
the “immensely magnified” monstrosities of London’s poor.
48
 Moments before his conversion 
Hyacinth’s self is dissolved into a cacophonous composite of everyone else’s thoughts in the 
room: like Saint Augustine in the Confessions, he is overwhelmed by physical affliction and a 
“state of tormented wonder,” which is followed by another assault of voices. While in Saint 
Augustine a child’s voice instigates the last phase toward conversion, in The Princess Hyacinth’s 
“springing up” on a chair is triggered by the speech of one of the local revolutionaries at the 
club. Following the stutter of his revolutionary oration, Hyacinth’s gathered self dramatically 
disappears, as suggested by James’s choice of the passive voice: “laughed over and jeered over, 
hustled and poked in the ribs,” “feeling himself pressed,” and “scarcely knowing what 
happened” are states akin to ecstatic abdication of consciousness, suggesting Hyacinth’s loss of 
self-presence. As with Saint Augustine, Hyacinth’s “bodily consciousness” precipitates his 
awareness of a new person fabricated through bodily responses to sensations. And just like with 
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 Hyacinth’s vision of London echoes Augustine’s vision of Lady Continence (Augustine, Confessions, 




Saint Augustine, Hyacinth’s awareness that the conversion indeed had taken place befalls him 
later – obscured from view, in the narrative gap, interstitially precisely, between Book Two and 
Three.  
I have indicated the impossibility of charting the originary moment of Saint Augustine’s 
conversion because the “bare immediacy” (to use William James’s term) of sensations and 
impressions assaulting him imperceptibly is untraceable. The germ from which Hyacinth’s 
conversion sprouts is equally indeterminate, if it ever existed. The novel’s opening – Pinnie and 
Hyacinth’s visit to the boy’s dying mother in Milbank prison – is as good a guess as any: “too 
intensely absorbed in watching the prisoner” (84), and increasingly bewildered by the repulsive 
spectacle, “the boy accommodated himself as he might to his strange ordeal [of being hugged by 
a stranger he is yet to find out is his mother]. What thoughts were begotten at that moment in his 
wondering little mind, Miss Pynsent was destined to learn at another time” (88-89). Because “the 
thoughts begotten in his wondering little mind” will beget the thoughts of his split origin 
(Hyacinth is the bastard son of a Duke and a French plebeian woman) which presumably beget 
his subsequent revolutionary allegiances, the prison scene offers itself as an indubitable 
“inception” of Hyacinth’s conversion. But the novel emblematizes this experience as a resilient, 
silently operating impression – an impression that over the years effectuates Hyacinth’s 
“tremendous little drama” (164):  
What he knew, what he guessed, sickened him, and what he didn’t know tormented him; 
but in his illuminated ignorance he had fashioned forth an article of faith. This had 
gradually emerged from the depths of darkness in which he found himself plunged as a 
consequence of the challenge he had addressed to Pinnie – while he was still only a child 




January afternoon. He had come in from a walk; she was seated at her lamp, as usual with 
her work, and she began to tell him of a letter … He listened to her story, standing in 
front of her, and then, by way of response, he said to her, “Who was that woman you took 
me to see ever so long ago?” … Hyacinth could never have told you why the crisis 
occurred on such a day, why his question broke out at that particular moment. The 
strangeness of the matter to himself was that the germ of his curiosity should have 
developed so slowly; that the haunting wonder, which now, as he looked back, appeared 
to fill his whole childhood, should only after so long an interval have crept up to the air. 
(166, emphasis added) 
The language of conversion traverses the passage: haunting wonder, the crisis, and a sudden 
break-out after a period of slow simmering. A childhood impression of the prison lingers latently 
and engenders in the ignorant Hyacinth what James frames in the Preface as his “lively inner 
revolution.” While he “could never have told you why the crisis occurred on such a day,” the 
novel implicitly suggests, short of linking it directly with the crisis, one plausible reason. The 
fateful question Hyacinth drops before Pinnie is outlined as an immediate sequel to “one of his 
interminable, restless, melancholy, moody, yet all-observant strolls through London” (102). The 
walk triggers the crisis, in other words, because it is an activity of inadvertent gathering of 
impressions: “He rambled for an hour, in a state of breathless ecstasy; brushing the dew from the 
deep fern and bracken and the rich borders of the garden [at Medley], tasting the fragrant air, and 
stopping everywhere, in murmuring rapture, at the touch of some exquisite impression. His 
whole walk was peopled with recognitions” (301).
49
 The mechanism of delayed reflection is at 
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work again: a “fruit of perambulation” as James calls them in the Preface (AN 59), ideas and 
emotions are generated by impressions gradually converted, subliminally collected, in the past, 
during a walk. Or more explicitly: “Rare sensations and impressions, moments of acute 
happiness, almost always, with Hyacinth, in retrospect, became rather mythic and legendary” 
(254) – mythic and legendary (i.e. narratable) because the “bare immediacy of feltness” 
subsequently acquires the linear and causal quality. Having fermented in him over an unspecified 
and unspecifiable period of time, assembled with and transformed by other “rare sensations,” the 
impressions accumulated in Milbank “creep up” and “break out.”
50
 The stupid life of sensations 
and impressions is paradoxically yet essentially constitutive of a person: 
Every displeasure or gratification of the visual sense coloured his whole mind. … What 
was most important in life for him was simply his impressions. They came from 
everything he touched, they kept him thrilling and throbbing during a considerable part of 
his waking consciousness, and they constituted, as yet, the principal events and stages of 
his career. Fortunately, they were sometimes very delightful. Everything in the field of 
observation suggested this or that; everything struck him, penetrated, stirred; he had, in a 
word, more impressions than he knew what to do with – felt sometimes as if they would 
consume or asphyxiate him. (157-58 , emphasis added) 
The fatality of impressions’ transformative potential is exerted through their power to absorb and 
thereby transform one into a new person – first into a revolutionary, later into an aesthete. In a 
slight emendation of this passage in the New York Edition of The Princess (1908), “reflexions” 
are added to “impressions” (“Nothing in life had such an interest or such a price for him as his 
impressions and reflexions”), and impressions subsequently flagged as “strange communications 
                                                                                                                                                       
day been different, had the air not been as sweet, he wouldn’t have been promoted to speak or act, as the 
italics in the original (because) indicate. 
50






 The “principle events” through which life communicates itself, impressions stand for 
events of continuously unfolding conversion and individuation (“stages of life”), carrying within 
themselves not the present of their assault, but what is yet to be mobilized, inadvertently, to forge 
a new person.  
Hyacinth’s visit to his dying mother in Milbank prison can, therefore, hardly designate 
the inception of his inward revolution.
52
 More generally, that conversion has no germ because it 
is never singular is strongly substantiated by the novel’s pursuit of Hyacinth’s second conversion 
in Paris into an aesthete, and the third one into an artist. Once in Paris, he walks “from rising till 
bed-time every day of the week,” until “an extraordinary fatigue” and “a tremendous lassitude” 
overwhelm him, to the point his becoming “incoherent to himself” (379). The growing 
incongruity between his presently emerging and previously fashioned attachments eventually 
yields an awareness “of a transfer, partial if not complete, of his sympathies” (383, emphasis 
added). The pattern is familiar: the repeated laceration of Hyacinth’s self, a stage hastening the 
moment of conversion, is now figured in the “impalpable presence” of the ghost of Hyacinth’s 
grandfather (named Hyacinthe) – a “vague yet vivid personage,” “Hyacinth’s constant 
companion … who roamed about with Florentine’s boy, hand in hand, … treated him to 
innumerable revelations and counsels …. and knew the lad’s secret without being told” (381).
53
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But as with the previous conversion, the moment of its outset is undetectable – Hyacinth’s 
vacation, six months before, at Medley, where the Princess is said to have “taken possession of 
his mind to the extent that she completely renewed it” (384) figures perhaps as the most probable 
“origin.” And again, like at the “Sun and Moon” in London, the sounds, visual impressions and 
smells of Paris trigger the next stage in Hyacinth’s revolution, most appropriately at the Place de 
la Révolution: “the nightly emanation of Paris seemed to rise more richly, to float and hang in 
the air, to mingle with the universal light and the many-voiced sound, to resolve itself into a 
thousand solicitations and opportunities. … he grew restless and excited, and a kind of pleasant 
terror of the place and hour entered into his blood” (393). Similarly in Venice, as he exclaims in 
a letter to the Princess, “what ineffable impressions, what a revelation of the exquisite! … I can 
scarcely believe that it’s of myself that I am telling these fine things; … I have lost sight of the 
sacred cause [his vow to Hoffendahl] almost altogether in my recent adventures. It is not that it 
has not been there to see, for that perhaps is the clearest result of extending one’s horizon. … I 
don’t know what it comes from” (395-397, emphasis added). 
Clearly, much depends on the fact that the trace of conversion’s inception is 
systematically obscured. Without beginning, conversion is also without end: due to its 
involuntary, random, and fortuitous nature, another conversion is always already on the way, 
overlapping with the ongoing one, interrupting it, merging with it. Repetition – although, 
obviously, not of the same – renders conversion a universal state, disturbing and promising in at 
least two ways: superficially, a ceaselessly converted self has no fixed identity and can, 
hypothetically, be anything; and more dramatically, a self not present to its own conversion is 
neither a chief crafter, not an absolute master of its own form. It is therefor for reasons more 
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profound than his divided heredity (a French plebeian mother, an English aristocrat father) that 
Hyacinth is unable to answer the deceptively simple question of who he is. Not from resignation, 
but out of ontological, rather than psychological, necessity his only reply ought to be dismissive: 
“Oh, I daresay I ain’t anything” (127). 
In “What is an Emotion?”, the essay following “Some Omissions,” William James offers 
additional validation for the priority of the somatic over the mental by arguing that the 
pathological and the normal cases ought to be classed under the same rubric. His example is that 
of morbid fear which in “normal cases” arises from various physical obstructions of proper 
breathing – once they are removed, “the dread, ipso facto, seems to depart.”
54
 Pathological cases 
of morbid fear, James contends, arise not from physical obstruction but from hallucinations of 
dread engendered by the nervous system as it overtakes the reception of the object perceived: 
dread here occurs not as a result of obstructed breathing and palpitation, but as the consequence 
of nervous activity. In an accompanying footnote James stresses that abnormal states, such as  
Trance, ecstasy, &c., offer analogous examples, – not to speak of ordinary dreaming. 
Under all these conditions one may have the liveliest subjective feelings, either of eye or 
ear, or of the more visceral and emotional sort, as a result of pure nerve-central activity, 
with complete peripheral repose. Whether the subjective strength of the feeling be due in 
these cases to the actual energy of the central disturbance, or merely to the narrowing of 
the field of consciousness, need not concern us.
55
  
The interjection is significant in that it equates the pathological states which do not necessitate 
prior corporeal reaction, with normal states which do, since the emotion of dread appears in both 
as secondary – a result either of bodily response, or of a hallucination of such response instigated 
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by nervous activity. That in the class of pathological cases James includes trance, ecstasy and 
dreaming is equally significant for the analysis of conversion, as all three states, just like 
conversion, entail the absence of willful consciousness, or loss of self-presence. James’s 1884 
essays on the priority of the corporeal over the emotional figure crucially not only as a precursor 
to but as a strange retrospective key to the central questions in James’s two lectures on 
“Conversion” in The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902).  
In The Varieties the mechanism of conversion is interlocked with the structure of 
consciousness, which James divides into “central” and “peripheral.” 
The collection of ideas alters by subtraction or by addition in the course of experience, 
and the tendencies alter as the organism gets more aged. The mental system may be 
undermined or weakened by this interstitial alteration just as a building is, and yet for a 
time keep upright by dead habit, But a new perception, a sudden emotional shock, or an 
occasion which lays bare the organic alteration, will make the whole fabric fall together; 
and then the centre of gravity sinks into an attitude more stable, for the new ideas that 




While this structure, also called “the field of consciousness,”
57
 at first appears fixed, its 
contents
58
 are impermanent. The ideas populating “the habitual centre of [man’s] personal 
energy” define his identity for a particular period of time: “To say that man is ‘converted’ means, 
in these terms, that religious ideas, previously peripheral in his consciousness, now take a central 
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place, and that religious aims form the habitual centre of his energy.”
59
 On the basis of how this 
psychological mechanism operates, conversion is initially classed into two binary types – sudden 
or gradual; and volitional or involuntary. However, the typology is soon rendered inoperative, 
since every gradual conversion has as its “critical points” moments of rapidity.
60
 Likewise, “even 
in the most voluntary built-up sort of regeneration there are passages of partial self-surrender 
interposed; … Some hidden process was started in you by the effort, which went on after the 
effort ceased, and made the result come as if it came spontaneously. … Self-surrender becomes 
then indispensable.”
61
 Gradation and the absence of self-presence are, therefore, fundamental to 
every religious conversion (as indicated by Saint Augustine’s account) which, James adds, 
translates into the language of psychology as “Let one do all in one’s power, and one’s nervous 
system will to the rest.”
62
 Significantly, like in the two essays from 1884, the corporeal (nervous 
system) is identified with the absence of self’s ideal structure (willful consciousness). Hyacinth’s 
conversions, regardless of how dissimilar they may initially appear (his transformation into a 
revolutionary willed and gradual; into an aesthete involuntary and gradual; into an artist willed 
and sudden), all involve, as we have seen, continuous self-surrender. William James’s 
description of the established conversion protocol (“Throughout the height of it, he undoubtedly 
seems to himself a passive spectator or undergoer of an astounding process performed upon him 
from above”)
63
 is therefore transferrable, almost verbatim, to the moment in the “Sun and Moon” 
when Hyacinth “felt himself, in a moment, down almost under the feet of the other men; stamped 
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upon with intentions of applause, of familiarity; laughed over and jeered over, hustled and poked 
in the ribs.”  
When self-surrender as the fundamental distinctive feature of conversion is yoked with 
William James’s insistence on the universality of conversion and the primacy of the corporeal 
over the emotional, momentous ontological – not just psychological – consequences emerge: 
Were we to write the story of the mind from the purely natural-history point of view, with 
no religious interest whatever we should still have to write down man’s liability to 
sudden and compete conversion as one of his most curious peculiarities. … [But] may the 
whole phenomenon of regeneration, even in these startling instantaneous examples, 
possibly be a strictly natural process, divine in its fruits, of course, but in one case more 
and in another less so, and neither more nor less divine in its mere causation and 
mechanism than any other process, high or low, of man’s interior life? … Converted men 
as a class are indistinguishable from natural men.
64
  
Because conversion as “strictly natural” is unrestricted to religious states, James’s central 
question in these two lectures is unconcerned, as is commonly thought, with the mechanism of 
religious conversion, but rather with “how the excitement shifts in a man’s mental system, and 
why aims that were peripheral become at a certain moment central.”
65
 Although he hastens to add 
that psychology “is unable in a given case to account accurately for all the single forces at work,” 
precisely because of the unaccountable multitude of forces at work, a recourse to his 1884 essays 
may provide a possible lead. 
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If conversion is “the elementary mechanism of our life,”
66
 involving, as matter of course, 
gradational self-surrender, then our lives too operate through continuous self-surrender on the 
most elementary level. Given that, as shown above, “What is an Emotion?” defines ecstasy, 
trance and dreaming as states analogous to the “normal cases” in which this self-surrender entails 
the priority of the corporeal over the emotional, the corollary to these juxtapositions is of 
ontological rather than strictly psychological order, in that the states of ecstasy or dreaming 
unfold according to the same logic as do our waking states. At stake is not mere psychological 
explication (conversion entails that we change over time) but a radical philosophical proposition 
according to which, because our persons are forged corporeally in the interstitial absence of 
consciousness, we are fundamentally impersonal, ontologically ecstatic.
67
 In the aftermath of 
conversion, James insists, “the personality is changed, the man is born anew, whether or not his 
psychological idiosyncrasies are what give the particular shape to his metamorphosis.”
68
 
At the beginning of Lecture IX of The Varieties, as I quoted above,
69
 James seems to 
describe the field of consciousness as fixed and its content as mutable (“To say that man is 
‘converted’ means, in these terms, that religious ideas, previously peripheral in his 
consciousness, now take a central place, and that religious aims form the habitual centre of his 
energy”). Definitions of this kind are largely responsible for the commonly erroneous 
psychologization of James’s account of conversion. To indicate that it is the psychological 
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content that varies within an already formed mental frame is to argue for the stability and 
continuity of personal identity. Conversion, on that account, is reducible to what is taken to be 
ordinary emotional transformations. In Lecture X of The Varieties, “Conversion Continued,” 
James introduces an element of disturbance: the “field of consciousness,” rather than figuring as 
“a definitely outlined thing,” is instead delineated by a “leaky or pervious margin:”
70
 
Until quite lately the unit for mental life which figured most was the single “idea,” 
supposed to be a definitely outlined thing. But at present psychologists are tending, first 
to admit that the actual unit is more probably the total mental state, the entire wave of 
consciousness or field of objects present to the thoughts at any time; and second, to see 
that it is impossible to outline this wave, this field, with any definiteness. … The 




That the margins of the field of consciousness are indeterminate suggests that their permeability 
(“leakiness,” “perviousness”) would render the whole field amorphous. James says as much 
when he designates this field as “lying around us like a ‘magnetic field’:  
Our whole past store of memories floats beyond this margin, ready at a touch to come in; 
and the entire mass of residual powers, impulses, and knowledges that constitute our 
empirical self stretches continuously beyond it. So vaguely drawn are the outlines 
between what is actual and what is only potential at any moment of our conscious life, 
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Striking in this account is a description of the field of consciousness as literally externalized, 
made to envelop us, like a halo, rather than serve as an internal anchoring mechanism. That 
consciousness is external and stretching, potentially infinitely, beyond its anyway indefinite 
margin suggests that essential volatility and interchangeability of the actual with the potential – 
of the material we are conscious of with the one we are unconscious of – would dramatically 
destabilize our control of the material that shapes one’s thoughts and emotions. And to press the 
claim further, the field’s infinity opens the possibility of its merging with other minds and their 
infinitely stretching margins. Henry James’s description of his protagonists’ reflecting filter as “a 
consciousness … subject to fine intensifications and wide enlargement” (AN 67) follows this 
conception of enlarged field of consciousness. 
In sum, contrary to what the beginning of Lecture IX may have seemed to argue – that 
the structure of consciousness is fixed, while the content is what changes
73
 – the structure of 
consciousness is not only volatile, it is essentially amorphous, rendering our persons equally so. 
In the Appendix to Psychology: A Briefer Course, the work James produced as an abridged 
version of his monumental Principles of Psychology, the constantly “changing character of 
consciousness” is explicitly said to call into question, and eventually annul, consciousness as 
such: 
The changing character of consciousness presents another puzzle. We first assumed 
conscious “states” as the units with which psychology deals, and we said later that they 
were in constant change. Yet any state must have a certain duration to be effective at all – 
a pain which lasted but a hundredth of a second would practically be no pain – and the 
question comes up, how long may a state last and still be treated as one state? In time-
perception for example, if the “present” as known … may be a dozen seconds long, how 
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long need the present as knower be? That is, what is the minimum duration of the 
consciousness in which those twelve seconds can be apprehended as just past, the 
minimum which can be called a “state” for such a cognitive purpose? Consciousness, as a 
process in time, offers the paradoxes which have been found in all continuous change. 
There are no “states” in such a thing, any more than there are facets in a circle, or place 
where an arrow “is” when it flies.
74
 
Thus, the indefinitely extending field of consciousness, which because of its indefiniteness can 
hardly still be called consciousness in the strict sense, figures as the very impersonal interstice 
within which impressions are converted into emotions. Just how radical this proposition is, is 
testified by the fact that James has to invent a whole new term to designate this weird construct – 
consciousness without personality, or person without identity. James’s new concept, which never 
took root because his radical empiricism was swept aside in the twentieth century by cognitive 
psychology and Freud’s psychoanalysis (both of which operate on the premise of the vulnerable 
yet essentially inviolable individual), is siousness: 
Everyone assumes that we have direct introspective acquaintance with our thinking 
activity as such, with our consciousness as something inward and contrasted with the 
outer objects which it knows. Yet I must confess that for my part I cannot feel sure of this 
conclusion. Whenever I try to become sensible of my thinking activity as such, what I 
catch is some bodily fact, an impression coming from my brow, or head, or throat, or 
nose. It seems as if consciousness as an inner activity were rather a postulate than a 
sensibly given fact, the postulate, namely, of a knower as correlative to all this known; 
and as if “sciousness” might be a better word by which to describe it. But “sciousness 
postulated as an hypothesis” is practically a very different thing from “states of 
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consciousness apprehended with infallible certainty by an inner sense.” For one thing, it 
throws the question of who the knower really is wide open again.
75
 
From Latin conscientia, which itself derives from con- (a form of com-, “together”) and scire 
(“to know”), consciousness can be said to mean, in its original denotation, thinking or knowing 
with – with, through, or by way of one’s self.
76
 In erasing the “with,” James erases the dual 
structure of knowing, and rearticulates the act of knowing as that without the knower. The 
knower – a thinking, self-aware mind – is a construct, a non-entity, a stance James will sharpen 
to its extreme in the 1905 essay “Does Consciousness Exist?” (to which he answers “no”). 
Hence, the answer to the question I formulated at the beginning of Part One – who thinks in this 
impersonal fissure that lacks the “con” – is: no one. The fissure is the space of self-surrender, 
where self exerts no control and where impressions are collected “ready at a touch to come in.” 
This infinitely expanding margin is also, like a bridge, a layer of our separation from and 
overlapping with others – a shared in-betweenness which Henry James relentlessly explores as 
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the place of power and manipulation in his later phase, as Sharon Cameron has shown,
77
 but only 
begins to glimpse the potential of in The Portrait of a Lady and more elaborately in The Princess 
Casamassima. Consider, for instance, a remarkable encounter between Hyacinth Robinson and 
Lady Aurora in The Princess, where from within the silent Venn diagram of their fields of 
consciousness a common thought emerges:  
He presently perceived that he himself had an agitating effect upon her. His senses were 
fine enough to make him feel that he revived certain associations and quickened certain 
wounds. She suddenly stopped talking, and the two sat there looking at each other, in a 
kind of occult community of suffering. Hyacinth made several mechanical remarks, 
explaining, insufficiently, why he had come, and in the course of a very few moments, 
quite independently of these observations, it seemed to him that there was a deeper, a 
measurelessly deep, confidence between them. A tacit confession passed and repassed, 
and each understood the situation of the other. They wouldn’t speak of it – it was very 
definite that they would never do that; for there was something in their common 
consciousness that was inconsistent with the grossness of accusation. Besides, the 
grievance of each was an apprehension, an instinct of the soul – not a sharp, definite 
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wrong, supported by proof. It was in the air and in their restless pulses, and not in 
anything that they could exhibit or complain of. Strange enough it seemed to Hyacinth 
that the history of each should be the counterpart of that of the other. (PC 539-04)  
Mirroring the chilling silent understanding between Isabel and Madame Merle toward the end of 
The Portrait of a Lady, the wordless encounter of Hyacinth and Lady Aurora occurs in the space 
of “their common consciousness.” Spoken communication is turned into background noise. 
Rather than being first formulated independently and then conveyed to the interlocutor, their 
thoughts, a veritable “community of suffering” that congeals in the common in-betweenness, 
fashions forth a common thought. This community is “occult” because it is not recognized by 
anyone else, nor is it founded on pregiven norms and values. It is formed momentarily and on no 
formative or normative principles, as nothing measurable or “supported by proof” keeps it from 
dissolving; what sculpts it is the “air” filled with “their restless pulses,” the “feltness” crowding 
the margins of their common yet (or therefore) impersonal consciousness.
78
 At the moment of 
their unspoken communion it is impossible to distinguish whose impressions belong to whom, 
and who thinks whose thought. This interstitial margin where impressions that belong to no one 
in particular are silently shared is where identities are at their weakest. It is where they are 
negotiated, composed and decomposed – an impersonal limbo that both does and does not 
belong to a single person, and from where perceptions will eventually become emotions and 
thoughts. This fissure, then, is the site of the political: of power, violence, antagonism, 
subjection, of submission and letting go, as Henry James acutely recognizes in the Preface to The 
Princess: “the most general state of one’s most exposed and assaulted figures [is] the state of 
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bewilderment … the condition of a humble heart, a bowed head, a patient wonder, a suspended 
judgment, before the ‘awful will’ and the mysterious decrees of Providence” (AN 66) – a 
condition of the margin in which all possibilities still lie open to the self, before our persons, 
through exposure and assault, are converted and crafted into a new form.  
 
II Politics: Amorphous Self via Mikhail Bakunin 
“I couldn’t help translating those [illegible] verses of Turgénieff,” Henry James wrote to William 
Dean Howells from Paris in October 1876, “tho’ I don’t share the Russian eagerness for War. 
T[urgenev] himself is full of it, and I suspect it is coming. The air is full of it and all the world 
here expects it.”
79
 The “War” James is referring to is the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and his 
translation is of Turgenev’s political poem “Croquet at Windsor,” published in The Nation on 
October 5, 1876.
80
 The point at which Turgenev’s horror-poem and the war between Turkey and 
                                               
79
 Henry James, The Letters of Henry James: 1875-1883, edited by Leon Edel (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), 72.  
80
 James’s is a somewhat loose, prose translation of “Croquet at Windsor” (The Nation, October 5, 1876, 
213):  
The Queen is sitting in her forest of Windsor; around her the ladies of her court play a 
game which not long since came into fashion – a game called croquet. You roll little balls 
and you make them pass skilfully through little hoops. The Queen looks on and laughs; 
but suddenly she stops; her face grows deathly pale.  
It seems to her that, instead of shapely balls driven by the lightly-tapping mallet, there are 
hundreds of heads rolling along, all smeared with blood. Heads of women, of young girls, 
of children; faces with marks of dreadful tortures and bestial outrage, of the claws of 
beasts, and all the horror of death-pangs. 
And now the youngest daughter of the Queen, a gentle maiden, pushes one of these heads 
further and further from the others, pushes it until it reaches her mother’s feet. The head 
of a child with curly hair; its little livid mouth turns to murmur reproaches. The Queen 
utters a shriek of horror; an ineffable terror darkens her eyes.  
“My doctor, quick, quick, let him come to me!” And she tells him her terrible vision. But 
he then answers:  
It doesn’t surprise me; reading the newspapers has disturbed you. The Times explains to 
us so well how the Bulgarians have deserved the wrath of the Turks. Here is a draught; 
take it and your trouble will pass.” And the Queen goes back into her palace.  
She is alone, and she begins to muse. Her eyelids fall, and – oh! horror, the edge of her 




Russia intersect is the massacre of more than 15,000 Bulgarian civilians by the Ottoman Empire 
in April and May of 1876. The massacre was Turkey’s response to the series of revolutionary 
attempts by the Balkan nations, in 1875 and 1876, to free themselves of its imperial rule. The 
mass killing sparked an outrage throughout Europe, generating Russia’s diplomatic and military 
intervention in the Balkans, and eventually leading to an all-out war between the two empires. 
Turgenev’s aim in the poem, however, is not the slaughter of civilians,
81
 but Britain’s pro-
Ottoman stance under Disraeli’s government (metonymized in the poem by the British Queen) 
which refused even to condemn, let alone take action against, the Turkish offensive in 
Bulgaria.
82
 On August 9, 1877, James wrote about this situation to Grace Norton: 
This is an extremely interesting time here; and indeed that is one reason why I have not 
been able to bring myself to go abroad, as I have been planning all this month to do. I 
can’t give up the morning papers! I am not one of the outsiders who thinks that the 
“greatness” of England is now exploded; but there mingles with my interest in her 
prospects and doings all this horrible Eastern Question a sensible mortification and 
                                                                                                                                                       
forget it. Wash it for me, rivers of England!” “No, your Majesty, never shall the royal 
robe of England be washed of the stain of this innocent blood!”  
81
 In a letter to his brother, Turgenev explains that the poem was inspired by the crime: “I indeed wrote 
the thing, or, better, conceived it at night, suffering from insomnia, while in a carriage on the Nikolayev 
Railway – under the impact of the Bulgarian horrors I had read about in the newspapers” (qtd. in Nicholas 
G. Žekulin, “Turgenev’s ‘Króket v Vindzore’ (‘Croquet at Windsor’),” New Zealand Slavonic Journal 
(1983): 87). 
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torture, but generally terminate their connexion with culprits in a more expeditious manner. (Laughter.)” 




sadness. She has no resolutely played a part – even a wrong one. She has been weak and 
helpless and (above all) unskillful, she has drifted and stumbled and not walked like a 
great nation. One has a feeling that the affairs of Europe are really going to be settled 
without her. At any rate the cynical, brutal, barbarous pro-Turkish attitude of an immense 
mass of people here (I am no fanatic for Russia, but I think the Emperor of R[ussia] 
might have been treated like a gentleman!) has thrown into vivid relief the most 
discreditable side of the English character.
83
 
James’s decision to translate the “Croquet at Windsor” marks the beginning of his serious 
interest in the political matters of imperial Britain and of the Europe teeming with revolution, an 
interest that emerged largely under the influence of Turgenev’s frequently communicated 
criticism of England’s handling of the “Bulgarian horrors and the Eastern Question.”
84
  
Turgenev wrote the “Croquet” in July 1876,
85
 while completing what would turn out to 
be his last novel, the Virgin Soil, which also explicitly engages political concerns. (The clash 
between the traditional gentry and the emerging populism and anarcho-socialist politics in Russia 
is refracted in this novel through the struggle for land-ownership reform.) Henry James was 
personally instrumental in disseminating both of these Turgenev’s texts to English readership. 
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Having translated the “Croquet” in 1876,
86
 he commendably reviewed the Virgin Soil for The 
Nation in 1877, and then himself obtained translation permission from Turgenev for the novel’s 
publication in English.
87
 Then in 1884, just one year after Turgenev’s death, James began 
working on his own “most political” novel, The Princess Camasmassima, whose plot, characters, 
theme and narrative complications virtually replicate those of the Virgin Soil.
88
  
James’s daily interest in Europe’s imperial crisis, coupled with his explicitly political 
exchanges with Turgenev around the Russo-Turkish War and the question of national revolutions 
in the Balkans,
89
 illuminate the novel that directly emerged from this interest and this exchange. 
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In following the Virgin Soil’s thematization of populist, nihilist and anarchist ideas, The Princess 
Casamassima reads somewhat like James’s palimpsestic “correction” of Turgenev’s novel.
90
 The 
two uncannily overlap on all of the main points: from the protagonist Nezhdanov, a bastard son 
of a nobleman who, like Hyacinth, “throws [himself] into the revolutionary movement,” to his 
love triangle with a beautiful and fervent female revolutionary, a triangle involving another man, 
“a revolutionist whose perceptions are narrow and whose faith is absolute,” and who, like Paul 
Muniment in The Princess, expresses the anarchist views of Mikhail Bakunin and Sergey 
Nechaev; from a shady revolutionary who, like Hoffendahl, never appears in person, to a “big, 
ugly, and awkward … female devotee of the ‘common cause,’” a spit image of Lady Aurora 
from The Princess, to an “aesthetic young man [who], venturing to play with revolution, finds it 
a coarse, ugly, vulgar, and above all cruel thing.”
91
 Turgenev’s hero, just like James’s Hyacinth, 
commits suicide in the end. When James summarizes the Virgin Soil in his review, the summary 
uncannily resembles the plot of The Princess: 
The author’s wisdom is shown in his deep perception of the fact that the clandestine 
movement of which he gives a sketch is particularly fertile in revelations of character. … 
                                                                                                                                                       
promised. You understand easily that with such convictions I see a dark future, and you must allow me 
not to dwell on this subject any longer. Jean Seznec, “Lettres de Tourguéneff à Henry James,” 
Comparative Literature 1, no. 3 (1949): 205-206. 
90
 Although he praised it in his review in The Nation, privately James expressed reservations about Virgin 
Soil. On April 18, 1877, he wrote to T.S. Perry, not too long before he was to ask the latter to translate 
Turgenev’s novel from French into English: “I send you herewith the cheap and nasty reprint of Terres 
Vierges which John Turgenieff lately sent me – having kept it only to review it. … The book will 
disappoint you, as it did me; it has fine things, but I think it the weakest of his long stories (quite), and it 
has been such a failure in Russia, I hear, that it as not been reprinted from the Review in which it 
appeared” (Henry James, Letters, Vol. 2, 108). However disappointing it may have been to him, James 
obviously found something valuable in Turgenev’s novel – enough to go so far as to produce what some 
critics see as his English “double.” Peter Brooks has even described “the plot and situation” of James’s 
novel as “in many ways close imitations of Turgenev’s.” Peter Brooks, Henry James Goes to Paris 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 21. Tilley makes a similar argument about James’s motive 
behind The Princess to improve on the points he disliked in Virgin Soil (Tilley, Background, 12). 
91
 Henry James, “Ivan Turgeneff’s New Novel,” The Nation, April 26, 1877, 252-53 (reprinted as “Terres 




[Turgenev’s] central figure is usually a person in a false position, generally not of his 
own making, which, according to the peculiar perversity of fate, is only aggravated by his 
effort to right himself. Such eminently is the case with young Neshdanoff, who is the 
natural son of a nobleman, not recognized by his father’s family, and who, drifting 
through irritation and smothered rage and vague aspiration into the stream of occult 
radicalism, finds himself fatally fastidious and skeptical and “aesthetic” – more 
essentially an aristocrat, in a word, than any of the aristocrats he has agreed to conspire 
against. He has not the gift of faith, and he is most uncomfortably at odds with the his 
companions, who have it in a high degree.
92
 
Compare this with James’s description of his own novel in the Preface to The Princess where 
Nezhdanov’s “occult radicalism” becomes “Hyacinth’s subterraneous politics and occult 
affiliations” (AN 77); where the former’s “smothered rage and vague aspiration” become the 
latter’s “perpetual smothered ferment” (AN 74); and where Nezhdanov’s “false position” is 
replicated in the fact that Hyacinth’s “position as an irreconcileable pledged enemy, thus 
rendered false by something more personal than his opinions and his vows, becomes the sharpest 
of his torments” (AN 72).
93
 By recovering this complex web of interconnections between James 
and Turgenev in the 1870-80s, and by illuminating through them what critics recognize as one of 
The Princess’s prime sources and interests, I aim to uncover the source of James’s aesthetic 
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method in his (and his work’s) political concerns which revolve around the problem of 
revolutionary anarchism. 
Just like the Virgin Soil, The Princess seems to center on a series of dualities: the tension 
between revolutionary destruction and the preservation of the status quo; the clash of individual 
with institutions; the societal economic polarity of the upper and the lower class, reflected on 
Hyacinth’s amphibious, “lacerated” identity (aristocrat father, plebeian mother). The novel’s 
“Preface,” too, by referring to the “more than ‘shady’ underworld of militant socialism” (AN 
72), its “perpetual smothered ferment” (AN 74), and “Hyacinth’s subterraneous politics and 
occult affiliations” (AN 77), enables these dualities. But there are complications. The London 
underworld is precisely “shady” and vague, constantly emitting uncertainties about its 
boundaries, goals, agency or properties. After the meeting with Diedrich Heffendahl, Hyacinth 
reveals his insight into societal topography: 
It is more strange than I can say. Nothing of it appears above the surface; but there is an 
immense underworld, peopled with a thousand forms of revolutionary passion and 
devotion. The manner in which it is organised is what astonished me; I knew that, or 
thought I knew it, in a general way, but the reality was a revelation. And on top of it all, 
society lives! People go and come, and buy and sell, and drink and dance, and make 
money and make love, and seem to know nothing and suspect nothing and think of 
nothing; and iniquities flourish, and the misery of half the world is prated about as a 
‘necessary evil,’ and generations rot away and starve, in the midst of it, and day follows 
day, and everything is for the best in the best of possible worlds. All that is one-half of it; 
the other half is that everything is doomed! In silence, in darkness, but under the feet of 




the lid of which society performs its antics. When once the machinery is complete, there 
will be a great rehearsal. That rehearsal is what they want me for. The invisible, 
impalpable wires are everywhere, passing through everything, attaching themselves to 
objects in which one would never think of looking for them. What could be more strange 
and incredible, for instance, than that they should exist just here? (330) 
In no way does this structural stratification correspond to class-based dualism, or to what Lisi 
Schoenbach reads as “a vast bureaucratic network,” parallel to the state structure.
94
 The two 
classes or two structures are not distributed in two social layers, as the level above the surface 
appears to be populated by all. Beneath the surface is the “immense underworld” – unpopulated 
(except by passions and devotions), simply called “the revolution,” and rendered in affective 
terms as an animated machine that “lives and works.” Its ubiquitous wires get affixed to just 
about anything, causing everything to be “doomed,” though the nature or the consequences of 
this doom also remain vague.  
Most commentators have seen in this subterraneous “trap” the representation of a rigidly 
structured, clandestine terrorist group, organized around an invisible center of power – 
Hoffendahl, the very “master” of terror. Others, like Ross Posnock, for example, have read the 
machine allegorically, as the spirit of modernity’s instrumentality, removed from any kind of 
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inspired revolutionary zeal, and filled only with “the cold passion of managerial rationality.”
95
 
But James’s novel, I want to suggest, doesn’t succumb easily to the vision of an inflexibly 
ordered underworld. The novel’s scattered references to underground swellings, “deep perpetual 
groans” (283), “hummings” and “vague murmurs” (AN 60), “shudders” (288) and “ecstasies of 
the barricade” (380) traverse, in contrast, the eerie imagery of the machine’s might, creating a 
cumulative impression of a force that resists the grip of centralized power, and mirrors the 
accumulation of bewildering conversions (the little “dooms”) which bring about Hyacinth’s 
“inward revolution.” When Eustache Poupin declares his admiration for Hoffendahl, for 
example, he does so not because “an economy of heroism was an advantage to any cause” (288) 
– not, in other words, because the success of the revolution hinges on a comprehensive plan 
devised from one center. On the contrary, 
He himself esteemed Hoffendahl’s attempt because it had shaken, more than anything – 
except, of course, the Commune – had shaken it since the French Revolution, the rotten 
fabric of the actual social order, and because that very fact of the impunity, the 
invisibility, of the persons concerned in it had given the predatory classes, had given all 
Europe, a shudder that had not yet subsided. (288) 
It is the shuddering after-shock of one of Hoffendahl’s or Commune’s blows (oscillating, as it 
does, between fear as affect and quiver as movement), the that still makes the ground tremble, 
producing unforeseeable effects and affecting all those standing on the ground.
96
 This is not to 
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say, of course, that The Princess is oblivious to the problem of organized terror or political 
revolution. On the contrary, while constantly invoking Hoffendahl’s absence (as so much in the 
novel seems to revolve around that void), The Princess thematizes the questions of power 
structures, organization and control; but it also problematizes them by weaving the imagery of 
unpredictability, uncontrollable eruptions of passions that no Hoffendahl can square into his 
revolutionary project. Hyacinth’s three conversions are the central case in point. Nor is 
anarchism mere metaphoric ambiance, nor, conversely, a vehicle for the novel’s implementation 
of contemporary theories of socialism and anarchism. The Princess, I want to suggest, goes 
beyond this simple polarity, in that it merges in complex and unexpected ways the multiple 
conversions of its protagonist with the operations of society. There are parallels to be drawn 
between social impermanence and the breaks the self suffers under the pressures of “assaults,” 
“provocations,” “intimations,” “eruptions.” To draw these parallels, which suggest persons to be 
essentially exposed –impersonal and social – is to undermine the logic according to which there 
is something basic or finite about the self, or about the social stability. Further, a self repeatedly 
converted threatens political and social order organized around the category of the individual 
understood in terms of coherent form (self-identical).
97
 In the final analysis, James’s conception 
of the self and of society as riven by unsynchronized forces, relations, interests and possibilities 
questions identity politics, taking into account the accidental, uncontrollable, the unpredictable. 
                                                                                                                                                       
that she has been able to dress her wounds, to hold up her head, to smile again; so that the shadow of that 
darkness has ceased to rest upon her. But what you do not see you still may hear; and one remembers with 
a certain shudder that only a few short years ago this province, so intimately French, was under the heel 
of a foreign foe. … Wherever one goes, in France, one meets, looking backward a little, the spectre of the 
great Revolution; and one meets it always in the shape of the destruction of something beautiful and 
precious. To make us forgive it at all, how much it must also have destroyed that was more hateful than 
itself!” Henry James, A Little Tour in France (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1894), 6, 204. This 
text was originally published in 1884 in the Atlantic Monthly.  
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In “The Political Vocation,” an essay dedicated to The Princess Casmassima, Irving 
Howe summarizes the novel’s central preoccupation: “Whatever was unknown, shadowy and 
fearful in the idea of radicalism churning beneath the surface of London, stimulated [James’s] 
curiosity; he wished to seize upon the potential of destruction while it remained a mere 
potential.”
98
 Though unpopular among the critics,
99
 Howe’s essay identifies The Princess’s 
essential grappling with amorphousness, another name for the “mere potential.”
100
 I stress this 
point as crucial because it puts a finger on the very source of uneasiness the readers commonly 
have with this novel – namely, its refusal or reluctance to make a political statement, to act, as it 
were. The Princess is notorious for its hesitation to take sides, as illustrated in Hyacinth’s 
vacillation between the world of beauty and the world of social justice; and it fails, to turn to 
Howe again, to “quite come to a commanding vision of the political life.” In this, for Howe, lies 
James’s flaw: he was “brilliantly gifted at entering the behavior of political people, but he had no 
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 Whether it is a potential for destruction or for something else must remain undecided, however, due to 




larger view of politics as collective mode of action.”
101
 Yet, this is precisely where the novel, in 
my view, becomes politically relevant. Rather than propose a plan of action and make Hyacinth, 
as Howe would have him, “a figure of strength,” or the novel itself more sociological,
102
 The 
Princess presents society as blurry potentiality, irresolutely torn between an impersonal machine, 
controlled by sinister power, plotting general doom (Hoffendahl “treated all things, persons, 
institutions, ideas, as so many notes in his great symphonic revolt” [334]); and an amorphous 
entity of unpredictable forces (“impalpable wires”) that work imperceptibly on random objects 
and bring about their “doom” by converting them.
103
 This ambiguity is dramatically compressed 
in Hyacinth’s imagining of his own ecstatic conversion mobilized by democracy:  
[t]here was joy, exultation, in the thought of surrendering one’s self to the wave of revolt, 
of floating in the tremendous tide, of feeling one’s self lifted and tossed, carried higher on 
the sun-touched crests of billows than one could ever be by a dry, lonely effort of one’s 
own. That vision could deepen to a kind of ecstasy; make it indifferent whether one’s 
ultimate fate, in such a heaving sea, were not almost certainly to be submerged in 
bottomless depths or dashed to pieces on resisting cliffs. Hyacinth felt that, whether his 
personal sympathy should rest finally with the victors or the vanquished, the victorious 
force was colossal and would require no testimony from the irresolute. (478) 
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The language here uncannily resembles not only Hyacinth’s first conversion at the “Sun and 
Moon” (“The room surged round, heaving up and down … He felt himself, in a moment, down 
almost under the feet of the other men; stamped upon … laughed over and jeered over, hustled 
and poked” (94)), but also Saint Augustine’s and William James’s respective accounts of 
conversion protocol, thus merging to the point of indistinguishability the description of political 
conversion (democratic revolution) and an “inward revolution” (personal conversion). It is this 
merging, ubiquitous in the second half of the novel, that creates confusion as to whether The 
Princess’s theme is politics or Hyacinth’s life. The confusion is, I contend, deliberate, as James’s 
theme, ultimately, is neither; instead, as the Preface indicates, its focal point is conversion –
ontological, political or, as we are yet to see, aesthetical – of “the immediate field of life” into 
“the reflected field of life.”  
Lionel Trilling’s preface to the 1948 edition of The Princess associates, for the first time, 
James’s novel with Mikhail Bakunin’s doctrine of amorphismus. The value of Trilling’s 
important, if stylistically dated, essay lies in the way it manages to link the two by preserving the 
complex and contradictory character of Bakunin’s political thought: hand in hand with his 
widely disseminated propensity for destruction, “nihilism,” and conspiratorial centers went 
ceaseless insistence on spontaneity, creative instinctiveness, anti-statism, and resistance to form. 
James, Trilling argues,  
envisaged a revolution with which we are no longer familiar. It was not a Marxian 
revolution. There is no upsurge of an angry proletariat led by a disciplined party which 
plans to head a new strong state. … There is no organized mass movement; there is no 
disciplined party but only a strong conspiratorial center. There are no plans for taking 




Hyacinth Robinson is torn between his desire for social justice and his fear lest the 
civilization of Europe be destroyed, he is dealing reasonably with anarchist belief. “The 
unchaining of what is today called the evil passions and the destruction of what is called 
public order” was the consummation of Bakunin’s aim which he defended by saying that 
“the desire for destruction is at the same time a creative desire.” It was not only the state 
but all social forms that were to be demolished according to his doctrine of amorphism; 
any social form held the seeds of the state's rebirth and must therefore be extirpated.
104
  
The Marx Trilling invokes here is the one of Das Kapital and of the split with anarchism, which 
culminated in 1872 when Bakunin was expelled from the International Workingmen’s 
Association. The fundamental disagreement concerned their different understanding of the role 
of the state in the revolution. While Marx considered the proletarian state a necessary transitional 
phase toward communism, Bakunin rejected any statist form. His dismissal of the state sprang 
forth from an earlier idea of “amorphism” which he first presented in The Principles of 
Revolution (1869), a piece he may have written with Sergey Nechayev,
105
 where the concept 
pertained to a demolition not only of the state as the supreme repressive authority, but of form as 
such: “With respect to time, the term revolution contains two completely different facts: the 
beginning, which is the time of the demolition of the existing social forms, and the end, the 
construction, that is to say, the creation of completely new forms out of this amorphism.”
106
 
After his break with Marx, Bakunin published Statism and Anarchy (1873), where he clarified 
this position: 
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In the belief that the masses bear all the elements of their future organizational norms in 
their own more or less historically evolved instincts, in their everyday needs and their 
conscious and unconscious desires, we seek [the] ideal within the people themselves. 
Since every state power, every government, by its nature and by it positions stands 
outside the people and above them, and must invariably try to subject them to rules and 
objectives which are alien to them, we declare ourselves the enemies of every 
government and every state power, the enemies of state organization of any kind. We 
believe that people can be happy and free only when they create their own life, 
organizing themselves from below upward by means of independent and completely free 




The statelessness Bakunin proposes appears as a loose network of associations, an entity without 
solid form and free from externally imposed power that would stand “outside the people and 
above them.” It is associationism based on numberless “instinctual” combinations, occasionally 
cooperating, impermanent and unfixed. In “Revolutionary Catechism” (1866) Bakunin wrote: 
“The political and economic organization of social life must not, as at present, be directed from 
the summit to the base – the center to the circumference – imposing unity through forced 
centralization. On the contrary, it must be reorganized to issue from the base to the summit – 
from the circumference to the center – according to the principles of free association and 
federation.”
108
 But this de-centered organization emphasizes spontaneity, Bakunin’s other central 
notion, equally important for James: “With the abolition of the State,” Bakunin wrote in 
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“General Problems of the Social Revolution” (1870), “the spontaneous self-organization of 
popular life, for centuries paralyzed and absorbed by the omnipotent power of the State, will 
revert to the communes.”
109
 Existing nation states are to be destroyed in favor of autonomous 
communes which would make spontaneous alliances with other communes and would 
themselves be subject to change. Paul Muniment in The Princess follows this logic when he 
clarifies to Hyacinth that “they were not in league, and they hadn’t in their totality grasped any 
idea at all” (292) – indicating that no external principle binds their revolutionary “cell” with 
others, since there is no pre-given idea or authority to embrace them into a unified whole. In this 
insistence on statelessness as formlessness, Bakunin (and Paul Muniment) prefigures George 
Sorel’s revolutionary syndicalism,
110
 which advances the idea of general strike, a formlessness 
par excellence, through repudiation of the notion of political projects: “There [is] no need for 
programmes of the future. … Workmen who put down their tools do not go to their employers 
with schemes for the better organisation of labour.”
111
 A pre-given projection of political 
organization cannot define genuine revolution, because it would preserve the traces of the 
previous form (the state): “The revolution appears as a revolt, pure and simple, and no place is 
reserved for sociologists, for fashionable people who are in favour of social reforms and for the 
intellectuals.”
112
 Both Bakunin, who opposed late Marx’s scientific socialism, and Sorel, who 
follows the early Marx of The Communist Manifesto, dispense with utopian blueprints that would 
predetermine the principles of a future social organization. “No theory, no ready-made system, 
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no book that has ever been written will save the world. I cleave to no system,” Bakunin wrote in 
an almost Emersonian mode, “I am a true seeker.”
113
  
 If James didn’t draw on Bakunin directly, his conception of society – its values and 
identity – as never fully formed parallels Bakunin’s idea of amorphism. Bakunin’s theories were 
recognizably present throughout Europe in the 1870s and 1880s. In the fall of 1861, while the 
James family was still living in Boston, Bakunin visited the United States travelling from San 
Francisco to New York and Boston, where he met with a number of abolitionists, writers, and 
politicians, among whom George Sumner, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, General George 
McClellan, Henry Wilson, and Louis Agassiz, who was Bakunin’s friend.
 114
 In 1872, when 
Henry James briefly returned from Europe to Cambridge, a large anarchist meeting, attended by 
young Benjamin Tucker, Ezra Heywood, William Greene and Josiah Warren,
115
 was held in 
Boston, and Bakunin’s text were began to be published soon afterward (God and State was 
translated and published by Benjamin Tucker in Boston in 1883).
116
 On a more personal basis, 
Bakunin was a long-time friend of Ivan Turgenev’s,
117
 whose friendship James cherished for the 
last eight years of Turgenev’s life.  
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But what drew James to Bakunin, I believe, was not destructiveness, which James 
abhorred in all of its forms, but Bakunin’s peculiar variety of anarchism which emphasizes 
destruction and spontaneity. In the “Letter to Albert Richard,” Bakunin wrote: 
I must, more than ever, consider you as a believer in centralization, and in the 
revolutionary State, while I am more than ever opposed to it, and have faith only in 
revolutionary anarchy, which will everywhere be accompanied by an invisible collective 
power, the only dictatorship I will accept. … There must be anarchy, there must be – if 
the revolution is to become and remain alive, real, and powerful, the greatest possible 




That life, like revolution, should be spontaneous, without a goal prescribed in advance, means 
also that it should be without identifiable origin that charts its course in retrospect. This is the 
meaning of Bakunin’s amorphism, which aptly outlines Hyacinth’s numerous conversions in The 
Princess as well as William James’s definition of the “field of consciousness.” However, 
Bakunin’s term “anarchy” moves away from the project of anarchism. Anarchy is life 
(“spontaneous life,” “a tremendous awakening of passions and aspirations”)
119
 – not its 
organizing principle or law, but the condition of possibility of any revolution or conversion, what 
Hyacinth understands as “immense underworld, peopled with a thousand forms of revolutionary 
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passion and devotion” (330). Bakunin’s amorphism and anarchy are philosophical rather than 
political (or anti-political) concepts, and as such announce Emmanuel Levinas’s definition of 
anarchy as a pre-political notion, prior to any politics (prior in the conceptual rather than the 
temporal sense): “It would be self-contradictory to set it up as a principle,” Levinas says. 
“Anarchy cannot be sovereign, like an arche. It can only disturb the State – but in a radical way, 
making possible the moments of negation without any affirmation. The State then cannot set 
itself up as a Whole. But on the other hand, anarchy can be stated. Yet, disorder has an 
irreducible meaning, as refusal of synthesis.”
120
 Neither a movement, nor a theory of revolution, 
nor revolutionary praxis based on socio-economic parameters, but, as Simon Critchley defines it, 
“an interstitial distance within the state.”
121
 It is a force of spontaneous spacing and fissuring 
within the state, within society, or any form for that matter, which disallows its solidification into 
identity with itself. For Hyacinth, then, revolution is anarchy rather than anarchism:  
[His was a] sense, vividly kindled and never quenched, that the forces secretly arrayed 
against the present social order the pervasive and universal in the air one breathed, in the 
ground one trod, in the hand of an acquaintance that one might touch, or the eye of a 
stranger that might rest a moment upon one’s own. They were above, below, within, 
without, in every contact and combination of life; and it was no disproof of them to say it 
was too odd that they should lurk in a particular improbable form. To lurk in improbable 
forms was precisely their strength. (486) 
These are the forces of anarchy – the transformative process of spacing and fissuring of every 
form. Understood in that way, anarchy is a way of rethinking our relation to any sovereignty, be 
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it of a state or a form of personal identity. If anarchy exists as an interstitial force – William 
James’s “interstitial alteration” – creating cracks and crevices within the social body, it is also a 
force that, as Levinas indicates, creates a pre-political space of in-betweeness within which 
meanings and identities are negotiated and converted. In a letter to Sarah Wyman Whitman, 
William James follows this very logic when he names these interstices the capillary “crannies of 
the world”:  
I am against bigness and greatness in all their forms; and [I am] with the invisible 
molecular moral forces that work from individual to individual, stealing in through the 
crannies of the world like so many soft rootlets or like the capillary oozing of water, and 
yet rending the hardest monuments of man’s pride, if you give them time. The bigger the 
unit you deal with, the hollower, the more brutal, the more mendacious is the life 
displayed. So I am against all big organizations as such, national ones first and foremost, 
against all big successes and big results, and in favor of the eternal forces of truth which 
always work in the individual and immediately unsuccessful way, under-dogs always, till 
history comes after they are long dead, and puts them on the top.
122
 
An interstitial space of sheer impersonal potentiality that parallels William James’s infinitely 
expansive margin, or Henry James’s “field of immediate life.” On this reading, Hyacinth’s 
suicide at end of The Princess is more significant than James’s pessimistic or politically 
conservative refusal of social change – it is an impossibility of the affirmation of form. The 
novel closes with an image of Hyacinth’s dead body turned into indiscernible, shapeless mass: 
when the Princess entered his dark room, “her eyes had attached themselves to the small bed. 
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There was something on it – something black, something ambiguous, something outstretched” 
(590).  
  
III Aesthetics: “The Rich Principle of the Note” 
In 1884, the year he began working on The Princess, James published his novelistic manifesto 
“The Art of Fiction.” This short essay was a response to Walter Besant’s lecture “The Art of 
Fiction,” delivered earlier the same year.
123
 Besant’s blatantly proscriptive text ventures to 
declare the “laws of fiction,” three of which caught James’s attention: that “the novelist must 
write from his experience,” that his “characters must be real and such as might be met with 
actual life,” and that “the most important point of all is the story.”
124
 James’s reply to Besant was 
not intended as a serious engagement with or refutation of the latter’s ludicrous prescripts, which 
had been anyway repudiated by everyone. Instead, James used the essay as a platform for 
professing his own literary views, which he was immediately then to put into practice in The 
Princess. 
James’s argument in “The Art of Fiction” proceeds from rejecting Besant’s insistence on 
literature’s “conscious moral purpose,” and centers on art’s freedom and essential amorality: 
“The good health of an art which undertakes so immediately to reproduce life must demand that 
it be perfectly free”; “We must grant the artist his subject, his idea, what the French call his 
donnée; our criticism is applied only to what he makes of it”’; “Questions of art are questions (in 
the widest sense) of execution; questions of morality are quite another affair, and will you not let 
us see how it is that you find it so easy to mix them up?” (AF 56, 62-63). But the artistic freedom 
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James advocates becomes in his essay identical with “the strange irregular rhythm of life”
 
(AF 
58) that novels are tasked with representing. Having preliminarily agreed with Besant that art, in 
being a representation of life, is essentially the expression of writer’s experience (“The only 
reason for the existence of a novel is that it does attempt to represent life”; “A novel is in its 
broadest definition a personal impression of life” [AF 46, 50])” James turns Besant’s decree on 
its head by equating writer’s experience with his impressions of life: 
The power to guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implication of things, to judge 
the whole piece by the pattern, the condition of feeling life, in general, so completely that 
you are well on your way to knowing any particular corner of it – this cluster of gifts may 
almost be said to constitute experience, and they occur in country and in town, and in the 
most differing stages of education. If experience consists of impressions, it may be said 
that impressions are experience, just as (have we not seen it?) they are the very air we 
breathe. Therefore, if I should certainly say to a novice, “Write from experience, and 
experience only,” I should feel that this was a rather tantalising monition if I were not 
careful immediately to add, “Try to be one of the people on whom nothing is lost!” (AF 
53)  
If “impressions are experience” but also “the very air we breathe,” then experience, itself the 
very air we breathe, is equivalent to unprocessed impression, or what James elsewhere calls the 
“blind,” “stupid,” “clumsy life” (AN 121), indeed the very air. “The province of art is all life, all 
feeling, all observation, all vision,” James clarifies further. “As Mr. Besant so justly intimates, it 
is all experience” (AF 59). But experience is also “the condition of feeling life,” as the passage 
above indicates – the condition, in other words, of being alive (which should not be confused 




aligns closely with William’s contemporaneous concept of “immediate feltness” from “On Some 
Omissions of Introspective Psychology,” as he distinguishes it from “its perception by a 
subsequent act of reflection.”
125
 Henry’s aesthetics operates, thus, on the same principle as 
William’s ontology, as both suppose a gap between immediate sensation (life, experience) and 
reflection (emotion, narrative). And both, consequently, require that the former be converted into 
the latter. James says as much in “The Art of Fiction” reformulating Besant’s rule about writer’s 
reliance on experience: 
It is excellent and inconclusive to say that one must write from experience. … What kind 
of experience is intended, and where does it begin and end? Experience is never limited 
and it is never complete; it is an immense sensibility, a kind of huge spider-web, of the 
finest silken threads, suspended in the chamber of consciousness and catching every air-
borne particle in its tissue. It is the very atmosphere of the mind; and when the mind is 
imaginative … it takes to itself the faintest hints of life, it converts the very pulses of the 
air into revelations. (AF 52) 
Unending, never-ending, “the very atmosphere of the mind” Henry’s definition of experience 
follows William James’s infinitely expanding field of consciousness I discussed in Part One, 
formulated in his Lecture IX on Conversion in The Varieties of Religious Experience: “The 
important fact which this “field” formula commemorates is the indetermination of the margin. 
Our whole past store of memories floats beyond this margin, ready at a touch to come in; and the 
entire mass of residual powers, impulses, and knowledges that constitute our empirical self 
stretches continuously beyond it.”
126
 The pulses of air – the raw sensations of “stupid life” – 
ought to be converted into artistic revelations.  
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“The Art of Fiction” has served as the basis for the standard view of James’s aesthetic 
method, cemented eighty years ago by Richard P. Blackmur. According to this view, James’s 
narratives filter the unruly chaos of life (“the very pulses of the air”) through a single 
consciousness: “The subject of art was life, or more particularly someone’s apprehension of the 
experience of it, and in striving truly to represent it art removed the waste and muddlement and 
bewilderment in which it is lived, and gave it a lucid, intelligent form” (AN xiv-xv).
127
 The form 
of James’s art is a narrative framed by character’s experience of life. Form, the opposite of 
amorousness and bewilderment, is therefore a recognizable structure, the parts of which relate to 
each other and to the whole according to the laws of causality, temporality, identity, 
signification, narratability, etc. On this reading, James does in his novels precisely what he 
insists that he does in the New York Edition prefaces: his writing converts “the immediate field 
of life” into “the reflected field of life” (AN 65). Characters that James identifies as “a reflecting 
and colouring medium” (AN 67), or more simply as “registers or ‘reflectors’” (AN 300), filter 
the unruly sensations and impressions of life (what we have seen James call the “immediate field 
of life”) into a narrative or “the reflected field of life” (AN 65): “Every question of form,” James 
explains in the preface to The Ambassadors, is therefore urgently reduced to “employing but one 
centre and keeping it all within [the] hero’s compass” (AN, 317). Through the central 
consciousness – character’s but also writer’s – art sculpts “the strange irregular rhythm of life” 
(AF 58) into coherence.  
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Yet, this view of James’s ostensibly remainderless economy of the relationship between 
art and life bifurcates into two mutually related problems. Just as the thesis about artistic 
conversion presupposes that art remain detached from the “stupid life” it recycles into meaning, 
the postulate of a reflecting consciousness presumes that the filtering mind be somehow 
abstracted from the process by which it converts experience into a narrative. Art and 
consciousness are, thus, nominally seen as transcendent structures, unscathed by the conversions 
they conduct and host. But when James advises the young writer in “The Art of Fiction” to “try 
to be one of the people on whom nothing is lost!” (AF 53) he is repeating word for word his own 
description of his protagonist from The Princess: “Everything which, in a great city, could touch 
the sentient faculty of a youth on whom nothing was lost ministered to his conviction that there 
was no possible good fortune in life of too ‘quiet’ an order for him to appreciate” (PC 164). 
Hyacinth’s infinitely expanding field of consciousness, like “a huge spider web catching every 
air-borne particle in its tissue,” is what artist ought to rely on, according to James. Art too 
happens, in other words, in the interstitial space, which as we have seen in Part Two of this 
chapter, is the place of anarchy, spacing, negotiating and converting the unnarratable subliminal 
experiences into storied coherence. 
In the Preface to The Princess James recounts the birth of his novel:  
This fiction proceeded quite directly, during the first year of a long residence in London, 
from the habit and the interest of walking the streets. I walked a great deal – for exercise, 
for amusement, for acquisition … and as to do this was to receive many impressions, so 
the impressions worked and sought an issue, so the book after a time was born. It is a fact 
that, as I look back, the attentive exploration of London, the assault directly made by the 




prime idea was unmistakeably the ripe round fruit of perambulation. (AN 59, emphasis 
added) 
James’s method of acquiring material for his stories appears to follow the affective protocol laid 
out in William James’s “On Some Omissions”: an impression “falls on a sense-organ” triggering 
a bodily change which subsequently produces an emotion. And here: having assaulted him 
during a walk, impressions generate a mutation that eventually yields a story. The pattern is the 
same as the one allegedly behind Hyacinth’s unexpected questioning of Pinnie, which was also 
triggered by a walk (“Hyacinth could never have told you why the crisis occurred on such a day, 
why his question broke out at that particular moment” [PC 166]), as well as the one, more 
generally, that instigates Hyacinth’s “lively inward revolutions.” In all three cases, the assault of 
dumb life is silently converted into a “reflective field” – either of art or of an emotion. 
But to depict Hyacinth’s inward revolution, James needed anarchy: 
My scheme called for the suggested nearness (to all our apparently ordered life) of some 
sinister anarchic underworld, heaving in its pain, its power and its hate; a presentation not 
of sharp particulars, but of loose appearances, vague motions and sounds and symptoms, 
just perceptible presences and general looming possibilities. To have adopted the scheme 
was to have had to meet the question of one’s “notes” … My notes then … were exactly 
my gathered impressions and stirred perceptions, the deposit in my working imagination 
of all my visual and all my constructive sense of London. The very plan of my book had 
in fact directly confronted me with the rich principle of the Note. … To take [notes] was 
as natural as to look, to think, to feel, to recognize, to remember, as to perform any act of 
understanding. … Notes had been in other words the things one couldn’t not take. (AN 




We have seen already that for James, as in this passage, life is only apparently ordered, and in 
fact always in close proximity to an anarchic underworld (“immediate field”) of disorderly 
impressions. What is striking in this passage, however, is not James’s view of life as disordered, 
but his notion of writing as governed by “the rich principle of the Note.” Notes are what one 
cannot not take – they are, indeed, the uncontrollably assaulting impressions: “I think of them as 
even still – dreadfully changed [converted] for the worse in respect to any romantic idea as I find 
them – breaking out on occasion into eloquence, throwing out deep notes from their vast vague 
murmur” (AN 60). The vast murmur breaking out is the very anarchic underworld of disorderly 
impressions, populating the infinitely expansive margin of the field of consciousness, only to 
break out from time to time, without any order or control. Surprising for a writer obsessed with 
novelistic form, writing on this account appears to be an impersonal affair of the “pervious and 
leaky margin,” incessantly reshaped by the intrusions of notes. Maurice Blanchot once called this 
method James’s “excess, perhaps a touch of madness against which he tries to protect 
himself.”
128
 It is madness, as James himself explicates in the Preface to The Spoils of Poynton 
(AN 120), at the heart of which lies a method which converts the stupid life into art. But no 
matter how methodical it may purport to be, the method is still maddening, always effectuating 
“a change for the worse” because, as Blanchot puts it, “the essence of James’s art [are] the joys 
of creation, which coincide with the pure indeterminacy of the work… : each instant to produce 
the entire work present and, even behind the constructed and limited work that he shapes, to 
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In August 1885, while The Princess was still being serialized in the Atlantic Monthly, 
James jotted down in his Notebook this joyous anxiety about his novel’s indeterminacy:  
It is absolutely necessary that at this point I should make the future evolution of The 
Princess Casamassima more clear to myself. I have never yet become engaged in a novel 
in which, after I had begun to write and send off my MS., the details had remained so 
vague. … The subject of The Princess is magnificent, and if I can only give up my mind 
to it properly – generously and trustfully – the form will shape itself as successfully as the 
idea deserves. I have plunged in rather blindly, and got a good many characters on my 
hands; but these will fall into their places if I keep cool and think it out. Oh art, art, what 




While the “hollowing desert,” like the unintelligible sameness of “stupid life,” awaits art to 
convert it into meaning, the novel’s narrative remains open – indeed, perennially open to 
incessant assaults and break-outs of the Note.  
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